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Abstract
The dissertation analyzes digitization through a phenomenological lens,
understanding the digitization as an “outgrowth” of a potential that was always
already latent within our being as the human-being. The analysis primarily utilizes
the philosophic work of the 20th century philosophers, Martin Heidegger and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Through their philosophies, I seek to synthesize Heidegger’s concept of
de-severance with Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of embodiment and the world as
possessing depth. In doing so, I bring these theoretical concepts together to build
a phenomenological “picture” of how it is that the digitization of the world came
into being. All the while, my ultimate project is seeking and displaying the
underlying drive, or will, that occurs when human de-severance, our particular
embodiment, and our unique access to the world as depth discover within the
world the potential to digitize.
This will, and the result of the interplay between human de-severance,
embodiment, and the world’s depth is the-will-to-flatten. In putting forth this
theory, I analyze how the will-to-flatten via digitization has influenced our
understandings and engagement with embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity.
While I argue that the will-to-flatten is the driving force of digitization, I ultimately
seek to display that the telos of this will is a paradox that cannot be resolved.
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Introduction
“Generalization of the problem: there was a passage to the infinite as objective infinity-This passage was a thematization (and forgetting) of the Offenheit, of the Life-World
(Lebenswelt)--We have to start anew from behind that point.”
–

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, (166)

The world has become increasingly digitized and will only continue to be
impacted by this digitization. Digitization, clearly denoting the material transition
from analog to digital, but given the context of this dissertation, will primarily be
analyzed phenomenologically as an ontological phenomenon in the attempt to
better understand the driving force “behind” digitization. One straightforward
reason for the significance of this endeavor is that digitization has become an
indispensable facet of modernity’s reality. So ubiquitous is digitization to the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that, much like air, there is a tendency
to presuppose its presence. Digitization’s existence has so fully saturated our
lives that it’s easy to overlook just how vital it is to the contemporary moment, but
one need not worry. We won’t be able to forget for too long, as we are being
reminded by a significant flow of scholarship - scholarship that informs us just
how digital technologies and media not only exist with us, but how they are
literally changing the world itself, for better or worse. And this work has
established essential arguments and conversation points in regards to how we
should treat digitization as we move towards the future, where human and the
digital continue to merge.
For example, Marshall McLuhan, a visionary of digital media and its
implications, published an eye-opening text in 1964, Understanding Media: The
Extensions of Man. This text established a vital recognition that the medium, and
by that McLuhan means the tangible technology itself, whether ancient or new,
fundamentally alters the way we live our lives, influencing even our actions and
thoughts (8). A television does not simply present us with discrete images. The
television itself alters the structure of the home; where we sit and converse with
1

friends and loved ones is changed by the presence of the television. Anne
Friedberg’s The Virtual Window brings us back to the screen, not simply as a
tangible apparatus, but as the metaphoric window through which so many of us
encounter each and every day. She writes, “The frame of the screen is a closed
system, a primary container for inset secondary and tertiary frames that may
recede in mise en abyme, but also converge to reunite within a grander but still
bounded frame” (241). The realities of our screens are paramount to our
fundamental understanding of the world and others, Friedberg tells us. Screens
both frame and filter, and hence, framing always produces a double
phenomenon. The frame simultaneously includes while it excludes.
But do we consider this exclusion, or unquestioningly take what is
included as our existence? What is being framed? What is not? We must
continue to ask ourselves these questions in the age of the screen or our realties
will be shaped by it. Douglas Rushkoff, in Program or Be Programmed, urges us
in a similar vein to confront our digital technology and media devices as active
users, and not to be unknowingly swayed by their potential power. He states,
“Understanding programing - either as a real programmer or even, as I’m
suggesting, as more of a critical thinker - is the only way to truly know what’s
going on in a digital environment, and to make willful choices about the roles we
play” (8). Our technologies, and those who control them, are programming us,
Rushkoff insists. We must know the program, the digital code, or at least be
cognizant of it if we wish to reprogram ourselves. Meanwhile, Nicholas Carr
investigates digital technologies and their capacity to change the human brain in
What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains: The Shallows. Much like Socrates’
warning in The Phaedrus, Carr addresses digital technology’s increasing
capacity to act as an extension of the mind, potentially diminishing our own
memory (Plato, 551-552). Our smart phones hold the numbers of our contacts,
scheduled appointments, and link us to Wikipedia, where so much of our human
knowledge resides - so why actually remember any of this as one’s own? Carr’s
The Shallows displays to us that our brains are literally being altered, our
2

synapses rewired. We are becoming as mechanistic as our machines, as timely
as our clocks. We’re losing our attention just as we become models of capitalistic
efficacy, paradoxically leaving only our technology with the more “human”
qualities, such as our emotions. Carr witnesses this transfer of qualities in
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey, where in the end, the artificial
intelligence HAL is the only figure that resonates qualities we consider most
“human.” HAL feels for its life, pleads for it. Human intelligence, in comparison,
so mediated, so altered by the computers we constantly use, appears “flattened,”
– mechanistic (224).
And yet, insisting upon a more positive position, Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford,
and Joshua Green confront digitization and its ability to transmit Spreadable
Media. Together, the three display the ease with which the digital technologies
we engage with link the world as one, spreading information in a vast, almost
instantaneous manner. We are all connected via digitization. A YouTube video
uploaded in Iraq can fundamentally, and quickly, impact human values and
meaning on a global scale, a thesis that was arguably prophesized by Walter
Benjamin in his seminal essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction. Reproducible technology, which increasingly turns works of art
into discrete images, strips from them their particular space and time, their aura,
allowing us to recreate and then transmit art all over the globe, politicizing it. Who
controls the dissemination of this art, as well as the message attached to it? Now
governments and corporations can use art as a means to an end, for profit,
democracy, or even fascistic purposes. But what if the citizens take charge?
What if citizens not only consume, but through a global public sphere of
technological interconnection, reclaim art, creating its message apart from any
higher institutional power? But this means we must still use digitization in order to
save the world, does it not? Carr’s fear, envisioned through HAL, might still be
realized even as we work to save everything. Engagement with digital technology
is impossible to abandon in our contemporary moment.
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Considering such a dystopia, Jaron Lanier takes a reflective step back
with You Are Not Your Gadget. Here Lanier insists that one can engage digital
technology yet learn when to “disconnect” in order to find and center oneself to
be more authentic in the face of the bombardment that Benjamin, Carr, and so
many others have warned us of. He notes that, “The antihuman approach to
computation is one of the most baseless ideas in history. A computer isn’t even
there unless a person experiences it” (26). Citizens, all of us, must be active
users, but in order to avoid acquiring the qualities of our gadgets, we must also
require time for disconnecting. What a conundrum we are in.
And yet, at the same time, we have David Trend’s Worlding, as well as
Jane McGonigal’s Reality Is Broken, encouraging us to invest ourselves; no,
immerse ourselves in virtual reality and digital games. Reality, the world, is
broken, they insist, and perhaps it has always been. Could reality be fixed? Yes,
but in order to fix reality, we must turn to our games and virtual worlds in order to
discover a more utopic state within our technology, which may just resonate
positive qualities within ourselves. Could learning from games and virtual worlds
resolve our own problems in “the real world” when we “disconnect?” These two,
and many others, convincingly inform us that a proper engagement with
digitization might just save our rather “broken” existence. We might just bring our
digitally reprogrammed selves back into the world, which so desperately
demands fixing.
All of the positions presented above certainly have differences in opinion,
scope, and especially how we should engage the digitized world, but there is
consensus, an identical vein that courses through all of these texts: the world is
becoming digital, and as it does, everything is changing, even the human being.
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Is Digitization Fundamentally Altering the World and Human
Experience?
The list of contributors to the theoretic and practical recognition that digital
technologies, encompassed by digitization as it broadly refers to this
phenomenon, goes far beyond the scope of the list mentioned above. However,
the message, though contradictory at times, is again transparently clear. Digital
technologies are everywhere, and all facets of the world face inevitable change,
or perhaps the change has already taken place from the devices that impact
such areas as gaming, augmented reality, virtual reality, artificial intelligence,
media, communications, economics, sociopolitical relations, and even everyday
appliances such as one’s car and clock. These digitized technologies, this
digitization, has had (and will continue to have) a profound change on the world,
human existence, and our own condition. This much is evident by an abundance
of digital theorists. Our human experience, as well as the world itself, where all of
us collectively reside, has been fundamentally altered, these scholars inform us.
We now have virtual worlds “apart” from real-world embodied and special
existence. Perhaps these other worlds, better worlds, will save this one we
currently consider home? What we need to do now is understand this
fundamental transition called digitization, if only we wish to understand, cope
with, and control, these changes. Digitization, this new world, or even worlds, is
literally present all around us. We must inform ourselves, then act, these scholars
all demand of us.
We can no longer ignore the digitization of the world. We can no longer
allow digitization’s ubiquity to numb us to its presence, as well as its
consequences. A seemingly endless degree of technology – old and new, as well
as that which is destined to come - has and is increasingly digitizing the world.
We know this to be a fact, if only we take a moment to observe the world around
us. Then we too may ask ourselves, is reality, the world itself, “broken” due to
digitization? Or was reality broken before, and digitization our savior in disguise?
Is the world fundamentally changing due to digitization? Strained attention spans,
5

a sense of isolation, global terror, drone attacks, cyber hacking, online bullying,
child pornography, digital propaganda, the potential weakening of international
sovereignty laws that facilitate the illegal sharing and downloading of content, or
the leaking of government information, and the increased effect of national
isolationism. To be sure, all of these issues, which are just to name a few, do
plague us today. And all these issues, as is so reiterated within the public sphere,
academic or exterior, if not directly due to the world’s digitization, are further
exacerbated by it. But on the other side, the brighter side, the claim is that
digitization is in fact the very means by which we might fix a reality that perhaps
was broken to begin with, change it, as it were. For example, gaming to prepare
oneself for real life events, teamwork in online space, improved concentration,
more engaging classrooms, a new wave of international communication,
communicating with a loved one far away as time and space compress, greater
recognition and acceptance of human difference, and the building of alternate
worlds (better worlds) in virtual space. All these examples, and many more,
appear to be positive aspects of the digitization of our world.
The narrative here, fueled by the conversation that has emerged around
the topic, is resoundingly clear. Technologies that enable a digital-experience
have, and are, continuing to change reality on a grand scale. And as the world
becomes digitized, in all of its variant forms, it is our moral duty to contemplate
the degree to which our world is becoming better or worse. We must
acknowledge this, because we cannot escape it. Think about it: the odds are
quite high that this text is coming to you from some type of digital screen,
impacting both your physical and cognitive experience. The digital camera on
your laptop, smart phone, or tablet sits waiting for you, ready to digitize an image
of you or anything possessed within your line of sight. The world itself waits in
preparation, ready to be turned into discrete digital code, then uploaded in
another world – the world of digital space. A numeric sequence of ones and
zeros now endlessly reside within countless hard drives, which interconnect, so
as to be transmitted to a new location through the ease of touching only a few
6

digital buttons. A reality within the world of technological reproduction that even
Walter Benjamin might be shocked by, were he still alive today.
A screen inside of the primary screen, which currently captivates your
sight, may even present a distant location to you while you read this work,
distance overcome. Two worlds become one, mediated through the Interconnect.
It is of course possible to engage this text while a YouTube video maintains its
telos in the corner as the location where the world becomes condensed,
streaming your favorite music video, maybe even suggesting videos, as it
algorithmically learns from your patterns of digital engagement. Or perhaps you’ll
minimize our conversation to view a live stream of a loved one over Skype. The
global distance that separates you from your loved ones can now be joined, their
presence brought near. You might even be wearing a digital retinal display,
projecting the textual image directly onto the contour of your eyes. Your eyes,
voice, hands, and basic body movements attuned to the reality that is displayed
via this fascinating, new technology. The previous limits of space, and the time
required to traverse it, feel more at ease with your passions for connection. In
The Language of New Media, Lev Manovich argues that time and space
experience a compression as technology advances and achieves “telepresence”
(165). The world itself has imploded into your smart phone, only to then explode
as the opening to a world of endless possibility for you, allowing you the gift of
presence where your material body currently isn’t. You can now connect with this
writing, as well as with the writing of others, without even the need to move from
the couch. A quick visit to Amazon allows you to download any text. Our digitized
world would surely seem to be a state of opulent magic in comparison to the
distance that was not to be overcome by those before us.
But, what if I have made too great of an assumption? What if you still find
joy in the tactile sense and smell of a paper book? Though a technological relic,
the paper book, magazine, or newspaper clearly haven’t entirely lost our
attention. Flipping through the pages of a new or used book has a tendency to
produce a nostalgic, calming sensation. Much like the taste of the madeleine
7

transcends Proust’s main protagonist in The Search of Lost Time to another
location, so too can the aroma of a paper book. Analog paper books and vinyl
records may well be making a return, as some long for a world less saturated in
digitization. But saturated in digitization we are, whether one enjoys it or not. The
ubiquity of the digital world is most certainly near your objective location. You are
not “alone,” at least not digitally alone. Other digital worlds continually enact
themselves all around us each and every second. However invisible they may be
as one walks the halls of one’s home, these digital worlds wait for us to tap into
them. The worlds in digital virtual space will immerse us, if only we let them.
These worlds will surely consume our sense of space, time, and even self, as
Jane McGonigal so beautifully displays in her text, SuperBetter: The Power of
Living Gamefully.
But again, how often do we reflect to consider the changes that digitization
has had on our lives, as well as changes on a grander scale, a world scale? In
the Philosophical Investigations, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein writes, “The
aspect of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity and familiarity” (50). What does Wittgenstein mean by this? Digitization,
the technological devices that now proliferate the world, which connect so many
of us to a constant stream of information, other people, games, and virtual worlds
may not warrant the label simple, but they do permeate existence. Are we too
familiar with digitization to notice its effects, to question digitization itself? The
children of today have literally been born into the digital age, they are digital
natives at birth, whether they know it or not. In fact, one day soon we may no
longer know of a world where digital immigrants reside. To have an iPhone or
Android phone placed into one’s hands in the first few years of life certainly
naturalizes the reality of digitization, but were those before these tangible devices
knowledgeable of digitization? The iPhone, which struck so many with a sense of
fascination in 2007, the year of its release, is now but a commonality of the world.
How odd it might strike us, only eleven years later, to witness someone picking
up the same phone and displaying a sense of amazement. The wonder inherent
8

in digitization’s impact on our lives has become sterilized due to its
everydayness, its commonality. As digital devices become such an integral
aspect of our lives, their presence becomes more difficult for us to acknowledge.
Given our contemporary moment, what is more ready-to-hand, to use Martin
Heidegger’s term, than our digital technologies? When a technology is ready-tohand, it simply works and fulfills its given task; it is “in its place,” so to speak.
What’s ready-to-hand we almost never question; instead, we engage it as a
practical actuality, a means to something else, and in doing so it falls into the
backdrop of our perception.
Considering another Heideggerian term, it is also true that we’ve become
digitized if we turn to the occasions when our digital technologies fail us. In these
moments, our technology presents itself to us in a different manner, it is presentto-hand, and we stumble in confusion, awakening to the sense of loss and
disorder before us. From the Internet to digital banking, digital clocks, digitized
global economies, digital classrooms, to even the increasing digitization of our
cars and general transportation, one thing should become clear to us: digitization
is all around. And when digitization escapes us, when it fails, we feel lost –
exposed to the world, and the distance it places upon our embodiment. We lose
our world, so to speak, we lose our mastery, our telos recognized via digitization.
Or, have we simply gone too far? There is now no doubt that digitization
has become a vital facet of daily life, but is it a fundamental change of our world,
of the human condition, our ontology (our fundamental being), which we are so
often reminded of? When we turn our attention to the narrative that is presented
to us, it doesn’t seem that the claim, “we lose our world” when digitization fails, is
in any way incorrect. And in some ways, given Heidegger’s notion of present-tohand, and Wittgenstein’s claims to familiarity, they are correct. We have shown
this. The issues encompassing digitization, as well as the disclosure of these
issues to a wider audience, resonate with all of us. Discussing digitization,
whether it is a specific technology, or more esoteric inquiry tends to captivate us and it should. We can all sense that digitization is having an impact on our lives.
9

The narratives surrounding digitization is as ubiquitous as digitization is itself. But
what is it that is changing? Has the human being fundamentally changed
ontologically in the face of digitization’s creation? And if so, how? These are the
questions I wish to dwell upon and come at anew through a phenomenological
lens.
Has this assertion that “digitization is changing everything,” the human
experience and its condition itself, been positioned upon certain presuppositions
as well? That is to say, does the conversation surrounding digitization, academic
or otherwise, tend to unknowingly engage in major presupposes regarding the
essential being of the digital? While the scholarship on digitization does realize
and engage with the need to reflect and analyze digital phenomenon, it so often
takes the materiality of the analog and digital technologies, what is directly before
us, as its point of initial departure.
The issue with this is that theorizations of digitization, centered around a
materialistic (or even an intellectualist) point of view, presuppose their own
philosophic metaphysical framework, which in turn directly influence the
conclusions that are made. A position whereby subject and object remain
distinct, easily allows for a misconception that the world is experiencing
fundamental changes via the emergence of digital technologies. Because of this,
it is not my intention to dismiss the claims that have been made about digitization
outright, rather it is to take a phenomenological approach to ascertaining the
phenomenon of digitization prior to making any direct claims on its potential for
fundamental “worldly,” or human, change. Digitization, being a term that will
become increasingly defined throughout the course of this analysis, is here to be
understood as an ontological phenomenon, one where the subject/object
dichotomy is called into philosophic question. A phenomenological analysis will
serve to unmask preconceived metaphysical standpoints, allowing for an
ontology that discovers the digital as a natural “outgrowth” of the human
condition, and more importantly as an outgrowth of a will that underlies the
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nature of this condition. And the will I speak of, which will come to be defined as
the-will-to-flatten, cannot be reduced to materialism.
That having been said, a materialist understanding of digitization, one
based upon a subject verse object dichotomy, does produce worthwhile
knowledge and contemplation on the experiences of a digital world. It’s true that
digitization is often times too close, too familiar, too ready-to-hand, to be seen by
us. The scholarship listed sees the digital as a significant issue to contemporary
psychology, sociology, communication, epistemology, politics, etc., this much is
certain, but it fails to consider the undercurrent that drives digitization’s very
being into existence. It is true that were digitization to evaporate from the world,
within an instant, unfathomable problems would quickly present themselves.
Billions of human beings currently have an interconnected dependence upon the
materiality of the digital, the global economy certainly does. But is “dependence”
a sign of the world and the human undergoing fundamental changes, or have we
made ourselves merely more vulnerable through our will towards digitization, with
all of the potential powers it bestows upon us when it works? The question rarely
asked is, what is digitization? What underlies digitization, what is driving it into
existence at all? How is it possible that the human being, and our unique
interplay with the world allowed for digitization to emerge at all?
Given these questions, I ask is digitization changing the human condition
on a fundamental level? Has digitization, as a seemingly profound technological
advance in our ability to manipulate reality, often by converting it into discrete
data, which can then be transmitted and shared with others, changed our human
condition? One might say it is now possible to build new worlds through
computational data alone, worlds that can evolve and change. We can produce
artificial intelligence that actually engages with us on an interactive level, which
we learn from, and have a meaningful connection to. Our drive towards
digitization has allowed us to open the sky, land on distant planets and even
comets. Who knows what else is on the horizon, how close we may get to what is
most empirically distant. But the question once again is, has this changed the
11

human condition and the world as it presents or “opens” itself to us? Has our
condition been “expanded” with digitization, or has it been impacted? Here we
must begin to be careful with our words, as fundamental, impact, and change
possess different meaning.
Considering these questions, Wittgenstein’s quotation shines light upon
the reason that the narrative of digitization, as fundamentally world changing,
even human changing, appeals so greatly to us. When reading such texts, we
once again discover a sense of amazement in our digital devices. As digitization
on a narrow or broad scale is held up in isolation against our reflection, its impact
on our lives becomes visible. But impact is different than announcing a
fundamental change, whether it be to the world or our own human experience.
Can the two be disentangled? Again and again, these narratives, which are so
familiar, not only awaken a sense of wonderment in the face of digitization, but
they also insist that change is taking place even to our own human condition.
Does the story we are so often told about digital technology rest on any
presuppositions? Have they gone too far with the claims of digitization as a grand
change to the world and the human being?
I wish to propose this thesis: digitization has (and is continuing to have) a
vast impact on the world and human life, especially our intersubjectivity;
however, examined phenomenologically, it is not the fundamental change to the
world or human condition, which is so often presented to us in contemporary
scholarship. Why, one might ask? Put simply, to fundamentally change the world
and our own condition, as human beings, would require that the world, our
embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity as a particular openness to the world,
change their condition. And while the world and our being have been impacted,
we will continue to show that it has not changed.
But what is meant by all of this? The world, human condition, openness,
and fundamental change versus impact – all of these concepts may feel too
ambiguous at the moment. In order to clarify this, we will engage the philosophy
of phenomenology, developed in the early twentieth century by the late Edmond
12

Husserl, a project, that is vast and has evolved since its inception into the cannon
of human knowledge. Guided by phenomenology we will discover a greater
sense/meaning in the terms and the presupposition that is so grounded in
contemporary digital media and technology scholarship on the subject of the
digital. In doing so, I will present the case for why digitization appears to be a
fundamental change to the world and the human condition, when it is in fact an
impact that has “arisen” from a fundamental condition, a condition that in truth,
has seen not fundamentally changed to itself since the advent of digitization, but
rather drives it into being as an existential aspect of the human condition on a
transcendent level – that is, beyond the scope of any one individual human life.

Layout of Chapters
Chapter One – Phenomenology of Digitization: this chapter will function as a
chapter of clarification. Here I will specify how a phenomenological investigation
of digitization critiques a deeply rooted ideology held within digital media and
technologies studies, an ideology of the subject versus the object, empiricist or
intellectualist, which interpret the world in a particular manner.
Phenomenologically, I will turn to Martin Heidegger’s being-in-the-world as an
alternative starting point to the metaphysics of subject versus object. In doing so,
the terminology of world, de-severance, embodiment, depth, digitization, and
ultimately the-will-to-flatten will come into greater necessary light. This
clarification of terminology will be useful for the reader throughout the
dissertation, situating a more comprehensive understanding of the dissertation as
a whole, also allowing for the analysis of individual technologies in order to
display that while digitization has impacted the world and human condition, it has
not fundamentally changed the human ontology as the-will-to-flatten.
Again, we shall come to see that contemporary digital technologies are
often interpreted under an historically situated metaphysics of internal versus
external, which places the subject over and against the objects; the objects in
13

this case are our digital devices, which we encounter in the world. We will display
that the “disconnect” between subject and object is one situated under an
historically upheld metaphysics that places the relationship between the world
and the human condition, even one’s own self and embodiment, as distinct and
empirically discoverable within their own right. This ideological manner of
comprehending the world sets in motion presuppositions regarding our sense of
distance and space, a distance that allows us to state that there are “digital
worlds” apart from the world we all know, a claim we will dispute as incorrect.
The subject object dichotomy presupposes a sense of a distance between
the world, the human, and technology, viewed as “things,” or objects, in the
world. Under this classic dichotomy, the spatial and temporal “distance” that is
always between myself, as a subject, and the other objects in the world, which
are not currently visible to me, become objectively problematic. Digital
technologies appear as an “overcoming” of the problem of distance, which if we
understand the human condition and the world under the terms of
phenomenology, was never a problem, phenomenologically speaking, to begin
with.
The issue is that under these historic metaphysical terms, even one’s own
body, as the medium of perception and the world’s unconcealment, or the very
manner in which the world “opens,” constantly presents itself as meaningful to
us, also becomes an object. What is presupposed through the subject object
dichotomy is human embodiment as a consistent correlative to the world, a
non-reducible medium, or existential, by which the world possesses certain
meaningful experiences to said embodiment. What’s more, the metaphysical
standpoint of the subject object dichotomy, often a presupposition of both
empiricism and idealism, inherently objectifies notions of the body, space, the
other, and even “self.” Objectification ultimately quantifies, measures, calculates,
and creates a taxonomy of differences, subsequently embedding an ideology that
places too great a space (or objective distance) between the subject and object.
Unsurprisingly, this ideology just mentioned is deeply rooted in our academic and
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social thinking such that it inherently invades the scholarly field of digital media
and technology studies.
Our intent, however, is not to state that this objectification, resting on the
subject object divide, is somehow inherently “wrong.” In fact, it is the functional
means by which humans, as a particular embodied relation to the world, have
apprehended the world in order for us to bring digital technologies into existence.
Digital technology depends on objectification. But is objectification all that there is
or all that is happening to us on an experiential level?
My argument is that objectification is the result of a certain type of human,
embodied existence. Our interest rests in the interplay of embodiment as a
particular situation that constantly works “itself” out reflectively, both individually
and more vitally intersubjectively, as a correlation to the world, which it is in and
always already a part of. As embodied “subject,” the world simultaneously
“conceals” and “reveals” itself due to its depth. And this is an experiential process
that happens prior to any objectification, whereby by we learn to idealize the
world and ourselves as subjects over and against objects that we perceive and
bring meaning to, ourselves.
What we often fail to comprehend is our relation to the world as a
particular type of embodied situation, whereby we always engage with anything
at all, whether it be our own “selves, or “external objects.” And this is a
simultaneous interplay of mutual engagement, resulting in a disclosure of
meaning and new experiences, as well as technological possibilities, that is
never fully finished or complete, and is constantly open to change – because we
are situated in-the-world as an embodiment perspective. We attempt to
understand our engagement with, as well as the implications of digital
technology, by exploring specific technologies via these phenomenological
terms. The hope is that we can gain a new understanding of our relationship to
digitization, not limited to the ideologies inherently entrenched in the
subject/object dichotomy, which often understand the digital as a new frontier.
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We will also sense that while digital technologies have had an impact on
the world and human condition, they have not changed it in any fundamental
way. In what way should we deal with the impacts of digitization after realizing
that the world and our own condition is fundamentally unaltered?
Chapter Two - Embodiment and Digitization: this chapter will explore human
embodiment as the manner that the human being is always already existentially
situated within the world and can never fully “extend” or separate into ulterior
worlds or realties beyond our de-servant being. I will explore digital virtual
technologies under the continued explication of the phenomenological concepts
that were developed in chapter one.
In doing so, throughout this chapter we will explore the phenomenological
experience of individual human embodiment as the inescapable and constant
involvement with a particular placement or situation, as well as the ground of deseverance. In order to do so, the chapter will explore such technologies as the
Oculus Rift– continually displaying embodiment’s fundamental interrelation to this
digital, virtual technology. Through the investigating of this technology, the reader
will come to better comprehend how human embodiment, engaged as one such
digital device as the Oculus Rift, not only brings the technology into existence,
but is always already grounded as an existential constant interrelation between
our particular body and a particular being-in-the-world (digital or not – as no
distention truly exists), which constantly forms and opens new meaningful
experiences. The Oculus opens aesthetic possibilities, which, while providing an
experience that can be learned from, like all experience, is not an escape from
the world into another, but is rather situationally bound to the potentials and
confines of embodiment.
Lastly, I will come to acknowledge that embodiment in the “real world” not
only impacts “digital worlds” and cultures, provided by the Oculus Rift, but is in
fact inseparable from one constant world of experience, which is the world that is
always mediated, and never escaped due to embodiment - even in the realm of
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the digital. We shall see that lived experience takes new aesthetic shape with our
digital technologies, but this does not mean that “new worlds” are possible, as
though these worlds could somehow be utterly distinct from embodiment and the
world of meaningful experience that situated de-severant being.
Chapter Three – Space and Digitization: Lev Manovich questioned the issue of
presence as it relates to distance and time in our digital era; in doing so, he
introduces his theory of telepresence. The concept Manovich opens is
undeniably of great importance, though we will stress that the underlying
foundation of any theory of telepresence is in fact situated on certain
presuppositions that I will unravel via this phenomenology of digitization.
In this chapter, I will analyze the issues of digitized presence within space,
digitization as the overcoming of empirical distance. This analysis will be guided
by the phenomenological concepts of de-severance, embodiment and space as
depth, which will add to the discussion of our “altered” perception of space in the
digital age. Examples of space in the digital age, one’s digital tele-presence will
focus on “real time” smart phone connection, reaching into locations far divorced
from one’s own empirical embodied location. Building off of the previous chapter,
I will make this leap by investing the issue of what it means to be present as deseverant within space phenomenologically understood through Merleau-Ponty’s
theory of depth, and the thickness of objects, concepts that inherently relate to
the perception of space as fundamentally changing via digitization.
What does it mean to be present is a significant philosophic question, and
how one addresses this issue influences the perception of technology and its
accomplishments. Within this chapter, the answers to perception, and the
overcoming of space, will unravel through the concept of de-severance, depth,
and the-will-to-flatten. At first glance, it may appear that the digital era has forced
us to question this concept anew. A question too often presupposed as obvious
has been reawakened in the digital age due to technologies such as
photography, film, and the surveillance camera – especially linked to one’s digital
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phone. However, we will begin from the perspective that presence – prior to the
digital era - is anything but obvious and is far too often misunderstood under the
ideologies of the subject/object dichotomy, missing de-severance.
By observing these technologies through a phenomenological lens, it will
become clear why theories such as Manovich’s ultimately “fall short.” What we
mean by this is that our theoretic lens will shed light on how and why Manovich
theorizes perception from a stance that is far too limiting. Though arguably
presupposed, Manovich consistently places the subject (or perceptual perceiver)
inside an objective body, which situates itself against a world of “material
objects,” which digital devices “extend” our presence into, or toward.
Our theoretic stance will argue that if space is limited, claims of objective
mathematics, little of the actual experience of presence (both its historic
ramifications, as well as its limitations) will be genuinely grasped under these
terms. The very reason that digital technology’s “compression” of space strikes
us as shocking and new is in fact a misunderstanding of human embodied
presence itself as de-severant. Furthermore, what is missed entirely is the
underlying will-to-flatten.
What will become clear is that our embodiment is always already situated
to worldly circumstances that anticipate what is not objectively ‘present,’ even
prior to digital emergence. The human de-severance is always situational, and
called on by the depth of space, which is more than what is objectively “against”
a subject. Digitization does not change this, digitization merely opens and
exacerbates ethical and moral considerations as one moves toward an
exploration of intersubjectivity and digitization, within a world where empirically
speaking, otherness is brought increasingly near by the-will-to-flatten.
Chapter Four - Intersubjective and Digitization: Within the previous chapters, the
embodied perspective of the “individual,” and this embodiment’s access to the
depth of space via de-severance, remain important, yet too confined. Because of
this, the fourth and final chapter will analyze digitization’s impact on
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intersubjectivity, ultimately looking toward the impact digitization is having, as the
will-to-flatten, on ethics. In this chapter, I will focus on Artificial Intelligence,
YouTube, and Facebook as experiences whereby digital technologies impact
intersubjective experience. In doing so, I will build upon the argument that
digitization resides within the-will-to-flatten, a will to make the farness vanish, and
ultimately to erode the depth of the world, even if this means the depth of the
other. My claim will be that the most profound impact of digital technologies is not
on our particular type of embodiment or escaping said embodiment for other
“worlds.” It is not the erosion of empirical space as distance. But, that digital
technologies have impacted our intersubjective experience, exacerbating the
scope of one’s situation, as well as allowing for an individual embodied
perspective to “take in” a larger scope of other experience than ever before,
though paradoxically allowing for a narrowing of this nearness – a closing off of
one’s phenomenological, intersubjective world. Our most profound contemporary
challenge is not in escaping the world for other worlds, which we will have shown
is not possible, but facing being-in-the-world with new ethical, moral, and political
questions in the wake of digitization’s impacts on the intersubjective experience.
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Chapter One: Phenomenology and Digitization
“…there was a passage to the infinite as objective infinity--This passage was a
thematization (and forgetting) of the Offenheit, of the Lebenswelt (*life-world) --We have
to start anew from behind that point”
–

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, (166)

Introduction
The intent of this chapter is clarification, especially for any reader unfamiliar with
the terminology, concepts, and theory of the philosophy of phenomenology.
Clarification will simultaneously link into the analysis of digitization and the-will-toflatten, hopefully enlightening what is meant by these concepts, which must to be
understood as the backbone of this phenomenological argument that runs
throughout the dissertation as a whole. If it is true that digitization has not altered
the fundamental ontology of the human being, but is rather the result of being-inthe-world, de-severant under a particular human embodiment, which “takes up”
space conceived of as depth, as I argue that it is, then some degree of context is
required. These italicized terms are rich with content and lead us toward the
realization that while digitization does not change our ontological condition, it
surely exacerbates certain innate human conditions and tendencies as the world
is brought continually nearer to us via digitization. This exacerbation, while not a
change of ontology, of our phenomenological condition, does impact the moral
and ethical implications of engaging with an increasingly digital world, where
what was once separated from an individual by an empirical distance (otherness,
for example) is increasingly brought into our world as we digitize, whether real or
virtual.

20

Phenomenology of the World: The phenomenology of being-inthe-world, and what led to it
Here the intention is to conceptualize the groundwork for a theory of the world
and its “digitization” as an all-encompassing framework to the lived experience of
our contemporary digital moment. A phenomenological theory of world is a
relatively underdeveloped concept in the analysis of digital media technology, in
the sense that this concept influences one’s perception of metaphysics and
ontology. For example, Don Idhe, in his text, Bodies in Technology, addresses
the phenomenological body as the site of knowing the world, digital or not, but
doesn’t delve into digitization or the will that underlies it. Digitization, understood
here is not simply an analysis of our tangible devices – from the computer and
the tablet, to smart phones, gaming systems, virtual realities, A.I. systems, etc. but the lived experience that all who confront digital technology are intended
“towards” as de-severant. In other words, we wish to better comprehend how
digital technology (broadly speaking), through the human condition, arose as a
tangible possible, and the subsequent effect of the technology on our individual
and collective intersubjective experience. This will ultimately lead toward futures
works that increasingly deal with the moral and ethical issues this theory of
digitization unfolds.
Lived experience means the primary opening of experience and
engagement with digitization’s impact on our lives, or how the world initially
presents itself as some-thing to be engaged – how we are first and foremost
caught up in the world as a matter of depth that we concern ourselves with
through various projects, both large and small, collective and individual. To avoid
slipping into confusion over the theory I wish to employ, we will begin by
addressing Edmond Husserl’s theory of the life-world as the all too often
presupposed “ground” by which the world always already opens, in various
manners, for the human being, which will lead into Heidegger’s analysis of beingin-the-world. Though it will be acknowledged that the human is not the selfcontained eternal “center” of experience, in the sense of the Cartesian cogito.
21

Still, it is imperative to recognize that we as human beings are always
experiencing “phenomena” or “things” via a particular manner, an embodied
schema to cite Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, which cannot be
overcome, whether tangible, imaginative, or digital (49). Our perceptual
perspective, which is to say we as the human being, is one whereby we are
opened to phenomenon through our modes of being-in-the-world as a human
being. The schema/mode I speak of, and wish to further investigate, always
pertains to digital technologies because this schema always includes one’s
embodiment, our being situated within the world, allowing for our intersubjective
experience with otherness, and the foundations of meaningful relations to
anything at all.
By turning to Edmond Husserl, the aim is not only to find the roots of the
phenomenological concept of world, but to explore its conceptual development.
We shall come to see that theory was developed in the early twentieth century,
stating that our primary experience exists as that which is prior to the act of
rational reflection upon existence, which has arguably lead to two relatively polar
outcomes – empiricism and intellectualism. Empiricism is seen as the
externalization of the world as material cause and effect, and intellectualism the
internalization of the world as a subject constituting said world through internal
acts of meaning. I will argue that one consequence of our capacity for reflection
(our sense of distance form “self,” and hence, distance form the world) has
resulted in the outcome of the world and our own human being has become
comprehended as objects of study, via the objectification of classical empiricism
beginning in the seventeenth century. And yet, this has always been the result of
what I consider to be the underlying condition of the human being, our underlying
will to nearness, the eradication of distance, the-will-to-flatten.
On the antithetical end of the spectrum, our being, and the world of things
has been understood as subjectification via the intellectualist tradition, which
refutes certain empiricist claims that posit the body and mind as casual objects.
The outcome of the subjectivist’s spectrum has been to turn our subjectivity, or
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the sense of “inner presence,” into a constituting force that constructs a
meaningful world around itself. At present, the primary objective is to overcome,
as well as modify these two extremes by turning toward a theory of the being-inthe-world, and sensing how what comes of this leads us to an understanding of
digitization not as an ontological shift in being, but a result of the-will-to-flatten.
If we succeed in ascertaining what is meant by the world as the
presupposed ground by which experience presents itself as an always already
opened space of our lived experience, our de-severance, it is the hope that a
more concrete understanding of digitization’s development and its impact on our
lives will present itself, eventually leading to further analysis into the moral and
ethical ramifications of digitization. Although we must initially engage with
Husserl, we shall come to see that his concept of world, while always remaining
a fundamental “backbone,” has in fact been modified by a number of scholars,
including the twentieth century philosophers Martin Heidegger and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, whose work this dissertation is theoretically constructed upon.
While Husserl ultimately grounds the life-world’s most constituting element
in the transcendental ego, which we shall understand as being too close to both
the rationalist and intellectualist traditions, we will ultimately develop our
understanding of the world as a constant play between our mode of de-severant
embodiment, space as depth, and intersubjectivity as they collectively relate to
the surrounding world of “things” to be brought near through the-will-to-flatten.
Through this initial clarification, the hope is to apprehend how human reflection
has historically fallen, and is now situated, into various types of metaphysical
analysis that dominant contemporary digital media scholarship. Both objective
and subjective analysis of the world, our body, and the cogito, find their
development through our human capacity for metaphysical reflection – a
phenomenon relating to the humans self-reflective capacitive as de-severant
openness towards the world. We shall see that it is only via the inherent
properties imbued upon our reflective state that various types of “worldly” and
“personal” analysis have emerged, resting “on” the presupposed ground of being23

in-the-world, the always already opened space of experience and ultimately
depth.
Next, I will come to comprehend how in one sense the objectification of
the world through our reflective capacity, firmly established during the tide of
enlightenment empiricism, has allowed for modern digital technology to emerge,
especially in chapter three, Space and Digitization, while subsequently leaving a
vast degree of blindness in regards to our comprehension of how the world
always already opens (or perceptually presents) itself via de-severant being. This
blindness was in fact acknowledged, however flawed, through the Kantian
idealist tradition that was established during the eighteenth century. If all of life is
merely a sequence of objective causal relations, as empiricism implies, how can
an account of one’s subjectivity, one’s “internal” life and free will as a meaningful
relation to the world of things, fit into such an objectivist account of existence?
Kantian idealism addressed this issue by turning toward the transcendental ego,
as the a-prior condition by which the world is meaningfully constituted by the
human subject. However, it must be understood that the idealist tradition took
this conception of an inner immanence too far, placing an overemphasis on the
world’s “meaningful construction” within the ego, or rational cogito, which was
perhaps Husserl’s greatest historic conceptual barrier, even as he developed a
theory of the world/life-world. In the end, we shall see that Husserl ultimately
resides too immersed in the wake of Kantian idealism, even as he develops a
radical new “ground” for philosophy.
That having been stated, regardless of objectifications inherent in
presuppositions, it will be shown that it is none other than the potential of our
being-the-world that has opened our objectification of the world, and even our
own bodies, to the possibilities revealed to us within the revolutions in
technological development and science. One might state that if a conception of
the world is of importance, why has it not been comprehended sooner, for it is
true that missing the world as the formative ground of experience does by no
means stop digitization from being developed. And this is because the-will-to24

flatten does not require this as a means to acquiring its telos towards nearness,
the "development of tangible technological digitization.
As Merleau-Ponty writes in his final major essay, “Eye and Mind,”
“Science manipulates things and gives up dwelling in them. It gives itself internal
models of things, and operating on the basis of these indices or variables, the
transformations that are permitted by their definition, science confronts the world
only from greater and greater distances” (351). The sense produced by this
metaphysical means of apprehending the world is one whereby the world
presents itself as calculative distance, establishing the sense of objectivity that
Merleau-Ponty refers to, which is the result of our human capacity for reflection
as a de-severant being. However, it shall be understood that to exacerbate this
sense of distance between ourselves and the world, so as to “see” the world,
embodiment, space, consciousness, and otherness as things in the world, or as
mere objects to be mathematized within objective space, is the very means by
which being-in-the-world conceals itself from our acknowledgement, even as it
brings forth technological development.
And it could be argued through an objectivist account that a
phenomenological analysis of being-in-the-world, the-will-to-flatten, and
digitization is of no use, or simply baseless; that having been stated, however, as
we situate the proceeding chapters, it is of importance through this chapter that
we apprehend how missing a theory of the being-in-the-world, of the
phenomenological world, does in fact diminish our power to philosophically
apprehend what happens to us over and above our own sense of intellectualist
“self-willing,” as we peruse various technological ends, as well as the
diminishment this has on how to assess the potential consequences of our
technologies.
In the case of this study, the ends are the increased development of digital
technologies within our lives. A theory of being-in-the-world will enrich the view of
how these tangible technologies came to be, and perhaps more importantly,
develop a sounder knowledge regarding their impact on our de-severant
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experience as it derives itself from the depth of world’s space as potential. To
understand the world as the ground upon which experience and meaning are
constituted, points us toward an acknowledgement that an impact upon the world
through our opened powers of embodiment, de-severance, and intersubjectivity
have led to digitization, and in doing so, have impacted our sense of nearness,
which is the grounds upon which experience itself is constituted.

Clarification of Husserl’s Theory of World
Delving too deeply into the nuances of Edmond Husserl’s theoretical life work
would demand the attention of an entire dissertation unto itself, which is the not
the intention here. That stated, the goal at present is not to simplify or diminish
Husserl, but to point toward a number of key concepts that he developed in his
critique of previous philosophers, primarily, though not limited to Rene Descartes,
David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. As witnessed in The Crisis of European
Sciences & Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl’s philosophic project is in
large part an attempt through various means, to correct the work of Kantian
philosophy, which Husserl believes to have been guided by Kant’s historicity, or
his temporal moment in relation to the ideas encompassing him, which impeded
him from noticing his own philosophic presuppositions (103). Ultimately,
Husserl’s addition to the field of phenomenology, in relation to the current
concern, begins with his development of phenomenological bracketing, which
can be found in his earlier texts, such as his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: first book, eventually
leading to his own self-critique and theoretical development of the life-world in his
final major text, The Crisis. But why did Husserl turn towards the world/life-world
as he neared the end of his life?
Two of Husserl’s primary concerns, concerns that enrich our own
enterprise, are as follows: first, a more complete comprehension of the
meaningful world of things; and second, the relation of worldly (objective) things
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to the subjective transcendental ego, or how and why we are intended toward
things, how and why the human being is able to bring things into its conscious
concern. The world for Husserl, is the beginning of all “cognitive” experience, as
well as the subject for the investigative plane of the natural attitude, which will be
further explored in Chapter Three. As Husserl states in Ideas, “The world is the
sum-total of objects of possible experience and experiential cognition, of objects
that, on the basis of actual experiences, are cognizable in correct theoretical
thinking” (6). The subjective transcendental ego (although considering it
secondary to the world is certainly problematic) is ultimately the constituting
source of meaning, as well as the constituting source of the objects experienced
in the world. Without an interpreter of things by a being capable of certain forms
of openness toward the world, which posits an interpretation, can we possibly
express that there is anything meaningful at all? Strip an interpreting “ego,” a
subject, from the world of “things” and what is actually left?
In fact, the question above establishes a great deal of the Kantian dilemma,
as well as Husserl’s response to it. That is to say, both the world and the
subjective transcendental ego consume Husserl’s scholarly work throughout the
turns of his career, as can be explicitly noticed from his Ideas to his final work,
The Crisis. What changes, however, is the means by which Husserl attempts to
philosophize the relation and interaction between the world of objects and the
subjective transcendental ego. First, Husserl begins with bracketing, and then
seemingly discards it as he moves toward a conceptualization of the world/lifeworld.
Expanding on this change, what we find in Ideas is the epoch, or the
phenomenological reduction, which brackets intentional contents of “the mind.”
Essentially, there’s a recognition by Husserl, arguably in large part via standing
on the shoulders of Kant’s investigations of worldly things against the
transcendental ego, which attributes meaning to any-thing that we are
intentionally “drawn” toward. For Husserl, even the intentional object of a dream,
however “illusorily” it may be, is meaningfully intended by the cogito, or ego,
27

regardless of its wordly - “thingness.” Not all that we are intended towards needs
to be tangible matter in the strict sense of the term, and this realization begins to
lead toward a theory of digitization, especially as it is built upon by Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty.
What is most important, at present, is to acknowledge that through Kantian
philosophy, Husserl develops a young phenomenology. Like Kant, Husserl is not
“stuck” in a methodological objectification of things, but a turn towards an
apprehension of how objectification occurs as meaningful to us human beings at
all, via a transcendental intersubjective ego – Husserl exists on the side of the
intellectualist, paving the way for a more contemporary phenomenology to
develop. For Husserl, to bracket an object of meaningful intentionality, or our
directional (or even in-directional) thought toward things, is to put in limbo all of
the presuppositions that existed during his historic moment - or our own at this
moment. By doing so, he set his task toward apprehending the subjective
transcendental ego in order to discover the very grounds by which anything (any
object of thought) is posited as meaningful. As Husserl notes in Ideas,
“…consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute
essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion” (65). The primary
issue at hand, for Husserl, is to discover the constituting pole, or “place,” of all
meaning. For without meaning, can we say that anything exists at all, or at
minimum, how can it be upheld as meaningful?
To introspectively locate the pole by which any meaningful relation to the
world is constituted is Husserl’s ultimate end, and as such, he turns internal, so
as to rather paradoxically miss the external he is cautious of. The intent to
discover the subject transcendental ego does not falter throughout Husserl’s
work, but he senses the issues of intense internalization via bracketing. And so,
as his work develops, he turns toward the world, or life-world (lebenswelt), as a
philosophic alternative to bracketing.
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Husserl’s life-world, and Heidegger’s move to
Being-in-the-World: Situating Being and De-servance – the path
to apprehending the-will-to-flatten
Husserl’s persistence towards apprehending the “ground” of the transcendental
ego is far from unimportant here, it is perhaps through his enduring examination
of the transcendental ego, or pure subjectivity – intellectualism - that such a
phenomenon was later challenged by phenomenologists, such as Martin
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. As we will soon discover, through the critiques of
the phenomenologists who took up Husserl’s philosophic task, Husserl’s desire
to overcome the natural attitudes’ presuppositions in order to discover the
subjective transcendental ego’s ground presents a certain irony. For Husserl,
much like Kant during his own time, rather unknowingly finds himself deeply
embedded within a certain Cartesian metaphysical presupposition of his own.
The presuppositions, which Husserl’s philosophy face, are that of the ego, I, or
cogito, as that which is “nearest” to the world of thingly objects as over and
against an ego, constituting objects as meaningful via our sense(s) of
intentionality. The irony is this: while Husserl falls into his own metaphysical
presupposition, which paves the way to a theory of world that I feel is essential to
understanding digitization, it is perhaps only as a result of his own
presuppositions regarding the existence of the transcendental ego that such a
form of self-constituting subjectivity becomes an apparent flaw to those who
engage with his phenomenological task. To overcome the metaphysical attitudes,
so as to apprehend Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, requires a sense of
interconnection toward the world, which relies neither upon subject nor object,
strictly speaking, as a formation of this dichotomous opposition that always
inherently creates the sense that there is distance between world and self. And
due to this, under tradition philosophic metaphysics, the world’s impact on our
experience either appears to be an act of causality upon the objective body on
one end, or one of self-constitution via the subject on the other, when in fact
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neither of these are entirely correct according to Martin Heidegger’s critique, nor
are they correct if we wish to better comprehend digitization.
But perhaps we have jumped too far? Allow me to return to Husserl. For if
we stated that being-in-the-world overcomes this opposition of subject and
object, how is it that Husserl never overcomes this issue? In The Crisis, Husserl
reorients his thinking, turning from the phenomenological reduction (bracketing)
to the life-world. Bracketing is negated in this final text, conceptually revamped
by a turn toward the theory of the world/life-world. However, The Crisis is still
largely as a continued critique of Kant, and a desire to “steer Kant’s path” into the
proper direction so as to articulate the place of subjectivity and its role in the
meaningful constitution of objectivity as we know it. As Husserl notes, in his
critique of Kant’s analysis within The Crisis,
“…it (*Kant’s analysis) had never penetrated to the subjective structure of our worldconsciousness prior to and within scientific knowledge and thus had never asked
how the world, which appears straightforwardly to us men, and to us as scientists,
comes to be knowable a priori—how, that is, the exact science of nature is possible,
the science for which, after all, pure mathematics, together with a further pure apriori, is the instrument of all knowledge which is objective, [i.e.,] unconditionally valid
for everyone who is rational (who thinks logically)” (103).

For Husserl, philosophy’s crisis is the presupposition taken, even by Kant as he
turns back to the subject, in order to apprehend the world as objective, the
thinglyness of the world. A tendency, when it becomes historically situated as
truth, totalizes worldly objectification while falling blind to the means by which this
objectification is possible, which Kant comprehended as problematic, yet failed to
see his way out of. Expanding upon this phenomenon, Husserl’s feels that the
drive toward objectification, when taken to its logical extreme, begins to objectify
the phenomenological openness toward the world, or “subjectivity,” which, in the
Husserlian sense, defines lived experience. As can be seen in fields such as
contemporary psychology, the turn toward empiricist objectification now mostly
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dominates the analysis of all experienced phenomena, from our history, to out
bodily senses, to worldly objectivity, to language, even our relation to others. As
an example, vision, broadly speaking, is often entirely objectified – and when
vision becomes objectified the phenomenal openness toward the world that is
vision (as de-servant experience) is lost upon us. This realization is vital to a
theory of digitization, because while we can analyze digitization strictly under the
terms of tangible objective digital technologies, digitization understood as a
human phenomenon, and all that resides “beneath” it as will, is missed in so
many contemporary analyses of the digital age.
Husserl’s insight, expanding upon the Kantian tradition, is the
acknowledgment that a phenomenon such as vision (merely providing one
example) is not simply an object among objects. As Husserl’s states in The
Crisis,
“Naturally, from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday
surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing—the surrounding world in which
all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are
also the sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In
this world we are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world (* italics added),
namely, as being here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything
that is established scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology. On
the other hand, we are subjects for this world, namely, as the ego-subjects
experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully; for us this
surrounding world has only the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencing, our
thoughts, our valuations, etc.” (104).

The conceptual development of the world/life-world, which we begin to discover
here, is without question a substantive critique of Kant, but it too ultimately falls
victim to its own criticism. Regardless of the variances in thought, Husserl
ultimately places the world’s meaningful constitution upon the subject as the
transcendental ego, though on a more radical spectrum than Kant conceived
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during his time, even as Kant opened the pathway to an analysis of the
phenomenological world.
Our next leap in the philosophy of the phenomenological world, requires a
turn toward Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl’s at the University of Freiburg.
It is well known that Husserl existed as a primary influence within Heidegger’s
scholarship, regardless of the degree to which Heidegger developed his own
phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutic path, subsequently abandoning
the transcendental ego as a philosophic starting point. Heidegger’s work, much
like Husserl’s, takes a variety of twists and turns as it ages. However, I would
argue that Heidegger’s concepts Being, being-in-the-world, as well as
unconcealment/concealment (or aletheia), can be seen throughout his body of
work as a whole. It is through Heidegger’s philosophic development that the
theory of digitization I will present here, as well as the theories of the other
philosophers I engage with, will radiate. This is because Heidegger marks a
historic philosophic divergence, which is still finding its cultivation to this day, in
works such as this one, however reinterpreted Heidegger may be. But what is
this divergence, and how does it pertain to the phenomenological concept of the
world?
What has been discovered thus far is that the life-world is the constitutive
ground by which the world opens, and hence, expresses itself as meaningful aprior and beyond. We have also determined that isolating the world as a
meaningful constitution via the subjective transcendental ego is problematic at
best. But what is left then to constitute meaning as the primary openness by
which the world is meaningful to us as human beings, prior to any idealizations of
the world by human rationality? Heidegger’s answer to this dilemma is to turn
toward Being. Being for Dasein, translated as being-there, or the state by which
Heidegger identifies the human, is not necessarily the same thing. That is to say
Being, as such, is not the philosophic confrontation of a subject against an
object, or visa versa. What Heidegger expresses is not only the desire to see
“past” subject versus object, but a realization that the idealized, or our reflective
32

tendency, is always a result of always already being-in-the-world and being-inthe-world, for Heidegger, is never first and foremost an experience of a subject
here and object over there against the subject, this too I believe is true of
digitization. But let’s first clarify being-in-the-world.
As Heidegger notes in his magnum opus, Being and Time, “Dasein's Being
takes on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood a priori as
grounded upon that state of Being which we have called "Being-in-the-world”
(78). An understanding of Heidegger’s Being-in is fundamental to apprehending
what alterations have been made to Husserl’s concept of the life-world. For
Heidegger, while the human being certainly possesses the power to “abandon”
its lived experience via moments of contemplative reflection, a turn to the
objective or subjective, or the stance by which subject and object may appear,
this is not our primary mode of existing – or how the world is first and foremost
lived, experienced, and ultimately willed as meaningfully given, it does the reach
the will the underlies the human being. For Heidegger, we are ‘alongside’ the
world in a sense, but even more accurately, we are a Being-in-it, we are utterly
absorbed in the world (Being and Time, 80). As he states, “Dasein is never
'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which
sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world.
Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as
Being-in-the-world, is as it is” (Being and Time, 84). By “free from Being-in”
Heidegger is already providing a critique of the philosophies of rationalism,
empiricism, and Kantian (even Husserlian) intellectualism, all of which (however
unbeknownst to them) come at the world as though the “mind,” or subject, exists
apart, or over and against the world as objects, and so even turns the mind into
an object of study. For example, the very idea of mathematic proximity, of
distance, has at its very foundation, a presupposed assumption that subjectivity,
or the being that observes the world, presents itself against the objects it
encounters. And while Heidegger is not contesting our sense of mathematic
spatiality as necessarily flawed, we are in-space(s) he claims, he want us to
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acknowledge that this is only a result of the unitary phenomenon by which we
first and foremost find ourselves as being-in-the-world, not separated from it as
the dichotomy of subject and object inherently presuppose at its very “core.”
Expounding upon this, Heidegger notes,
It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view,
especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no
matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the
'phenomenon of knowing the world' grasped than it got interpreted in a 'superficial',
formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of
setting up knowing as a 'relation between subject and Object' -a procedure in which
there lurks as much 'truth' as vacuity” (Being and Time, 86-87).

What is meant by this claim? “Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its
own Being,” Heidegger claims, an issue we will continue to address. What we
have here is the realization that the human has itself as an aspect of its worldly
concerns, which we inherently become “caught-up in.” One mode of openness,
by which the human is open to a meaningful relationship with the world is
precisely that the human “returns to itself” as an issue of concern, so to speak.
And concern, or care, for the world is a fundamental aspect of the life-world for
Heidegger. “To be concerned with,” implies to “take up,” to be absorbed with.
Dasein, or a human’s “own” existence is concerning to itself via being deseverant, that is, bringing the world near. We, as humans, have a tendency to
absorb ourselves in our own sense of existence as an experience of
something(s). Much as Husserl notes, “consciousness” is intending toward
things, whether “real” or “imaginative,” this never ceases to exist, real, dreamlike, or virtual, in fact this very being eventually constitutes the virtual. The sense
of self-knowing, as a concern, is an open “fixation,” whereby we are always
already meaningful to ourselves.
The issue here is that being open to a sense of concern with self, also
presents a sense of innerness – nearness to self, which digitization ultimately
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further fulfills through the realization of various tangible technologies. As
Heidegger notes, “In Dasein there lies an essential tendency toward closeness”
(Being and Time, 140). We can even see in Descartes’ Meditations on First
Philosophy that what appears “closest to me,” and least dissolvable is the “I
think” that accompanies me, an issue that will become of increasing importance
to us as we present our own theory of digitization.
The “natural” tendency, as it has emerged, is to posit our concern for self as
a subject over and against some-thing else: the world as thing(s). The result is
that the world can appear as separate, separate to an “ego,” which “gazes” upon
it, measures it, calculates it and assigns meaning to its “distinct objective parts.”
Heidegger’s point is not that this is somehow “false” of us -- how could it be if it is
happening, but that what comes first and foremost is the sense of open deseverance (as a fundamental aspect of being-in-the-world), and de-servance by
no means is limited to self-concern, strictly speaking. If we were a mere
movement toward self-concern via de-servance, this would be likened to an
implosion, and perhaps this will become of fruition to us via an analysis of
digitization – digitization is clearly a kind of “implosion.”
Being-in-the-world, as an aspect of this unity, we are always already, a
prior, absorbed-in-it. Prior to a turning back to oneself, meaningful concern must
exist a priori. The world only presents itself as “some-thing” or as “individual
things” by already being absorbed within the world. The things we appear to
encounter over and against a “gazing ego” only appear via a prior openness
toward our concern for the world, which is to say, a-prior to any sense of self;
hence, intersubjectivity and digitization in Chapter Four may be viewed as an
analysis of the “construction” of self. Granted, it makes sense that we possess
concern for ourselves, as we are also Beings-in-the-world. Strictly speaking, deseverance for Heidegger is the primary openness, an existential, that absorbs
our Being. De-severance is the way in which we are, as well as the mode by
which our Being “meets” the world as any meaningful relation. And it is only via
this mode that objects “appear” as meaningfully discrete entities, subject to our
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scrutiny.

Heidegger’s Being-in-the-World: A continued analysis of
de-severance, embodiment, and the openness toward space as
depth
It should now be clear that we have moved “beyond” Husserl’s transcendental
ego as the constituting ground of the world. However, our turn toward
Heidegger’s concepts of de-severance, as the life-world’s “ground,” opens an
array of new questions. If this Heideggerian claim that we have explored has any
theoretic sustenance to us, the question that presents itself at the moment is
such: how does any-thing appear to us via de-severance. How do “things”
appear through our state of absorption-with-the-world?
The world discloses itself for the human being, Heidegger claims, and this is
rather obvious. If we are having an experience at all, it must be a disclosure of
some-thing, some-thing that we as human beings are de-severed and absorbed
within. The fact of the matter is that if the world is a-prior concern, the world is
always already close to us as is, or at least some aspect(s) of our “individual”
world, aside from our intersubjectivity. To be absorbed with the world is literally to
already be involved with it situationally, embodied, drawn within certain aspects
of the world. Heidegger, especially in his later essays, particularly “The Origin of
the Work of Art,” claims that the world, which we meaningfully concern ourselves
with, constantly unconceals itself as something to be engaged with; that is to say,
absorption is never absorption with nothing at all, but rather de-severance is
absorbed into the world’s space understood as having a depth that both conceals
and unconceals (176).
Take the phenomenon of vison, for example. To experience anything at all
means to not being seeing something – vision is always at the same time a
double act of unconcealment and concealment – it possesses a depth that “calls”
or pulls de-severant vision into an engagement with the world, into possibilities,
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or even new technological or artistic possibilities of creation. For me to see
anything at all, I must also not be seeing something, and this exactly why I see
anything at all. For example, at present, my computer screen is visible to me
precisely because it does not show itself to me in its entirety. I do not see the
back of the computer screen, and that is the means by which the front is visible
to me. There is a depth that always holds back aspects of the visible, and it is in
this invisibility, this “distance,” that I am drawn via de-severant being-in-the-world.
In fact, the only manner by which it is possible to see the rest of my
computer is to move my physical location to another, or to imagine it in my
minds-eye, and yet neither of these ever reveal the total depth of the object, or its
potential to reveal. What’s more, if we speak of movement on a broad level, even
the realization that I want to see the back of the screen, because my vision
currently conceals it as the screen unconceals itself, is already a movement
toward the apprehension of the back – and so de-severance calls upon my
embodiment as a situation within the world to act. What impetus would there be
to move, or even to think of the back of the screen, or more so yet, the potential
of this marital screen to display otherness to me if all was unconcealed to me?
But it never is. Being-in-the-world always implies being within the space of depth.
As noted, Heidegger’s philosophic concepts of de-severance, as well as
unconcealment/concealment, further illuminate the concept of being-in-the-world,
which is now truly beginning to take its phenomenological shape within the
context of this analysis. Thus far, through this investigation, we have examined,
via a theory of the world/life-world, how it is that the world is able to disclose itself
as something to be experienced a prior to any conceptualization of the
metaphysical subject and object dichotomy. Through Heidegger we have also
begun to grasp a sense of why a finite Being-in-the-world, as situationally
embodied as de-severant, is one that experiences a sense of space as depth, as
one that conceals and unconceals. However, as even Heidegger tells us, the
human being is one that takes up itself as a matter of concern. The human being,
via our sense of de-servance, can return to itself, bringing what is distant in the
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world’s depth nearer to either have or reflect upon. What we mean here is that
the human is a self-reflexive being. The human can reflect, a reality that will gain
importance in the wake of our study, especially on an intersubjective level.
It is of great curiosity that Heidegger, perhaps with a greater sense of clarity
than anyone before him, establishes Dasein’s being as one that is first and
foremost Being-in-the-world, an open position from somewhere, yet is also
seemingly reluctant to engage explicitly with our placement as a particular type of
placement in-the-world as embodied. In all of Heidegger’s work, our embodied
totality, as the means by which we are situated in the world, is all but vaporized in
the face of his more abstract conceptions of Being, world, de-severance, and
Unconcealment/concealment. How are we to make sense of these concepts
without the body and all of the united particularities that establish our bodily
“schema” as the conduit toward the world, and visa vice, the world toward a
particular body? That is to say, de-severance, as life’s formative pull, is never
experienced beyond embodiment as a type of ethereal ghost or spiritual figure –
it depends upon embodiment, and so too does the meaningful style it “brings” to
the world. In fact, it should be no shock to us that even these concepts of ghost
and sprit require a body for us to give them “face,” and that it so say, meaning.
And this too is true as we turn towards digitization, digitization is never
unembodied, and this is simply a phenomenological truth. What ghost, angel, or
digital avatar can you recall that is ever presented as non-embodiment? Even
God has historically been provided a body, a rather human one.
Our point is this, to be in-the-world at all is always to be a particular type of
embodiment, and doesn’t one’s type of embodiment fundamentally pertain to any
establishment one has with the world? That is to say, aren’t “our” de-severant
concerns always the formulation of a codependent existence between a certain
type of body and world? Put another way, does not one’s schema of
embodiment, one’s body as a style of orientation, not establish particular
concerns with the world, particular ways of being experientially drawn-in by the
world as codependence? And do not our concerns, as we’ve noted above,
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engage us first and foremost within certain experiences whereby anything
experienced at all is a matter of de-severant unconcealment and subsequent
concealment in bringing it near, eliminating its distance, empirical or
phenomenally? All of these Heideggerian concepts, however rightfully reluctant
he is to move “too close” toward the ego, pertain to our embodiment. And so, we
turn toward embodiment as the final dimensionality of the life-world’s explication,
especially as it relates to de-severance and depth. And all of this ultimately leads
us towards the-will-to-flatten.

Embodiment: Human Attunement as De-severance
Heidegger notes that the body, while seemingly an object among objects under
the empiricist sense, is in fact “the absolute zero-object” (Patočka, Body,
Community, Language, World, 27). Here I turn toward Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a
philosopher influenced by Heidegger’s thought, who turned toward embodiment. I
will do the same in order to further clarify being-in-the-world, as I lead to
significance of the will-to-flatten as the driving force of digitization.
In addressing embodiment, I will begin by addressing two separate sections
from Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus, Phenomenology of Perception, and they
are as follows:
“And everything said about the sensed body pertains to the whole of the sensible of
which it is a part, and to the world. If the body is one sole body in its two phases, it
incorporates into itself the whole of the sensible and with the same movement
incorporates itself into a "Sensible in itself." We have to reject the age-old
assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely,
the world and the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between
the body and the world, since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the
seer, since evidently there is in the body only "shadows stuffed with organs," that is,
more of the visible? The world seen is not "in" my body, and my body is not "in" the
visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor
is surrounded by it” (138).
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The Body: “I have the world as an unfinished individual through my body as a power
for this world; I have the position of objects through the position of my body, or
inversely I have the position of my body through the position of objects, not through a
logical implication, nor in the manner in which we determine an unknown size
through its objective relations with given sizes, but rather through a real implication
and because my body is a movement toward the world and because the world is my
body’s support.” (366)

Merleau-Ponty states that our embodiment not only possesses the visible but is
in fact possessed by the visible in order to experience the world (Phenomenology
of Perception, 135). Though one can clearly lose certain visible/experiential
senses, it is only possible to claim that a sense can be “lost” if it is a sense to be
had. What can’t be possessed clearly can’t be lost. Our difficulty here is
displaying this theory explicitly, while at the same time not becoming consumed
by it so as to miss the primary issue at hand – digitization.
First, the visible here, while easily misunderstood as sight, is too simplistic
under our typical definition of the term. Our fleshy eyes as sight (*quoting
Merleau-Ponty) are important to Merleau-Ponty; there is no dismissing this.
However, embodiment as our primary experiential vision, under the
phenomenological theory, is not the historically driven taxonomy of making the
eyes into their own object of study. In fact, Merleau-Ponty finds this historically
driven objectivist move, which makes the body an object of study to be, at least
on some level, a mistake.
The issue, as Merleau-Ponty notes above, is to understand the body prior
to the metaphysical mindset, that is, to apprehend embodiment (our body) as
more than an object among objects, or the mind as something “inside” of the
body. “Consciousness,” so often apprehended as a mind inside an object-body is
a result of Heideggerian discoveries finding itself within a certain
stance/embodied position. Too often we understand consciousness as “in the
mind,” as something happening “inside of the head.” Merleau-Ponty’s point is not
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that the “rational, conscious mind,” is unimportant, as is often the case with other
major phenomenologists, but that this metaphysical stance is misguided. The
body, as our total embodiment, is never first and foremost an object before us for
a separate internal mind to analyze; rather, it is the means by which anything at
all is lived. Our particular schema of embodiment, our makeup, as a collectivity
(and not through the taxonomy of its objective “parts”) engages with the world in
a particular manner. The world acquires its meaning through this embodied
engagement, and de-severant being is “informed” by this schema, meaning that
the body can only become an object for itself by first and foremost being open to
engagement – as being-in-the-world. Embodiment implies de-severance as a
subsequent immersion with a world. Our sense of the “inner cogito,” or a subject
against objects, is merely the “shadow” of our total embodiment de-severantly
being drawn into the depth of space, however much we have historically placed
this “shadow” onto a pedestal, presupposing the embodiment by which it is
possible to be self-aware at all.
Another way to put this is to say all types of embodiment, in all of the
variant schemas embodiment manifests throughout the world, always have within
themselves a particular schema towards the world. Perhaps, human embodiment
is in fact one whereby the sense of de-severance is not only one whereby we are
attuned to things, but also our body as self-affection. Perhaps our particular form
of embodiment, as a type of total unity, is this reflective de-severance in the
sense that not only does the body as concern place itself into situations beyond
itself, but also takes up itself as its own situation in regard to what it is not, or
lacks, what it will-to-flatten and bring near.
The means by which the world becomes visible, or opens itself as
meaningful is a result of any living being’s schema of de-severance, and this type
of de-severance is codependent to the totality of the embodied form, and cannot
be considered outside of it. One states that their “conscious mind exists inside
their head, inside their body,” but this claim itself is not possible without a form of
embodiment that is first and foremost “their” collective whole, as it is enveloped
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by the being-in-the-world to which its schema attunes it. My vision, even as sight,
strictly speaking, does not exist on its own – like an object in a void. My hand
reaches toward the smart phone, and its tactile contour aligns with me, my hand
and vision find themselves together, while my de-servance senses possibility
within the depth of the device through this attunement. Can I say that my sight is
formatively independent of my particular stance as human being, which is my
type of embodied schema? My embodied hands and feet, as a type of schema,
are relevant to my eyes as an active sight. I visualize the screen and deseverantly discover that “it is in front of me,” but can sight accomplish this without
the totality of embodied schema? The orientation of my hands and feet correlates
to my schema of direction and cannot to be de-severed if my sight is to have any
sense. Consciousness is the totality of my de-severant embodiment. It is not prior
to it, but the result of it.
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Chapter Two: Embodiment and Digitization
“The body is our general means of having a world.”
-

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (147)

-

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (140)

“But certain ways in which entities are discovered in a purely cognitive manner also have
the character of bringing them close. In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards
closeness.” (p. 140).

Introduction
The phenomenological concept of embodiment, and all of its potential to enrich
our understanding of digitization, has a tendency to remain outside the realm of
conventional conversation, which all of us experience throughout our everyday
lives. This is no inherent fault of ours, and it still remains true that the significance
of our bodies does not go unnoticed. For example, it is true that most of us may
speak of having a body, caring for our bodies, sensing our own body, or being in
our body. We may also address another person, or something, as being
embodied within the world. But does this imply grasping the philosophic
significance of embodiment, and what it can contribute to an understanding of the
meaningful world we live within? Often this leap remains outside of our
conversations, a fact that should change if we desire to further comprehend the
impact that digitization is having on the practicality of our lives.
One way to address the unfamiliarity of phenomenology’s contribution to
an understanding of embodiment is to see that conversation on the body and
embodiment, when it takes place among us, tends to reside either within the
objectivity of scientific literature, or in what Martin Heidegger deems, “idle talk”
(Gerede) within Being and Time (211). For Heidegger, most of our conventional
conversation resides within “idle talk,” which is not inherently a negative
phenomenon, but it does diminish the significance of the discursive meaning that
a term such as embodiment might hold for many of us. It is a task to overcome in
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the quest to further our understanding of digitization and its phenomenological
relation to us.
Idle talk, as Heidegger tells us, “Terminologically…signifies a positive
phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s
understanding and interpreting” (211). He further elaborates by stating that,
“Proximally, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this
interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average
understanding and the state-of-mind belonging to it” (211). This clarification is
important, as it affirms that what is provided to us through our daily conversations
(idle talk), persists throughout our lives as the meaningful framework for
comprehending and interpreting any and all terminology, philosophic or not,
which we come into contact with. This of course means that the pervasive culture
understanding of the body, in conventional conversation, is the means by which
we first come to grasp the concept of embodiment when first introduced to it
phenomenologically. For this reason, as with phenomenological and other foreign
terms, it remains vital to consider one’s words wisely when approaching the
phenomenology of embodiment. Especially when deploying embodiment as a
way to better comprehend digitization.
Both within the study of phenomenology, and hopefully outside of it, a
conceptual analysis of embodiment will enrich our knowledge of digitization as
we come to find that embodiment is fundamentally linked to the emergence,
meaning, and potential, as well as limitations of digitization as it relates to our
embodied human form. For this reason, the phenomenological study of
embodiment, when grounded within examples of everyday life, is essential to a
study of digitization. This is because all human engagement with technology,
new or old, is in essence, a relation of one’s body and the technology. Even in
idle talk we sense this, but do we grasp the significance? Could the two possibly
come to be without one another? And in what way can embodiment and
digitization, when grasped phenomenologically, inform us about our human
condition, and our underlying motivations?
44

Such questions will come to light under a lens of embodiment and
digitization, which are increasingly relevant to our contemporary moment. To
comprehend digitization, let us first approach what is paradoxically closest, yet
also most distant to us – our own embodiment. In doing so, we will find that any
attempt that is made to understand the meaningful significance that digitization
has had upon the human being and the world, presupposed or not, takes into
account that this is a relationship that is revealed to us, first and foremost,
through being embodied as such.
The digitization of the world, does not only have a meaningful impact on
our intersubjective experience, our experience of and with the other. Prior to any
intersubjective experience, embodiment must first facilitate the possibility of any
and all reciprocal contact with the world that an “individual subject” experiences.
Embodiment, it is essential to observe, is the foundation by which meaning
occurs to any one of us as a revealed experience. This individual reciprocation of
embodiment, and its interconnection with the world, depends on that being’s
embodiment, in this case, human embodiment. Perhaps the most basic, yet
essential, aspect of phenomenology’s discoveries is that the tenant of
embodiment’s relation to the world is the realization that any meaningful
development to the world is a constant co-relation to being embodied. In fact, this
argument can be understood as the core of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophic project,
most notably in Phenomenology of Perception, and its relevance still expands
and modifies with increasing significance today. For Merleau-Ponty, the classic
subject object dichotomy is called into question. The world of things,
technological or not, which seemingly exists over and against my conscious
mind, is brought into scrutiny. Embodiment for Merleau-Ponty could be
understood simply as the contact point between the self and world, but this would
still diminish what he is attempting to get across to his reader. Embodiment, the
body, is not simply a connection to world, but is rather akin to an interwoven
fabric that is one with the world, an everlasting bond from birth until death.
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For example, Descartes, a rationalist, as well as others within the
empiricist tradition, have a tendency to act as though the mind or reason can
exist “outside” of itself, detached from space and time as a grand observer of
things. This philosophic tradition places the reasoning mind over and above the
world of things, even one’s own body as an object of study. But as MerleauPonty states in Phenomenology of Perception, “Thus, we must not say that our
body is in space, not for that matter in time. It inhabits space and time” (140).
Embodiment, discussed in a phenomenological sense, is the very index, or
“opening,” by which world and thought exist at all. What is significant here is that
a theory of embodiment, as an openness – a revealing of the world as something
to meaningfully engage with - challenges prior presuppositions and grants new
insight into the formation of meaning. And surely the advent of digitization is a
meaningful event in the horizon of human existence. What can it tell us of our
condition as human beings?
Simply put, under a phenomenological sense, one must have a body in
order for the world to reveal itself as something meaningful prior even to the
formation of being a “self” within it. Furthermore, the phenomenological theory
grounds embodiment as a type of “constant openness.” That is to say, given the
classical understanding of consciousness over materiality, couldn’t
consciousness transcend the material body? This has major implications given
the digitization of the world as a primary will that can be seen expressed in
digitization (as will soon be explored in depth); it is the freeing, or transcendence
of the mind. For example, the storage of any and all information can be
witnessed within the palm of one’s hands when dealing with a smartphone – the
world “flattened” into one’s palm, the sense of depth diminished, controlled.
However, if one takes the phenomenological theory of embodiment into serious
consideration, one also must begin to question the validity of this willing to
“overcome” the temporal body. There is, in digitization, a will for transcendence,
power, and ultimately a “God’s eye view” upon the world as such, but given
embodiment, this willing must be called into serious question.
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While it is undeniably true that history transcends individuals as the
meaningful ground of any and all culturally established knowledge, the brute
experience of the world that any “individual” knows, is solely gained, strictly
speaking, upon an embodied being that is neither a-prior (before one’s birth), or
a-posterior (after one’s death.) The situatedness just mentioned is the only
manner in which any being, human or otherwise, could come to know/open the
world of experience and possibilities. Being embodied, in its essence, requires a
type of situatedness within the world, requiring that all embodiment be temporal –
that is, inhabited by time, as noted by Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, any and all
types of embodiment establish a meaningful relation to the world that is directed
by the structure of the being’s embodiment. Another way to say this, taking
embodiment into consideration, is that it is relatively absurd to inquire how
another animal meaningfully understands its world. Such an inquiry would require
the embodiment of a different being, which is an impossibility. This is to say, all
meaningful experience that both you and I have gained, is the result of being
embodied as homo-sapiens during our particular embodied life. Even the
transcendent nature of human history, while clearly “beyond” any individual
human being, is also the manifestation of the embodied human beings of past,
continually reinterpreted and lived by each and every human in the present, via
embodiment. In this sense, history too is the outgrowth and result of
embodiment, when understood as emerging from the practical relation of
embodied beings and the world of the “past.” Put in different terms, the
embodiment of the past’s meaning to us, as a meaningful relation to the world,
quite literally lives in the embodiment of human beings existing in the present. It
is through embodiment that we “hold” the past.
Embodiment ties an individual to the world, and is quite genuinely, a
fabric, or as noted above, an openness. Examples of this emerge with all of our
particular embodied senses, digitization being no exception. Granted, humans
tend to gravitate disproportionately toward sight as their primary mode of
“knowing the world.” An individual doesn’t go to smell, hear, touch, or taste their
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long last friend. We claim we went to “see” them. That said, when discussing
embodiment within phenomenology there are endless sights to turn one’s
analytic attention. The relation, for example, between light and dark is
meaningfully interwoven through the means by which my “fleshy” eyes, to quote
Merleau-Ponty, make “contact” with the world (Lawlor, “Dwelling in the Textures
of the Visible,” 152). However, when asking an individual on the street to
consider lightness and darkness, odds are that connotations, our ideas derived
from idle-talk, will come to “mind.” But considering embodiment, light and dark
acquire their meaning on the level of presumptive, even unreflective idea, only
because of embodiment, which gives birth to the ideas of lightness and darkness.
The light of the sun warms the embodiment of my being on a primordial level that
has a tendency, however obvious, to go unnoticed. The light of the sun provides
human embodiment with the possibilities of navigation, given the particularity of
the nature of our “seeing.” Light gives our body a reason to mean, a location to
move towards. Darkness stunts our sense of movement, taking a hold of our
being, providing an unsettling awareness of the virtues that lightness provides.
Light speaks to our embodiment; it calls on it, but not yet in a conceptual
manner, not on the level of idea. Furthermore, light in its primal appearance,
emerges from the sky, orienting one’s sense of any directional glance
whatsoever. And provided by our embodiment, there is a particular glance.
Darkness, on the other hand, appears to engulf the light, hiding it from being.
Darkness emerges from the “depths” of the world, tempting one to enter the
unrecognizable, due to our particular embodiment. The human eyes, two of
them, situated whereby they cannot “see” into one other, are not either fully
parallel. Our eyes exist on an upright being, placing one’s privileged sight above
much of the body, as well as the world “below.” When taking embodiment into
account in this manner, there is less surprise when one reaches, via deseverance, the level of connotation, or idea. Ideas emerge from the raw
experience of embodiment as such. Is it a surprise that religions tend to worship
the light above, while condemning the dark below? One does not need to look far
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into the canon of pop-culture in order to acknowledge the symbolism of light as
good, and the dark as bad. The release of Star Wars reminds us of this.
Simply put, embodiment reveals all elements of the world that we take up,
throughout time, past, present, and future, as something meaningful. Because of
this, the examples present for phenomenological analysis are as endless as the
entire unfolding continuum of meaning itself. Were we stripped of embodiment,
reduced only to “mind,” as though this were a possibility, no meaning could exist
whatsoever. Likewise, without one’s “personal” embodiment, no meaningful,
intersubjective, sociological relation, which is to say a cultural epistemic relation
to another within the world, could transpire and flourish into the transformation of
a culture. And perhaps most importantly, at least as an underlying preface, no
being, human or otherwise, could be of any form of de-severance without first
and foremost being embodied. A jump to de-severance presupposes
embodiment as the “fabric” required for de-severance. And as noted by MerleauPonty, time, as well as the space we occupy, are not distinct from embodiment;
instead, time and space find their meaningful existence as interwoven in the
relations to finite embodiment. All de-severance, and ultimately meaning, come
from a certain perspective in-time. Embodiment ensures, regardless of its form
(human or otherwise), a consistently situated being-within-space. And
embodiment as being-within-space is essential to an understanding of
digitization, because it is the very means for the consistency of a contextualized
perspective, which any and all subjects are confined to throughout their lifetime.
If we are to understand the existential tradition as placing emphasis on
authenticity and freedom, as figures such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger,
and Sartre clearly did, then embodiment is paradoxically the means by which any
freedom and authenticity are possible, as well as the consistent limitations
exerted upon these ideals.
And it is at this juncture where enough groundwork has been laid in
regard to embodiment, to work back to previous points, and analyze a number of
digital technologies and their intrinsic relation to our embodiment as the
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meaningful site of our existence. In doing so, a fundamental truth regarding
human nature will emerge. What will be recognized is that de-severant being,
embodied as humans are, wills to overcome its own embodiment via digitization.
This willing is an historic project, whereby overcoming the limits of embodiment
remains concealed as the driving force motivating digitization.
The will we speak of is a will-to-flatten experience, which itself is
fascinatingly derived of our embodiment, as the constant “re-uptake” of the world
as something for our embodiment to totalize. The will-to-flatten experience is a
will to control the world’s depth. Flattening the world essentially implies an
increased revealing of the world to the human being, yet this revealing has a
tendency to conceal its own goal. Techne, often translated as art, or technology
in the sense of making, is a teachable mode of rational revealing that is
intrinsically connected to digitization (Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 1799).
Human beings, as de-severant, bring technologies into existence that continually
reveal previously unknown aspects of the world. In doing so, digital technology
seemingly flattens aspects of the world, which would have previously been
considered unfathomable. An as example, from an apartment in Upper Michigan,
a friend whose material body is empirically halfway across the globe, is revealed
digitally to me in “real time.” Soon to be addressed in greater detail, this is
paradoxically possible only as a willful “defiance” against the confines the
embodiment exerts upon the human being, which can only emerge and be
revealed via the conditions of human embodiment itself.
The will-to-flatten, is a natural derivative of the very potential to “stretch”
our being via de-severance within time and space. What this ultimately displays
is that embodiment is both the fundamental site of our possibilities, and
simultaneously, our most significant “limitation,” a necessary confine that reveals
being(s). What impact this has, and will have, on the human being in the age of
digitization is of course yet to be fully known. This, however, does not undermine
the need for an exploration of embodiment’s significance within the age of
digitization. However, it must be reiterated that history (and we are a historic
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being) is an ever unfinished “project,” and any totalizing theory of what is to come
is surely founded upon naïveté. That said, this should never mean that one must
dismiss the aim of greater insight into any subject matter. It is simply an essential
recognition of the “shortcomings” of our being.

Heidegger’s Significance to Embodiment: And His Reluctance to
Address Embodiment and Depth
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, an outgrowth, perhaps better understood as
regrowth, of phenomenology’s foundations laid by the work of his mentor,
Edmond Husserl, paved a new path for the philosophy of phenomenology, a
path, so potentially expansive that it’s still being explored and remapped to this
day. Heidegger’s Being and Time set in motion a significant challenge of the
thinking that dominated his era, and arguably still dominant to this day. And the
challenges Heidegger made to the tradition of philosophy have not gone
unnoticed, nor failed to captivate his readers. As noted in the documentary,
Human, all Too Human – Heidegger. “More critical commentaries have been
dedicated to Heidegger, than to any other philosopher, apart from Aristotle”
(BBC, Human, all Too Human). The engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy
isn’t simply due to his idiosyncratic prose, negatively critiqued by Theodor
Adorno as “The Jargon of Authenticity” (Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity).
Heidegger’s philosophy, even with its creative vocabulary, and taking into
account its arguable obfuscation, is a turn from Husserl’s radical subjectivism,
toward an inquiry into the presuppositions that Heidegger argues run throughout
the breadth of Western philosophy. Heidegger begins his philosophy at the site of
the “Being,” a location too often addressed within philosophy as self-evident. But
for Heidegger, being is argued to be elusive, and anything but self-evident.
By turning towards an analysis of Being and beings, with aid of his “new”
terminology, Heidegger avoids the philosophy of the Cartesian cogito, which is
intrinsically bound to the subject/object, or mind/body, dichotomy. An inquiry into
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the cogito is to ask, where and what is my subjective self, my “central” I-think? In
presupposing the existence of a cogito, both rationalists and empiricists base
their understanding of the world from the metaphysical perspective of a relational
property that is distinct from the world of objective things, over and against this
subjectivity. Heidegger, by way of contrast, essentially dismisses this separation.
Put another way, the philosophic tradition of separating subject and object isn’t
merely problematic for Heidegger, it’s essentially overcome within his philosophy.
In fact, Heidegger would claim that in philosophically making the metaphysical
leap to an analysis of subject over and against object, being-in-the-world, and
Being in general, becomes utterly presupposed – dismissed, overlooked, as it
were. This dismissal of what Heidegger refers to as Being, ultimately drives his
analysis throughout all the argumentative avenues that his philosophy undergoes
throughout the years of his life.
In questioning Being, and the “Being of beings,” Heidegger asks a
question so seemingly simplistic, he asserts that by and large it has gone
unaddressed throughout the course of Western philosophy. What does it mean to
be, he posits? What is dasein, a German term Heidegger uses for the human
being, translated as being-there, in its essence? What does dasein entail, and
what is being-there’s relation to Being? As noted in the previous chapters, a
fundamental characteristic of dasein, according to Heidegger’s analysis in Being
and Time, is that the human being (dasein) is de-severant in nature. As deseverant, human beings are not only open to the world, but humans possess an
innate ability to unconcealment aspects of a world that would otherwise remain
concealed to Being. Both technology and art, understood within a modern
context, reveal the world to dasein, according to Heidegger (Heidegger,
“Question Concerning Technology,” “The Origin of the Work of Art”). While these
modes of revealing are essential to understanding embodiment and digitization,
so too is the reason Heidegger presents for the world concealing itself from the
human being, a further consequence, we shall see, of being embodied.
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That having been said, what is essential to Heidegger, is not only a
dismissal of Descartes’ human mind as cogito, but of the Aristotelian theory of
humans as the animal whose soul is guided by intellect, a rational soul (Aristotle,
“De Anima”). This is not to suggest that Heidegger dismisses humans as
potentially rational beings, imbued with the gift of a capacity to reflect upon
experience. Quite clearly this is not true, as noted repeatedly in What Is Called
Thinking, Heidegger finds that what is “Most thought-provoking is that we are still
not thinking…” (4). Rather, Heidegger understands our being, first and foremost,
as dominated by the phenomenological quality of “stretching” one’s being into
particular tasks via de-severance. This reality of de-severance, for Heidegger, is
not implicitly rational; in fact, it is quite the contrary. De-severance should not be
directly linked to his concept of thinking, regardless of de-severance remaining
the ground upon which thinking may be paved. De-severance and thinking are
not synonymous. One might rather posit de-severance as the drive of
Heidegger’s care, Husserl’s intentionality, or rather yet, primordial foundations of
the will, in the Nietzschean sense. And de-severance, whether conceived of as
the grounds of care, intentionality, or will, does not necessitate rationality. This is
essential to the issue of digitization, as it clarifies that digitization, in all its
seeming technological ingenuity and genius, should not be conceived of as being
inherently driven by rationality. The force, de-severance, that wills digitization
into unconcealment/existence is not rational, it is paradoxical, and it resides
within being embodied.
To clarify, de-severance may “hand us over” to the potential for rational
thought, but it does not, in its essential nature, guarantee Heideggerian
“thinking.” Likewise, having the innate capacity to “extend” my phenomenological
being into the “distance,” such as operating a digital drone, or existing in the
realm of a virtual world, does not insure rationality or suggest it. While idle-talk
tends to place rationality as the heart of technology, the drive toward digitization
is not dependent upon rationality. And it is Heidegger who puts this
presupposition into radical question.
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Again, this phenomenological quality of the human being as de-severant
opens the possibility for rationalization. However, even as we are faced with the
presence of digitation, no such rational objectives of the technologies currently in
existence need be, or even are at this very moment, insured.
So why and how have we managed to reveal digitization as an aspect of
our reality within the world? And what truth resides concealed within these
technologies, forged from the force of de-severance being? Nothing other than a
particular form of willing, a will driven by the paradox of embodiment. And the
willing that guides the actions of a de-severant being need not be known to us
for this will to possess and direct our actions toward a desired end. In order to
perceive the will that drives digitization, embodiment as access to the world’s
depth, must be understood. And here we encounter a philosophic location that
Heidegger recognizes, yet never adequately engages with as is necessary to
better comprehend digitization.
And still, what Heidegger’s contribution to philosophy displays is that deseverance is fundamental to our being, it is the very means by which we access
the world as something more than it is – as something to be revealed, awakened.
When we intend anything at all, awake or in our dreams, we are de-severant
insofar as our willing is brought to us as an issue to take up. In this re-uptake, we
are within the fabric of existence, not distinct from it as subject and object.
Furthermore, de-severance implies that human beings “stretch” their being within
a world that is always open to a range of infinite possibilities, constantly revealing
potentials within the materiality of existence. Heidegger notes, “In Dasein there
lies an essential tendency towards closeness.” (Being and Time, 140). This is to
say, human beings, in all our tasks, are constantly in a state of unconcealment
possibilities, taking up the world as a task to be engaged with.
The world did not come with digitization as an actualized “product,”
digitization is clearly not like the sun, which has always already rested
unconcealed for us in the sky. What digitization requires is de-severance,
provided by our being, in order to reveal our own essential will “towards
54

closeness.” The materials necessary to construct the circuitry of the world-wideweb remained as concealed actualities, dependent upon a de-severance of our
human type to emerge. What Heidegger’s philosophy discloses to his reader is
the unique character of the human being to reveal new spaces for experience,
whether this be through technology or art. This unconcealment, whether it be a
work of art or a technology, ultimately further reveals possibilities within the open
depth of Being. But does revealing entail knowing what will be revealed, or why
we are revealing a possibility of Being? Not at all. As noted above, the human
being can unconceal without a sense of what is being opened, without reason
into its own willing. The repercussions of unconcealment, and why we are
unconcealing the world as we are, can and do remain concealed to us if we do
not allow what has been unconcealed to address us as a call to question. To
question what and how? To question our will, and to do so as a
phenomenological inquiry, which does not pretend to “stand over the subject of
digitization,” as an object, but rather as an experience that we are part of, and
which can inform us about our own selves as human beings.
And in this regard, Heidegger’s general dismissal of embodiment gains
importance for addressing the answers digitization asks of us.

Human Embodiment as being-in-the-World: The world can only
be de-severed by having an embodied perspective within it
To further comprehend digitization, it is essential to understand digitization as an
extension of a “grounded” unison between embodiment and world. In this
manner, digitization is an outgrowth of the potentiality when human embodiment
and the world exist together as one. Whether or not digitization is indispensable
to, or merely a possibility of, this relation is a question worth asking, but one that
would be based primarily upon the grounds of an esoteric analysis. Digitization
has occurred, and it exists. The practical question is to ask what, if anything,
digitization reveals to us about our own human condition, as well as our
potentials and limitations as embodied human beings. A truth that is coming to
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light is that human embodiment exists as a catalyst, within a world of concealed
potential. Embodiment always already had, as its potential, the ability to reveal
digitization through technological means. And this embodied potential was met,
even as new digital technologies continue to emerge. The question of how
embodiment managed this task, and why, is one that is connected to an analysis
of both embodiment’s potentials and limitations.
As Heidegger informs us, dasein is always subjected to the consequences
of being-in-the-world. And while Heidegger is aware of the body’s significance in
his use of the terms ready-to-hand, and present-to-hand, Heidegger’s analysis of
dasein rarely focuses on the body as the site whereby the world is revealed. It is
Merleau-Ponty who expands upon Heidegger’s phenomenology, placing primary
emphasis on embodiment and perception as the site of being-in-the-world.
Subsequently, Merleau-Ponty begins at embodiment and perception when
analyzing subjects such as art, language, technology, and politics. This is a
pivotal turn within the field of phenomenology, in part because it clarifies that deseverance is not some mystical force “within” the human being; rather, deseverance discovers the potentiality of the world via the way in which human
embodiment comes to know the world through a particular embodied schema.
And this schema establishes styles of knowing the world, as well as the
possibilities of its revealing.
As Merleau-Ponty writes, “I hold my body as an indivisible possession and
I know the position of each of my limbs through a body schema [un schema
corporel]” (Phenomenology of Perception, 101). This schema, for Merleau-Ponty,
should not be confused with the empiricist’s objective mode of analysis, which
tends to observe the motions, organs, cells, DNA, and even atoms distinctly –
however fruitful such an analysis may prove to be. The body is not merely an
objective, in fact, the body schema is not an object at all, Merleau-Ponty insists.
The body schema is lived as experience within the world. Due to this, we tend to
presuppose the body schema, as well as its significance in coming to know and
reveal the world to us. As noted, “…the “body schema” is, in the end, a manner
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of expressing that my body is in and towards the world” (103). Because of this,
“When I say that an object is on a table, I always place myself (in thought) in the
table or the object, and I apply a category to them that in principle fits the relation
between my body and the external objects” (103). This “in thought” is deseverance and the “taking up” an object as it applies to the schema of my body is
finding meaning in anything within the world, while simultaneously knowing its
existence through my own embodiment. Whatever the object may reveal is
predicated upon its potential to “find itself” within my body’s schema.
And it is essential to the case of digitization that we grasp both the
importance of Heidegger’s de-severance, while also incorporating the additions
of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of embodiment, as the means by which a schema of
“knowing” the world’s depth is achieved whatsoever. Addressing this issue will
also enrich a further insight into the question of what kind of willful drive resides
within the creation and engagement with digital technologies.
But what drive do I suggest the will is attempting to overcome in the
“materialization” of digitization? Nothing other than the very being-in, as being
situated in-the-world, which provides the possibility for the will to posit its aim as
a will toward “taking up” the world, which now also means itself, as a drive to
overcoming its very being, as situated within the world. But why are we situated?
What situates this will to overcome at all? What situates the will, and which
Heidegger does not dismiss throughout his philosophy, but arguably negates
throughout his philosophic work, is embodiment as the “ground” of being-in – of
knowing the world, and reciprocally expressing the world as such. The will
beneath digitization, is none other than the will that wills its own escape from very
situational placement, as a being embodied within the world.
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Embodiment as “knowing the world” Part 1: Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophic contribution and its relation to Virtual Reality
“Only a phenomenology of expression that begins and remains within lived experience
can avoid the pitfalls of classical approaches that offer nothing but a “bad ambiguity,”
nothing but the “mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority.””
-

Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (7)

-

Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (7)

“If thought were complete and pure in itself, then it would possess in advance everything
we would ever think (either alone or in dialogue).”

The will that drives digitization is nothing new to the “human condition.” As
previously noted, being-in-the-world is an historic process of coming to “know the
world,” to reveal it. To express the possibilities that lay dormant “with-in,” but
paradoxically present in their potential to our de-severant capacity as embodied
within a grander situation. As embodied via our schema, human beings “take up”
the world, and find “within it” the task and concern that drives our willing towards
overcoming the world’s depth “against” our embodiment. And in order to do so,
as Merleau-Ponty continually informs us throughout Phenomenology of
Perception, and arguably even more so within his later work, requires
embodiment as a schema of being-in the world. All beings in the world, that is all
life, is embodied in one manner or another. And given the phenomenological
concern, our own embodiment, our own lived experience, is of the greatest
interest to ourselves. We are a being that attempts to know itself, and this
attempt is made possible only by having a situation at all. Our situation is beingin the world, as embodied, situationally within and as a constant correlation to the
world. What is essential to Merleau-Ponty, and this exploration of digitization, is
that embodiment always situates within, and is never external to the world. Being
embodied implies being within the world’s depth. However, embodiment is also,
strictly speaking, never an internal to the world either. If there is an “echo” of selfhood, a soul (so to speak), it is only “found” within our de-severant nature as a
constant “re-uptake” of the world’s depth as embodied. Being embodied is being
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“in” the world. The depth that engulfs us, and which we reveal by navigation
within it, sustains embodiment as a constant perspective. Our embodiment,
manifested as digitization, wills the overcoming of depth, but this overcoming is
impossible, because depth sustains this will.
As Donald A. Landes informs us in his text, Merleau-Ponty and the
Paradox of Expression, “If thought were complete and pure in itself, then it would
possess in advance everything we would ever think (either alone or in dialogue)”
(7). This is a succinct quotation which grasps one of the primary points MerleauPonty attempts to convey within the whole of his philosophy. The mind, or “innerself”, however defined or indefinable its autonomy may be, is always situational
because of embodiment, and is always the result of the schema of embodiment.
Our knowing the world is never an escape from it or a “grand” eye gazing upon it
in pure rational thought, as though it were distinct from us. Another way to
rephrase the Landes quote is to acknowledge that thought is never complete or
pure because it is always contextualized within the world’s depth. Yet another
way to understand this is to say if thought were pure and complete, there would
be no depth. In this scenario, there would be no willing at all, nothing to take-up
or overcome.
What informs our being, and subsequently all aspects of our historic
epistemology, whether in theory or practice, is that our embodied relationship to
being-in-the-world remains thick, it is a “depth.” The world provides a neverending depth for embodiment to “take up,” from the inside out, and
simultaneously, the outside in. As Merleau-Ponty writes, in The Visible and the
Invisible, “It suffices for us for the moment to note that he who sees cannot
possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he is of it,* unless, by
principle, according to what is required by the articulation of the look with the
things, he is one of the visibles, capable, by a singular reversal, of seeing them—
he who is one of them” (134-135). One way to decipher this statement by
Merleau-Ponty is to express that embodiment, as schema, that is, as a particular
form of existing, reflects itself in the world, and the world vis-à-vis reflects itself in
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this style of embodiment. There are endless examples of this, both within
digitization and outside of it. It is sufficient to say then that when we access the
world’s depth, with our embodiment, we find in it possibilities of reflecting our own
schema of embodiment. All digital technologies relate to our embodiment. The
field of ergonomics takes this matter as its obsession, but the truth of the matter
is that ergonomics merely tweaks, or resides within a secondary sphere of
contemplation in regard to what always already takes place in any human
construction, simply by being embodied as we are.

The examples of this again are not only endless within digitization, but
absolutely fundamental to it, as well as to any creation prior to it. The first Xbox,
released in North America on November 15th, 2001, had a controller that was
made for none other than the schema of the human hands (Game Informer, 48).
There is no doubt that time, energy, and ultimately capital was invested into
researching the ergonomics of how best to design the first edition of this product
for the human hands, as well as “tweaking” those that would follow within the
subsequent versions of the Xbox. However, the issue here is that this
thoughtfulness was in fact secondary. Of course, the gaming system’s controls
would be designed for the human hand; it is comically self-evident pointing this
out, as this is the primary means by which the game is made accessible to the
embodied gamer. And yet, this phenomenon accompanies every aspect of
digitization, whether it be from the writing of every code to the emersion in virtual
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reality, however subtle and unnoticeable it is at first inspection. All emergence
facilitated by embodiment takes place both at the stage of the theoretical
“drawing board,” as well as in the practice of making and then using any digital
technology that is now “real,” and “facing” us within the world. The world is
reflected only with-in our knowing of the world as embodied through a particular
schema that is ultimately unique to the human being, as opposed to any other
style of embodiment.
It is worth briefly noting here that while I am making the case that
Heidegger displays what I would suggest is a notable ambivalence toward
engaging embodiment “head on,” within in his own philosophic, and hence, is
inadequate to fully understand embodiment and digitization, the human hands
are also essential to dasein’s being in Being and Time. It is not happenstance on
Heidegger’s part that the concepts of ready-to-hand and present-to-hand
accompany his critique of dasein as being-in-the-world throughout Being and
Time. Under the lens of Merleau-Ponty, it would make sense to
phenomenologically posit Heidegger’s explicit discussion of the hands as a
primary sight of our embodiments coming to know the world, coming to “take it
up,” as it were. The concept of a disembodied mind would be undoubtedly be
rather absurd to Heidegger, as it is through our “engagement” with equipment
that the world is discovered, as a fashion, which is predicated upon certain style
of hand(s).
Again, and this is not to dismiss the richness that accounts of embodiment
as a totality (*which is specifically what I wish to avoid by bringing Merleau-Ponty
in), but the hands are a fundamental site of epistemic “contact.” This is true
throughout digitization, given the keyboards on which I type, to smart-phone,
which is specifically designed for the hands. But what is fundament here is not
simply noticing that the human body and our digital technologies are made for
the other, which I will continue to extrapolate upon, but that the body is not simply
a thing in the world. The fact that the Xbox controller requires itself to be
ergonomically tweaked to better the gamer’s unawareness of the device, making
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it ready-to-hand, is secondary to its existence as a de-severant “extension” of
human embodiment; which according to Merleau-Ponty, is not simply an object
in the world. In Part 1 of Phenomenology of Perception, titled “The Body,”
Merleau-Ponty expands upon Heidegger’s realization, stating that the body,
embodiment, cannot be understood as another object in the world (152-153).
Merleau-Ponty is not naïve in this section to realizing that the body can and has
become the objective study of the sciences, lending itself to discoveries and
advancements in health and technology. His point is that this too resides with a
secondary awareness of the body. First and foremost, prior to us making the
body present-to-hand, that is, aware of, and a subject for ergonomics to
objectively study, embodiment exists not as an object, but as expression, which
“opens the world.” As Merleau-Ponty states, “I am not in front of my body, I am in
my body, or rather I am my body” (151). Landes, in Merleau-Ponty and the
Paradox of Expression, addresses this quite eloquently by noting, “There is an
immediate relation of sense between body and world. Being in the world is
accomplished as the interplay between spontaneity and sedimentation, and thus
expressive embodiment is the deeper truth that classical philosophies have failed
to recognize” (88). What these two are attempting to display is that while it is true
that I can analyze my body as an object, and this has surely produced fruitful
benefits, it dismisses the body as the site of “taking up” the world, which is
constantly accomplished prior to any reflection on the body as an object. And
what is more, it gives us a world to address.
The human body, as embodiment, “plays the world,” so to speak, and
reciprocally the world calls on the body to play it. And just like a musical
instrument, embodiment’s particular style simultaneously informs the body, world,
and “myself,” of what the world is, and where within the world embodiment can
discover and become more than is found within the present moment. Digitization,
and all of its discoveries, theatrical or in material practice, display this truth when
analyzed phylogenetically. As example, consider the advent of, and engagement
with, virtual realties, such as through the Oculus Rift, a virtual reality device. And
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at best, virtual reality’s accessories, such as the Virtuix Omni and Myo Gesture
Control Armband. These devices, considered phenomenologically, are the result
of the correlation of the world and our embodiment, first and foremost, on a level
that does not reside within objectification, or by insisting that objects within said
virtual realities be/are present-to-hand objects. Another way to put this, and this
points to why “classical philosophies have failed to recognize” embodiment as
the opening to being, is that embodiment works on the essential grounds of
“forgetting” that we are embodied as such.
Virtual reality is embodiment and is in no way an escape from it. That is, to
play within virtual reality, for one to “take-up” residency within a viral world, one
must feel as though they are within it, and this is accomplished only on the
grounds of paradoxically feeling embodied, by losing the sense of being
embodied. For virtual reality to fully work, it must be experienced as ready-tohand; that is, we are within our daily routine, and this is the loss of the sense of
embodiment’s significance in order for sense to occur. At best, a virtual
experience should provide the experiencer the ability to “drop” one’s selfawareness (the present-to-handness) of being in anything that is even remotely
strange to their body, the result being that the virtual reality “attaches” itself as
correlative to the human’s body-scheme of knowing the world as embodied. This
requires that one does not struggle with the world, but precisely that one “find
oneself” so embodied to being-in-it that it is firmly “had,” and not appear as
found at all. Only then can the virtual environment be “taken-up” as experience
for genuine embodied engaging. That is, only then will it feel completely real to
the experiencer. And it is this reason that virtual reality has existed as possible
for quite some time, yet is only now beginning to become technologically possible
through refinements of the technologies.
This can and must be achieved explicitly through what allows us the
ready-to-hand “take up” of our lives within one’s daily reality, that is, within our
normal experience of embodiment outside of virtual worlds. Specifically,
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embodiment is the pre-epistemic ground for “take-up” to occur as the possibility
of knowing of anything at all.
An example of this is the clunky nature of the Oculus Gear VR, however
stunning it may be to a first-time VR user, the problems inherent to the gear are
quickly realized. This technology was released November 27th, 2015, as an
addition to the Samsung Galaxy line of phones (GSMArena). This device is made
to house one’s cellular device, as seen below. The phone then displays visuals,
which are seen by the viewer through the gear in order to “enter” a virtual world.
The device itself is built to replicate our binocular vision, as embodied by having
two eyes horizontally adjacent to each other. This is stereoscopics at play,
creating the sense of depth and emersion that the human eyes enable. The
device even considers the curvature of the human eyes. All of this having been
noted, the technology itself, like all virtual reality devices, point us back to the
significance of embodiment prior to even engaging in the experience. The device
must conform to the style of embodiment that we are, and subsequently, even
has foam cushioning around the locations where it meets the face, to further
erode the illusion of wearing anything at all.
Once the device is in use, the experience offered by the product, while
impressively immersive, still quickly exemplifies the present-to-hand issues that
virtual reality faces. And these issues are present not because embodiment
needs overcoming, but because we are embodied and can never escape this
fact. In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes, “Habit expresses
the power we have of dilating our being in the world, or of altering our existence
through incorporating new instruments” (145). Prior to a first-time user ever
placing the Oculus Gear VR onto their head, and pressing play, embodiment has
habituated the de-severant “take up” one knows of the world. Paradoxically,
embodiment is made aware of by this device, which is exactly what it attempts to
“overcoming.” The hilarity of watching another engage with the technology is
almost more enjoyable than experiencing the virtual world for oneself. The
reason for this is that the user’s own embodiment becomes comically aware to
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them, as well as those watching the person partially absorbed in the virtual
reality. It might be accurate to say that the individual using the device is
experiencing “double-embodiment,” a term I’ll use here to express the sense of
simultaneously having and losing one’s epistemic map of the world – a deseverant confusion, as it were.
Another way to express this double-embodiment is to note that the person
engaging with the device is both ready-to-hand and present-to-hand at the same
moment, or at least navigating the two extremes at a rate so quick that it is
unfamiliar to the normal experience of the world. On the one hand, one’s
embodied vision is allowed the “take-up” needed by the device for embodiment to
slip into a new location, as in a dream, via a vision. On the other hand, this is not
so at all, as the person is exceptionally aware that that they both are and are not
embodied in the “right” place when wearing the device and playing a virtual
world. One’s “take up” with the world is confused, so much so, as to make some
individual physically sick, even to the point of dizziness that induces vomiting, a
symptom known as virtual reality sickness (LaViola Jr., “A Discussion of
Cybersickness in Virtual Environments”). But why is this? A phenomenologically
grasp of embodiment holds an answer.
Phenomenological embodiment is never lost by any living human being,
regardless of the situation, precisely because embodiment is situating. Death is
the loss of embodiment, the loss of situationally “taking up” the world and
discovering residency in it, of being-in-the-world, which death puts to an end.
Oculus Gear VR, thankfully, doesn’t end being-in-the-world. But the device does
“dilate” the world, as Merleau-Ponty notes above. A “new instrument” has been
added as soon as one hits play button on the Gear VR. But this instrument is
“clunky” because it both does and does not allow for the total “emersion”
embodiment needs for it to have access to the map of “habit.” Habit is what
allows embodiment to “take up” the world as a whole, giving embodiment over to
fluid de-served experience. Embodiment is lost to us as the pre-objective
opening to the world because for it to fulfill itself, as a correlative relation between
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embodiment and world, it must not take note of itself as an issue. Embodiment as
an issue, becomes quite literally, sickeningly at issue for some that use the
Oculus Gear VR, one of the reasons being that one’s hands and feet are not
present within the virtual experience provided by this technology. The sensation
of having, while oddly not having, phantom limbs immediately takes over as one
form of double-embodiment. The individual is aware that their hands and feet, as
their normal powers of expression, are eliminated in this virtual world. But of
course, these powers are left simultaneously “behind” as accessible in the world
of their daily life, which now oddly blend together as one “new” foreign world of
experience. Because of this, it is wise that the individual using this device sits
down, as the propensity to falling over is normal. This is due to what I am
referring to as “double-embodiment,” as being ready-to-hand and present-tohand at once. The loss of, or the inability to “take up” either world, real or virtual,
is what occurs here. One can’t fully “gear” oneself into the “take up” of the virtual
world due to a lack of possessing the entire map that embodiment typically
provides. Worse yet, and adding to the amusement of those viewing the VR
occupant, is the difficulty of “taking up” residency in the world of reality. For
example, to adjust the focus of the Oculus Gear VR to one’s eyes, a dial must be
fine-tuned on the device. The issue, at least when first acclimating to the device,
or of “altering our existence through incorporating new instruments,” as MerleauPonty puts it, is that it is difficult to use one’s hands to properly locate the dial.
Meanwhile, one’s vision is made remarkably ready-to-hand, allowing for
genuine “take up” of this singular region of embodiment’s “map,” and yet still,
one’s vision is disoriented by the lack of the whole. This directs one to another
point made by Merleau-Ponty, which is that the “parts” of the body are in fact
never the discrete parts of the sciences. “Within” each part of my body, so too the
other parts reside and inform said parts’ “take-up” of the world. It is not
psychedelically driven to state that my eyes “touch” the world, or my eyes “see”
it. Vision needs its counterparts, and it is this lack that makes the rest of one’s
body present-to-hand. When using the device, one is also made aware of the
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body, as an “object” of concern for the individual engaging with the technology.
“How do I move in here?” Or, “Ouch! What did I just hit my hand on!?,” are
common expressions one hears from an individual wearing the device. All of this
is amusing, but also directs us back to embodiment as the grounds of being-inthe-world. If any virtual technology is to “succeed” at total emersion into the
“habit” that is required for a true “take up” of the virtual world, doubleembodiment must not occur.
This is precisely what digitization is striving towards, as it perfects the
experience of virtual reality. The Virtuix Omni and Myo Gesture Control Armband
can be used as additions to the Oculus Rift, providing both the hands and legs a
“situation” within the virtual world. What cannot be escaped is embodiment within
these realties. Embodiment situates what we bring to these realties, and because
these realities are embodied, embodiment situates what we “bring back” from
them.

Oculus Rift. Released March 28th, 2016

67

Virtuix Omni. Remains in production, while released to Kickstarer Funders in January of 2017.

Myo Gesture Control Armband. Released to the public as of 2017.
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Embodiment as “knowing the world” Part 2: Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophic contribution and its relation to digital content as
discovered within the grounds of embodiment
“My body is the hinge and the negotiation between real and ideal weight, and its every
gesture is between pure repetition and pure creation, between body and mind, between
determinism and spontaneity.”
-

Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradox of Expression, (11)

Prior to any detached, cognitive act “within” the mind of a subject, embodiment
has already accessed the world, of which it is of. One’s embodiment “maps” the
world as epistemic and accessible to itself, as something to “take up,” engage
with, and express. Expression, that is, what is expressed every subtle moment of
embodied life, is always de-severance residing within the continuous grounds of
embodiment. Our embodied does not rest against digitization. Digitization is
embodiment’s discovery of its own potential within the world. Or as MerleauPonty states, in Phenomenology of Perception,
“Our body, insofar as it moves itself, that is, insofar as it is inseparable from a
perspective and is this very perspective brought into existence, is the condition of
possibility not merely of the geometrical synthesis, but also of all the expressive
operations and all the acquisitions that constitute the cultural world. When it is said that
thought is spontaneous, this does not mean that it coincides with itself; rather, it means
that thought transcends itself, and speech is precisely the act by which it in fact becomes
eternal.” (408)

One way to understand this quotation is to realize that in an analysis of
embodiment, embodiment itself is being expressed. In no act, mathematic,
coded, or in cultural theory or practice, is embodiment somehow exempt. Rather,
these accomplishments, including digitization, find their creative breath exhaled
through the correlation of our style of embodiment to their being-in the world.
For example, it may be beneficial here to think of digitization’s creative
“environments” as existent upon embodiment’s de-severant style of already
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handing the human being over to the possibilities of imagination, or dreams.
Digitization, I will argue, is essentially imagination, or accessing the world’s
depth, realized. And to grasp how this possible it is important to understand
phenomenologically how imagination itself is possible, as a constant attribute of
embodiment being-in-the-world. In doing so, I will focus on a digital game.
However, this analysis, applies to the advent, look, and use of operating
systems, desktop interfaces, social media, virtual landscapes, and all other digital
games.
Consider the 2016 video game, DOOM. The game, released On May
13th, of 2016, was the much-anticipated reboot of a 1993 video game, which
holds the same title. The original DOOM, released on December 10th, 1993, is
often considered to be the historic epitome of the first-person shooter (Mäyrä,
(104). The intention of the 2016 version of the game was essentially to bring the
graphics and game-play of the original into modern day life. The game was
released on Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 4, and the Xbox One gaming
platforms, and received significant critical acclaim (Yin-Poole). Both games, new
and old, are based within the context of a futuristic Mars space-station scenario,
as well as access to the realms of Hell. In human’s search for alternative energy
forms, a portal to hell has been opened. And you probably guessed, the
aftermath isn’t pretty. The game places you into a fast-paced landscape of
zombies and hellish demons, just waiting to be destroyed by the protagonist.

DOOM, 1993. Final Boss.
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DOOM, 2016. Final Boss.

Provided the phenomenological lens of embodiment, these creatures are
fascinatingly foreign, yet also “known” to their artistic creators, as well as myself,
through nothing other than the epistemic being-in-the-world of embodiment. And
this relation to embodiment brings digital games, however alien, into existence,
and has done so in imagination prior to the actualization of digitization.
What often goes unnoticed within our imagination and dreams is that
these hypothetical experiences, occurring “within the mind,” are also never
unembodied, and rely fully upon the knowledge gained in having always been
embodied – having always “taken up” a world. In this sense, the very notion of
anything existing alone “in the mind” may be brought into question. One’s
daydream of a far-off land, where all problems are left “behind,” is predicated
upon being de-severed in that experience from a certain perspective; a certain
style of embodiment is already with this imaginative scenario. The blissful trees
and breeze within this dreamscape reside for one as having known them as
something not against one’s own body, but with one’s body as a being-in the
world. Their meaningful significance to me cannot be detached from having
previously “taken them up,” as an embodied experience, their relationship to me.
The texture of the trees and soft warm breeze, are known not just as distinct from
one’s own embodiment, but as with them. Sight, touch, smell, etc. “take up”
residency in all experiences. Through being-in-the-world, one’s skin engages
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with the skin of the tree, knowing it only as rough, thick, and strong against the
delicate nature of one’s own skin.
Perhaps the tree in one’s imagination is foreign to reality, exhibiting a bark
that is smooth as the skin of a peach. Here we discover the depth latent within
being embodied, as our de-severant style is. This odd imagination finds in the
tree’s bark an expression of something more than is there in the world. But is it
more than is there? For whimsical imagination to occur, embodiment as deseverant must already access the depth of possibility. While it is true that no
actual tree possesses soft bark/skin like that of peach, the very imagination of it
is discovered in the depth of world’s possibility. And soft and hard skin only make
sense to one, embodied already, who “takes up” access to the world’s depth. The
possibility for a tree in one’s imagination to exhibit another quality is not “outside”
of the world, it is in the world that this is possible. One discovers oneself in this
experience not as a “pure mind” above the experience, but as being-in it,
situationally. No imagination or dream, strictly speaking, is out of reality.
Even our most bizarre moments of “true creative expression,” within a
dreamscape, or actualized on pen and paper, reside within our embodiment’s
“map” of what it epistemically “grasps.” Take the final Boss in the video game
DOOM (*see images above). The foreign features, however odd they may be,
make sense to me not because they are entirely mine, but because in the world
of embodied experience, I have already “discovered” my body “against” foreign
beings as embodied and given room for the discovery of their potential depth.
The spider-cockroach like being in DOOM is discovered by its creator, via
the world’s depth through embodiment. The same is true when a new gamer
meets the digital enemy for the first time. The spider and cockroach-like being in
this experience take up residency within my own embodiment, not as my own,
but precisely as “mapping” the unknown styles of being embodied. The meaning
of this foreign “object” is discovered here. One can only sympathize with the
strangeness of its eyes and legs, because my own eyes and legs have brought
forth meaningful sense to the world through taking it up as depth. What one
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cannot grasp, and what emerges as fright to the viewer in this imagination
brought to digital life, is precisely that these creatures, in one’s lived experience
with them, present possibilities that one’s embodied style never fully knows. This
is so only because one is embodied as such. The extra appendages of an insect,
and the imaginative nightmare that the gamer now lives make sense because of
what one lacks in their own embodiment. The multitude of unexperienced eyes
and legs that an insect’s style has, both does and does-not make sense to the
human style of embodiment, and this depth of the unknown is carried into our
dreams and imaginative states of creation.
A digital virtual “dreamscape,” whereby the laws and rules of reality seem
foreign, new, and exciting, as in both DOOM games, presuppose that they were
“brought” to this digital space, only upon the grounds of embodiment. All digital
worlds, however seemingly foreign, as though they are in a dream, have been
given creative life only through the consistency of human beings embodied within
a world to begin with.
What’s more, as alluded to above, is that within dreams and virtual worlds,
one is never disembodied. And prior to any “material” realization of digital
platforms or worlds as “true” possibilities for one’s engagement, the dream
already possessed what was always already required for digitization. And this is
so only by being embodied situationally. Even in the creation of virtual worlds, the
one designing the world is situated, and always remains within their own
embodiment, even if we desire to extrapolate to the perspective within the world’s
creation on the screen. No game or avatar “within” a game is without embodied
perspective, which one’s own embodiment as the constant grounds of being can
find home in through the screen, keyboard, mouse, or virtual appendages that
situate themselves to the human body for one to become “taken up” with the
experience of the game.
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And yet, the will that drives digitization is the will to escape
embodiment: Human beings “resent” the limits inherent in being
situational, and will to overcome this limitation
It is my hope that this chapter makes clear that embodiment and digitization are
inherently paradoxical in their relation, and this paradox is not one to be
overcome, ever. This is precisely because without embodiment digitization could
not be realized, as one’s own being would not have situation, a world to take up.
No depth exists without embodiment. The elimination of depth is only presumably
achieved at the death of embodiment, at which point no situation at all would be
accessible.
As I am attempting to display, digitization “actualizes” the attempt at
escaping embodiment, which is the condition that holds this attempt in constant
place as an actuality to be attempted. Oddly enough, if digitization is scrutinized
with a “phenomenological lens,” embodiment becomes increasingly evident as
the ground upon which the world is opened as a condition for “embodiment,” as a
de-severed style of being-in, to “take up” an impossible task. Subsequently, the
ultimate paradox of embodiment and digitization only grows in our attempt to
escape embodiment. Never has the body become so imprisoned “within” itself as
the means to escape itself in the quest to overcome depth. The smart phone may
as well be considered a part of the human body at this point. And virtual reality,
as it is coming to be realized, rests upon the encapsulation of the embodiment.
And with that, I leave you with this image. Perhaps the future holds the possibility
of creating our own sense of depth, while our phenomenal is imprisoned at
home.
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Man “inside” a game/virtual reality simulator.
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Chapter Three: Space and Digitization
“When I see an object, I always feel [éprouve] that there is still some being
beyond what I currently see, and not merely more visible being, but also more
tangible or audible being, and not merely more sensible being, but moreover a
depth of the object that no sensory withdraw will ever fully exhaust.”
-

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (224)

Introduction
Digitization, telepresence and all it entails, has seemingly eviscerated the
distance space imparts upon each and every one of us. Technologies that
interconnect us, such as smart phones, virtual reality devices, tablets, watches,
or desktops - these technologies are all impacting, perhaps even changing, the
experience of space, and this is undeniable. It is now possible to Skype in real
time any digitized person whose physical location exists across the globe or even
in outer space. Two friends that have never met “outside” of a game’s “virtual”
space, now exist together as comrades within a digital world. The length of time
once required to communicate over a vast spatial distance has seemingly
evaporated in our digitized existence.
In addressing the conditions of the contemporary digital landscape, it has
become common ground to turn toward space. But in what regard? Never before
has so much information rested within the embodied hands of any one individual,
nor has the ability to transcend one’s own physical location in order to
simultaneously experience another location been possible. Whether this
contemporary feat is used for peer-to-peer communication, education, business,
governance, or even gaming, the conclusion is presented as a victory over space
itself.
But in what way? Is the experience of space’s structure fundamentally
altered? Has space itself, via digitization, been fundamentally overcome? What
would this mean? Empirically speaking, digitization has clearly continued to
collapse space. Distance, as access from one location to another across the
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globe, has been eliminated; the 2018 Winter Olympics in full display within our
own living rooms is an example of that. But so too is outer space being
condensed, “touching” our own perception, held visually within our hands. Never
before have the planets within our solar system and beyond felt so close, so
near. I can now virtually tour Paris with the Oculus Rift, “eliminating” the distance
between my embodiment and the location, as well as the time (space) required to
arrive there. The transmission of a visual signal from one place to another is so
small, it might as well be nonexistent. One can know a friend’s locations, even
their intentions, with relative certainty only moments after an initial text message.
The alterations digital technology has caused to one’s existence “in” space
clearly appear as something profound to a sensible human being. In the
presence of such technology questions arise. For example: In what way has the
experience of space changed? If the experience of space has in fact changed,
have we human beings been changed as a result? And if this change shows
itself to be true, what are the short and long-term repercussions?
For example, Michael Heim, in his text The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality,
asserts that an ontological shift in our awareness has occurred. He states, “When
I write of an ontological shift, I mean more than a change in how we humans see
things, more than a paradigm shift or a switch in our epistemological stance. Of
course, our access to knowledge changes dramatically as we computerize the
arts, sciences, and business. But there are more things in heaven and earth than
are dreamed in our epistemology. An ontological shift is a change in the world
under our feet, in the whole context in which our knowledge and awareness are
rooted (xiii).” After making this assertion, Heim uses the example of the
automobile as a previous technology that changed “the world itself,” presumably
on an ontological level given his definition above (p. xiii). The experience of
space is undeniably impacted with the advent of the automobile. In the past, for
example, one may have considered traveling from New York City to Chicago in
the span of only a day to be an absurdity, but it is not until the technology of the
train or car that this absurdity is understood as anything but. But does this
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constitute an ontological shift in the human capacity for sensing space, that is a
change in our being itself?
The car, and other such technologies, are often used as early
technological examples prior to digitization. But again, the question at hand is if
this an ontological shift, a shift in being itself? And perhaps this depends on
semantics, though I argue that if we turn toward a phenomenological lens,
greater clarity will illuminate the matter, and we will see that while semantics can
muddy understanding, it does not distort the human condition itself, not
digitization and its underlying aim.
There is no doubt that digitization is changing the world on an empirical
level, but is it changing our ontology, our being? Or is it via our ontological
condition of space that we always “run up against” a particular ontology of space,
which ultimately constitutes us, allowing for digitization to become a reality? To
become something “actual.” To address this in a slightly different manner - does
digitization attempt to overcome space as one of our fundamental ontological
conditions? Perhaps it is not that our ontological conditions have changed, but
that we have fooled ourselves into believing that we’ve achieved an ontological
shift. In other words, fooled ourselves into believing that we have somehow
overcome space.
The theory of Space and Digitization, which is to be presented here, will
be constructed upon the foundations of a continued exploration of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment as it pertains to and influences his concept of
space. Space, and the objects human beings face within it, possess depth for
Merleau-Ponty, and there is a transcendent thickness to all objects encountered
in and as an aspect of space. There is, according to Merleau-Ponty in the
quotation above, “a depth of the object that no sensory withdraw will ever fully
exhaust” (Phenomenology of Perception, 224). And this depth of space, I will
argue, is essentially to both explore and acquire a greater phenomenological
understanding of digitization.
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And while human embodiment and space, conceived of as depth, are
essential to the following theory, I will first bring greater light to Martin
Heidegger’s concept of de-severance, the always already, meaning that deseverance must be understood as indivisible from conceptualizing how it is that
depth, and the thickness of objects, exist as such for the human condition. Next,
by engaging both Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, my intent is to display
how the objects of space, possessing depth, have made the revealing of
digitization possible. I will seek to display that with this de-servant access to
space as depth, a will-to-flatten is simply essential to the human condition as deseverant, which long precedes digitization, but is also never completely fulfilled
as a telos to totalizing depth and eradicating it through digitization.
My primary argument within this chapter on space and digitization is to
show that what remains presupposed “within” digitization is exactly this will-toflatten both space as empirical calculative distance, but more, philosophically,
this will’s true end is to flatten the phenomenological depth of space itself, which
we tend to presuppose. My final position is that while our embodiment, desevered as the human being is, always already wills-to-flatten depth (and hence
reveals digitization into being), such as a telos always remains fundamentally out
of reach due to both the nature of depth itself, and the human as fundamentally
situated within the world as embodiment. This being said, I will argue that the
consequences of this will-to-flatten, whether one sees them as positive or
negative, have a genuine impact on that being that has digitized its existence.

Clarification on Heidegger’s Analysis of Historically Driven
Ontology: The way towards the human condition as De-severant
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger analyzes the human being through the term
Dasein, or “being there.” In doing so, Heidegger’s intent throughout the text is to
conduct an in-depth inquiry into the fundamental conditions of Dasein’s relation
to being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, Heidegger informs his reader, is an
experience that Dasein is always already a part of, and which traditional
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philosophy and the contemporary sciences have subsequently presupposed, or
lost sight of. Of the numerus arguments made by Heidegger throughout his
magnum opus, Being and Time, one that is of great significance to contemplating
space and digitization, is his own analysis of the human being’s primary ontology
as de-severant.
Yet, in order to better grasp Heidegger’s argument surrounding deseverance, and ultimately its significance to space and digitation, it is vital that
Heidegger’s reader (whether through primary or supplementary ones) actively
come to “take on” his philosophic position for oneself. To do this, one must sense
that our grasp, the manner in which we interpret the world and even our own
being, is always under the influence and filter of history, which largely determines
one’s experience of the world. This lens through which we “come at the world,”
impacts how we see and understand said world, and this lens (any lens
according to Heidegger) is always historically driven.
Subsequently, Heidegger argues that Western history, from the time of
Socrates, exacerbated by the discoveries and philosophic direction of Descartes,
has obsessively objectified all areas of existence under the natural attitude. This
Heideggerian critique is significant to phenomenology as a whole, as many within
the philosophic theory continue to inquire into how it is that historic modes of
thinking (ideas) come into being, as well as impact the human condition as the
idea solidifies intersubjectively across time and culture. An analysis of
digitization, as the potential flattening of distance, depth, and time, surely
possess a rich ocean of inquiry for phenomenologists theorizing on the concept
of mind/idea in the twenty first century, and will be addressed in the final chapter
on intersubjectively and digitization.
For the time being, it should be noted that the intersubjective history one is
in is also consequently determinative of the primary ontological perception of the
world, even of the issue of consciousness. In Heidegger’s day, and still in our
own contemporary moment, the dominate ontology, which influences both casual
conversation and scientific research alike is a metaphysical dichotomy of “inner”
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consciousness, and the space of things “outside” of consciousness – the world of
objects. This can either take the form of an empiricist critique that apprehends
the exterior world as impressing itself upon human being, determining its
cognitive state, or, in the intellectualist philosophic tradition, influencing even
Edmond Husserl, one’s inner subjectivity impresses itself upon the external
world, socially determining the meaning within objective reality.
The issue for Heidegger, and subsequent phenomenologists in the wake
of Heidegger, is that this historically driven project, whether empiricist or
intellectualist, either renders consciousness as subjectivity and the world as
objectivity (intellectualism); or, it renders both inner and outer realms of existence
as ultimately objectifiable (empiricism). The result, according to Heidegger and
the Phenomenological tradition, is that both “inner” consciousness and “outer”
space have been treated as literal objects of inquiry, especially within the fields of
those contemporaries working within the project of digitization. That said, from
Heidegger’s own ontological stance, this clearly guides us toward scientific and
technological discoveries, which open certain doors, while simultaneously
remaining short-sighted to being, or primary raw phenomenological experience.
To be clear, for Heidegger this historic trajectory presupposes, and subsequently
misses Dasein’s most fundamental conditions, forgetting the question of what it is
to be.
In asking the question of being, Heidegger continually addresses the
seemingly odd phrasing of the “always already,” which I too will use. The reason
for this, and its importance to space and digitization, is that being-in-the-world (an
aspect of which is being in space) is always already a fundamental aspect of the
human condition, a condition Heidegger understands as presupposed in previous
philosophies/ontologies. Heidegger notes, “Dasein is an entity which, in its very
Being, comports itself understandingly towards Being” (Being and Time, 78).
Being, grasped in a Heideggerian manner, is the totality that the human being
(Dasein) is in and a part of. The world is what opens itself to the human being as
experience of anything at all. Heidegger further states, “…Dasein’s Being takes
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on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood a prior as
grounded upon that state of Being which we have called “Being-in-the-world’”
(Being and Time, 78). Simply put, being embodied (situated) within space is all
one knows, and due to this, there can never technically be any form of seeing
“above” it through either rational or analytic consideration. There is always the
sustained reality of always already being-in-space, not outside of it, or over and
against it, as Heidegger informs us the historic ontologies presuppose.
Furthermore, and due to this, our intentionality (here Heidegger is building upon
Husserl’s concept of intentionality), the manner in which the human being
comports itself toward the world, is by its nature one of de-severance when
analyzed on the foundation of returning to being, as Heidegger did in Being and
Time.
Heidegger’s de-severance, then, should not be reduced to either a purely
objective or subjective phenomenon; it cannot be simplified to an inner/outer
dichotomy. Doing so would be the fundamentally wrong approach to grasping the
phenomenological significance of de-severance as it pertains to space and
digitization. And this, due to our history, may be the most difficult point to grasp
and maintain throughout the current analysis, but I feel is essential to clarify.

De-severance and the Phenomenology of Space: How is space,
understood as depth, accessible to the human being?
In Being and Time, by phenomenologically going “back” to Dasein’s ontological
being-in-the-world, Heidegger states “But in as much as any entity within-theworld is likewise in space, its spatiality will have an ontological connection with
the world. We must therefore determine in what sense space is constituent for
that world which has in turn been characterized as an item in the structure of
Being-in-the-world” (134). Here, Heidegger begins to move towards the
significance of de-severance, as a mode of being towards the world, being
“moved by” the world, called on it, so to speak. His analysis of space is one not
of calculative space, though he works through how it is that calculative space can
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be formed later on in “reflection.” Our primary ontological existence, however, is
first and foremost one of being ready-to-hand, a term hinting again towards
embodiment as the fundamental grounds of knowing the world. Ready-to-hand is
coming to know the world not in an analytic, reflective manner, but through doing,
through engaging with one’s world and its surroundings. When I type with my
computer the keyboard is largely ready-to-hand, meaning it is a mode of
accessing the world; it is not aware of me on a cognitive level, but my
embodiment has rather attuned itself to it, so as to make it an “extension” of my
being, driving my digital possibilities on the screen. The keyboard only becomes
noticeable to me, or present-to-hand, if it breaks or is the matter of analytic
reflection. The vast majority of experience, and primary ontological experience, is
this pulledness (ready-to-hand) into situations, in virtue of being embodied as
one is. It is only through this primary mode of being-in-the-world that a concern
for the concept of what is close in space arises within reflection.
Space then, for Heidegger, though not specifically dealing with MerleauPonty’s depth, is very much so aware of space phenomenologically. It might be
said that Heidegger “brings” the issue of space into the phenomenological, noting
the experience of space as such. And this is simply to say, Heidegger is going
“back” to what the experience of space is for the human being prior to any will to
calculate it as distance between objects, or of objects. In fact, Heidegger goes on
to claim, “Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness, which is not to
be ascertained by measuring distances” (135). The way in which closeness is
had at all is via Dasein’s nature itself, not as independent from it. Heidegger then,
essentially, attributes spatiality to the human being, while also not denying the
existence of the world itself. It can simply be stated that for phenomenologists,
any notion of the world, including its inherent spatiality, independent of the
human being, is fundamentally absurd. As such, he writes, “If we attribute
spatiality to Dasein, then this ‘Being in space’ must manifestly be conceived in
terms of the kind of Being which that entity possesses” (138). But the human
being is neither fundamentally an object or subject for Heidegger, and yet it is a
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being that is in-the-world as a means of opening itself to experience, an
existential.
Hence, Heidegger states, “…its (*the human being’s) spatiality shows the
characters of de-severance and directionality. When we speak of deseverance as a kind
of Being which Dasein has with regard to Being-in-the-world, we do not understand by it
any such thing as remoteness (or closeness) or even distance. We use the expression
“deseverance” in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a
constitutive state of Dasein’s Being – a state with regard to which removing something in
the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. “De-severing” amounts
to making the farness vanish – that is, making the remoteness of something disappear,
bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered
close by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness,
like distance, is a determinate categorical characteristic of entities who nature is not that
of Dasein” (138-139).

This passage, and I quote it in its length due to its importance,
simultaneously explains de-severance under Heidegger’s own terms, while
paving the way to linking de-severance to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of space as
depth, and all the while it is rich with significance in regard to the nature of the
human being’s fundamental will towards digitization, as the will-to-flatten-depth.
De-severance, understood by Heidegger is always an existential of the
human condition, which makes spatiality itself accessible. And as such, for the
human being, de-severance is an irreducible mode of being-in-the-world; this is
to say, as an existential, there is no going beyond de-severance, or into it,
because the very means at attempting to do so would be de-severance itself at
play. As such, de-severance is neither object nor subject, neither inner nor outer,
and it cannot be reduced to any tangible thing. De-severance is a means of
opening experience, a mode of orientation within the world for the human being.
To explain de-severance through something else would be futile. One might say,
the human being, as de-severance, discovers itself both in and as a part of
space, and as such, the diversity of realities that space maintains, due to depth.
Digitization, in its essence, brings the spatiality of the world, the experience of the
84

world, as close to us as humanly possible in our particular historic moment –
digitization is a transcendent human project that “reaches toward” closeness.
Transcendent in that what has driven digitization into existence, underlies a
fundamental movement towards nearness that has long pre-dated digitization’s
tangible reality. And this is due to the human being’s existential de-severance,
and de-severance’s access to space, rich with depth. It is only through a deseverant access to space that a will for nearness of the things discovered within
space is made possible. Reciprocally, it should be noted that through depth, as a
phenomenological component of space, the technological possibilities for
creating digital technologies were discovered. And here a clarification of depth,
as a primary aspect of space, is required. This will lead to the realities of the willto-flatten, which will manifest itself as digitization within our tangible digital
technologies.
In, Phenomenology of Perception, one of Merleau-Ponty’s realizations,
which will enrich the current issue of Space and Digitization, while further
situating de-severance within the argument, is that space should not be
considered as somehow distinct from the human condition, or as against us.
Space, though undeniably possible to calculate and mathematize, is not first and
foremost a thing of objectivity, but rather a medium in which de-severed
embodied discovers a world, finds itself while seeking possibility within the depth
of that world. And while it is incorrect to claim that for Merleau-Ponty, space is a
byproduct of de-servant embodiment, de-severance, embodiment and space (as
human) do mutually “inform” each other as one, and it is in this exchange that the
depth of space, and the thickness of things, is made possible. As Merleau-Ponty
writes, “Space is not the milieu (real or logical) in which things are laid out, but
rather the means by which the position of things becomes possible. That is,
rather than imagining space as a sort of ether in which all things are immersed,
or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic they would all share, we must think
of space as the universal power for their connections” (Phenomenology of
Perception, 254). Space theorized under Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
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lens, much like de-severance for Heidegger, is not the empirical relationship
between objects within mathematic space against a subjectivity, but rather an
existential for us human beings that is rich with depth, ultimately meaning that the
existence of things in space is thick with potential for the human being, as
embodied de-severance.
As Merleau-Ponty states, “We observe for the first time with regard to
one’s own body what is true of all perceived things: the perception of space and
the perception of the thing, or the spatiality of the thing and its being as a thing,
are not two distinct problems” (Phenomenology of Perception, 149). Things in
space, phenomenologically related to our embodiment as de-severant, maintain
a constant revealing and concealing of possibilities to us, just as is the case with
our own embodiment. The development of our embodied schema, existing as
thick with possibility, is never fully revealed to itself, but rather discovers itself
within its engagement with the word. It is in the “thinglyness” of our body, as an
aspect of space, where the potential for engagement and attunement with the
world is discovered. Possibility is revealed as process and engagement to the
de-severant being through this mutual relation of space and thing.
And while space maintains the existence of things “before” us, it is also
space conceived of as depth, which never fully reveals the entire potential of any
object it is part of. And this depth, this thickness of things, is precisely the
significance of space as it pertains to digitization, not just space as empirical
distance. What is held back, concealed in space’s depth, is exactly what calls on
our will to engage with an object as more than merely something against us, as
though any object were contained fully as itself, complete and devoid of radiant
potential because all is present before us. But this (object-contained-as-self) is
never the case for the human being, which is exactly what intrigues MerleauPonty. Because within depth, objects maintain a thickness to them; possibilities
that remain never fully completed are still accessible to de-severance as beingsof-potential. And it is ultimately space for Merleau-Ponty which maintains this
essential nature of things. This is the reason human beings discover tasks in
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objects that we continually take up and will ourselves toward. If objects of space
possessed no depth, that is, objects-in-themselves, what possibly could be
discovered in them? What would drive human beings to seek out and bring the
things discovered within space toward us as matters of concern, were it not the
latent potential within them? And were it not for the depth of objects, how else
would digitization have been willed into reality as tangible objects, revealing
within themselves an end to seemingly eroding the distance that space also
imparts between objects within the world?
The issue of space, as just noted, is always a co-relation to embodiment,
which is to say that space is only discovered and made possible as such by
being embodied in space, a position or placement. Neither embodiment nor
space would remain as they are without the other. But again, what is space for
the human being, embodied and de-severant as we are? What do we mean
phenomenologically when we refer to space? And how is it that space is
essential to digitization? Phenomenologically speaking, the condition of space
“drives” digitization by the possibilities and limitations it always places upon the
human condition. This is true, paradoxically by what space simultaneously opens
to us as de-severant as potential, yet at the same moment denies as
conquerable: namely, not the empirical distance of space, but the depth of space
itself. As noted, space is always already more than something calculative, more
than an object of study, precisely because space is the potential access to depth
and the thickness of things we discover within the world, in space. The depth of
some-thing can never be fully reduced to pure objectivity because in doing so it
would lose its potential for depth, which is why we engage with said object at all.
Within space, there is depth that the human being has access to as observed in
the creation of technology and art. Creation, the emergence of something “new”
out of what resides before us in space, is precisely access to space as depth – a
fundamentally human existential condition, which is essential to our being-in-theworld, and our will-to-flatten.
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Were space not rich with depth, the space that makes objects accessible
to creation would have no thickness at all to them, and hence there would be no
will on behalf of the human being to flatten space via the emergence of digital
technologies out of the world’s depth. Furthermore, were space not rich with
depth, our will-to-flatten, a will toward anything at all, would be reentered
nonexistence. This is because space is sustained depth, and in so being, depth
calls our de-severant being towards projects and ends – whether individualistic,
or on a grander underlying level, which transcends the human being throughout
time. In this call to flatten, to bring the world near, as Heidegger notes, there are
many digital technologies to look towards. One excellent example is the tangible
emergence of the smart phone, which Apple released in 2007. In the sense of
this phenomenology, no one smart phone should be understood as an object
unto itself, but as a historic project that was willed into existence by discovering,
within the world’s depth, a potential to envision and create such a device out of a
collection of objects and algorithms that were not digital themselves before we
willed and found such potential within them. From the depth of the individual
plastics, to the metal circuitry, to the code that runs our smart devices, all of
these were found by a de-severance that wills-to-flatten its existence, with the
aim of bringing the world as close to our immediate embodiment as possible. And
the smart phone is of course a telecommunication device that allows for
telepresence. Even within the word, telepresence, we discover the will-to-flatten,
achieved by the reality of the smart-phone. the Greek tele, or “at a distance,” and
presence, together bring the distance to our embodied presence, flattening the
objective space between our being and that of another’s so that oneself and
otherness can be near.
This is one digital example of how all things found in space, for the human
being on the grounds of our embodied de-severant condition, must possess
depth, which is of richer thickness to them than something that is merely “there
before us.” This is the reason that the objects within space may be taken up by
the human being as matters for concern, and also what calls on us to bring
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otherness, as “object,” near. Through the smart phone, digitization made
tangible”/real”, we continue to fulfill our will towards closeness by eroding the
distance that space inherently places upon the human being as situationally
embodied.
What can be seen here is that will-to-flatten not only underlies digitization,
but all previous (*all technologies?) technologies within the same trajectory of
eliminating objective distance. In being so, bringing digitization into reality
required finding within objects the potential for bringing the world as close to the
human being as possible, eliminating and even consuming the distance of space.
And this phenomenon is only increasing as the world continues towards
digitization. For example, an article by The Atlantic, titled The Rise of the
Connected Family, notes that due to the social pressures of our work being
digitized, an increasing lack of time is available for being with one’s family (The
Rise of the Connected Family). The article notes, “…(per a survey, well over half
of people who use smartphones are connected to work for 13-plus hours a day)”
(The Rise of the Connected Family). One of the pressures that digitization has
caused in eliminating distance is that the distance between work, whether one is
physically (embodied) at work or not, one is always phenomenologically speaking
at work via our de-severant being because we have brought work so near via
digitization. The article’s answer for this in a digitized world, and for the will-toflatten, is not to eliminate the smartphone, the very technological means the
human being has created in order to actually overcoming objective distance, but
to bring the family nearer via increased digitization.
As The Atlantic article notes, “But in this modern jigsaw puzzle of
interpersonal dynamics, a new wave of home technologies is emerging that may
alleviate a slew of family stress points…technologies from home assistants and
intelligent cameras to virtual-reality apps, ambient communication channels, and
beyond - allows us to reexamine the very idea of what it means to be “home”
(The Rise of the Connected Family). This new idea of the home is, as the article
defines it, “the connected” home. And the connected home is nothing other than
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de-severance, finding within the depth of space, the will-to-flatten the family itself.
Here the family is seen as the “object” to be flattened through digitization. The
will-to-flatten is consumed by the needs of the family and attempts to bring it near
in a world that ever more so calls on us through our digital devices to connect
with it in ever increasing and complex ways, eliminating our time to be with the
family itself as the closeness of embodied being physically next to one another.
The reality then, is that as the world calls us nearer to itself in all directions
through our smart phones (work in this case taking on precedence), the means to
get near the family is obviously also through digitization. The article continues by
stating, “Take a product like Ohmni, for example, which allows family members to
maintain a remote presence in the home, even when they are away. With Ohmni,
a self-direct telepresence robot controlled via a user’s app, a traveling parent can
employ the machine as a kind of surrogate…” (The Rise of the Connected
Family). Here the distance of objective space is overcome by the robot as the
embodiment within the home, one’s own face projected upon the robot as if we
are near, and the happenings of the home cast across our smart phone screen
many miles away. An excellent example of the will-to-flatten not only the
calculative distance of the world, but also the very idea of the family, of the
human being.
The paradox within this, which must be come to terms with, is that in
regard to all of its practical outcomes for the human being, this “achievement” of
flattening the world, is made possible only upon the grounds of space as
something which ultimately cannot be flattened. If space, phenomenologically
conceived of as depth, and the thickness of objects (human or otherwise) found
within space could be “overcome,” not merely as calculative distance, the world
would lose its thickness and cease to be experienced as something to flatten via
engagement with the world, meaning that will that drives digitization itself would
cease to exist as will. But is this not exactly what the will-to-flatten aims for, to
flatten not only calculative objective space, but the depth of space itself? And
here rests the fundamental paradox.
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Objective Space Under the Empirical Natural Attitude:
Digitization as the erosion of Empirical Distance
The claim as to how digitization has eroded empirical space has just been
touched upon, perhaps even been made evident, and yet a greater analysis into
this phenomenon and its implications is necessary before any further analysis of
the impact that the will-to-flatten space as depth is required. Due to our historical
moment (as Heidegger’s Dasein), our awareness of the world is still consumed
with the naturalistic empirical experience of space – shortsighted as it were. That
having been said, there is also nothing wrong with this, per se; it is the means for
digital technologies to come into being. However, what the natural attitude
presupposes is important, and must be reached through an analysis of this
attitude towards the world, even as it clearly is directed by the will-to-flatten, and
the desire to control the world’s depth via the will-to-flatten, recognize it or not.
The will-to-flatten, as it has been framed within the critique of digital media, is
one of flattening distance, and this is self-evident, as I wish to continue to make
clear. The true implications are not if we have flattened empirical distance, we
have, but the consequences of presupposing flattening depth within this desire.
What is empirical space under the natural attitude? According to Alfred
Schutz, a phenomenological sociologist, in his text, The Structures of the LifeWorld: Volume 1, “In the natural attitude, I always find myself in a world which is
for me taken for granted and self-evidently “real” (4). Another way to understand
this claim is simply to state that more often than not we take the world at “face
value,” especially as it appears to exist before me as something factually real
throughout my daily life. As objects over and against my own being, my own
subjectivity. Much of this factuality is of course not only the result of directly
experiencing the world through our senses, but a type of social interpretation,
whereby the meaning of what I am confronted with depends on my culture,
language, religion, philosophy, science, and ultimately my moment in time. And
space, whether we consciously think of it or not, constantly remains as a mode
whereby we experience the world, whether awake, dreaming, or mediated
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through digitization. Simply put, as a human being under this attitude we are
always “in” situations – intended towards an object, event, memory, or idea – and
these are spatial in character due to our embodiment as a situational being.
However, in order to dig deeper into the experience of space under the natural
attitude, a question is in order.
Under the most practical, and that is to say logical sense, what comes to
mind when you hear the word “space?” A broad question, and of course the
answer is multifaceted. Giving any specific answer largely depends on the type of
question asked of the term. So, some contextual examples might be as follows.
Where in space is your personal desktop computer located in relation to
yourself? Or, in what space do you most often place your smart phone or tablet?
If you are in a virtual reality, how do you sense that space you are in? Perhaps
you are playing Star Wars Battlefront, World of War Craft, or Call of Duty.
Regardless of the game, these situations also place a person within a location
that demands an understanding of spatial references in order to effectively
navigate the task at hand. The game might be two-dimensional or threedimensional; a sense of space under the most practical level is still “always”
required. How we get from point A to point B is an essential aspect of space, and
it calls on every one of us to act, digital or not.
The similarity that resides within all of these questions, however distinctive
they may appear at first glance, is that our answers tend to reside within the
natural attitude, whereby space denotes a logical distance from one location to
another (or between objects) within the world of “real” things, regardless of if they
are tangible or digital. Ultimately, it makes little actual difference, space is always
a mode of pressure, one to overcome by traversing it, a call to act. The act of
getting “over” said location into another. Spatially, we relate ourselves to objects
in essentially the same as we do while we’re playing a digital game. (The issue of
how we ethically treat the bodies of other humans in digital space is, however,
is open to further analysis, as is the consequence as we merge this “worlds.”)
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In fact, the vast majority of digital and virtual games mimic the physics of
objective “worldly” space, at least to a relative degree. If not, it would be quite
disorienting to navigate among objects within the game. In fact, a common
complaint in many early 2D or 3D games relate to glitches, such as “clipping”,
whereby the spatiality of the situation does not match our understanding of
worldly space. Our expectations of how space “works” get tested – whether to
our annoyance or humor. In “the real world,” our heads do not go through a
concrete wall if we run at it. We know this as a result having grown up in this
world, as being-in-the-world, and all of this makes sense to me under the natural
attitude; it is a pre-thought, and expectation. I have a constant tendency to take
this face-to-face relation between myself and other objects for granted as the
very property of space. I treat space as the discernable, calculative distance
between the “real” objects that confront me, regardless of if they are in a game or
not, the effect of which is that we treat objects as distances among other objects
and ourselves as an object among them. Again, this is in no way inherently
wrong, it simply means that I tend to reduce objects to tangible entities in and of
themselves, which always stand against other objects of the same tangibility.
Space under the natural attitude becomes about the calculative distance
between objects, or within a single object – digital or not. The calculative
tendency to understand what currently resides as “there” before us as numeric is
what phenomenology terms as “profane vision.” And while it further opens the
potential for digitization emergence, technologically speaking, it misses depth.
But in doing so, phenomenological depth is a nonissue, it is no issue in its
unawareness, the will is simply to flatten distance, taking the will-to-flatten depth
for granted as the underlying project. Empirically, the project becomes one of
bringing the space of otherness into my immediate embodiment (such as a smart
phone), or to construct a replica of any space within my immediate embodiment
(a video game or VR).
As noted by Leonard Lawlor, in his article “Dwelling in the Texture of the
Visible,” “profane vision” is what Merleau-Ponty considered to be the natural
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attitude’s understanding of space as mere distance between “real” objects set
against one another (152). For Merleau-Ponty, this understanding of space is
ultimately too simplistic, though it makes sense to us under the natural attitude;
one takes this measurable distance between one thing and another as the given
attribute of space. If, however, one senses space as only the measurable
distance between objects in the world, or between things and oneself, what is
missed is the human being’s fundamental, ontological experience of space that
always goes “beyond,” and comes “before,” the natural attitudes mindset of
space as the distance between things, or myself and other things. Leonard
Lawlor concisely describes what Merleau-Ponty meant by this concept of profane
vision. Lawlor writes, “The idealization is even necessary according to MerleauPonty, if thought is too empirically dominated. Descartes was right to make space
clear, manageable, and homogenous so that thought is able to survey it. “His
mistake,” according to Merleau-Ponty, “was to erect it into a positive being,
beyond all points of view, all latency and depth, devoid of any real thickness”
(OE: 48/MPR: 364). Something about space evades our attempts to study it from
above” (155). The most important aspect of this passage is the realization that
under the natural attitude, space is “seen” solely as a positive entity, and not as
an ontological condition of “having a world.”
What this means is, if one addresses digitization from the natural attitude,
the digitization of space appears as a major ontological shift, when in fact I would
argue phenomenologically that it is not. Empirical space, as noted in the above
example of the “connected family,” has evidently been flattened space. One can
be at an empirical distant, yet still “be” at home via a robotic device that displays
one’s face, movements, and responses in “real time.” There is no doubt that this
reality has ramifications on our existence, but is it telling of our underlying
existential existence, our embodiment, de-severance, depth, or the will-to-flatten?
And yet, the will-to-flatten has seemingly eradicated empirical space. The will to
experience a foreign land, to live a dream is now. I can find myself within the
visual location of a foreign plant over the computer screen and can awaken a
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dream in reality over a virtual device or movie screen. Never before has
Hollywood made the dream so real, the inner self and its wants and needs so
evident and lifelike over celluloid. Within digitization realized, as it has been,
fantasy is not for the subconscious, it is to be lived within tangible space as real.
Digitation has yielded a promise to make what not only is distant in space, but in
the space of our minds, manifest within the world.
And, if one remains within the natural attitude, whereby space is
understood as a positive entity, of merely bringing the distance of things near,
digitization does appear as a tremendous shift in our world, perhaps even an
“ontological one.” If space is understood as a positive relation between actual
things, whether real or digital, that is to say, the calculative spatiotemporal
distance between things, then digitization is bringing us to “the promised land,”
whereby the world appears to me as a shrunken totality that can literally rest
within my grasp, and so it does. From my smart phone, to gaming online, the
world (no, even multiple worlds) appear to be within relative control. According to
the theory of telepresence I can be in multiple locations seemingly at once. Via
my phone I can digitally see my dogs over the screen, scolding them for
misbehavior while I’m at work miles away from their objective location. A man
can sit in a government office and take the life of another human being with a
drone, regardless of their objective position on the global map. Within each and
every one of our bedrooms, we can collectively experience the Solar System and
beyond, via the genius of NASA.
What’s more, almost all of this is happening exclusively in “real time.” And
due to this phenomenon of “real time,” whereby the distance of calculative space
is temporally diminished to instantiations relations, it is not difficult to “see”
digitization as a phenomenal step for mankind. And indeed, in numerous ways it
most certainly is. Even the analog radio “brought us together” in ways that
seemed unimaginable before its advent, though this too points back to the will-toflatten, as a historic project, human and de-severant in nature.

95

Both analog and digital technologies do appear to the natural attitude as a
radical shift in our ontological condition of space – space has on various levels
become seemingly inconsequential to the modern human. As Lev Manovich
notes in his text, The Language of New Media, “…in contrast to photography and
film, electronic telecommunication can function as two-way communication. Not
only can a user immediately obtain images of various locations, bringing them
together within a single electronic screen, but, via telepresence, she can also be
"present" in these locations. In other words, she can affect change on material
reality over physical distance in real time (160).” Here, Manovich is entirely
correct, and it is not my intention to dismiss the marvel of modern technology.
Many examples, as have been discussed above, illuminate the point presented
by Manovich regarding modern digital technology, or digitization.
But is this all there is to the human ontological condition of space? The
reduction of space into digital data, which can then be stored and streamed
immediately, so as to appear perceptually instantaneous is undeniably something
to marvel at, especially its impact on our intersubjective relations, as will soon be
addressed. But again, has digitization fundamentally changed our ontological
relation to space in the phenomenological sense, which is to say our open
relation to the world as human beings? Merleau-Ponty informs us that under the
natural attitude, whereby space is a mere positive entity to be overcome or dealt
with on a face-to-face level, we tend to lose sight of space as “depth,” or as a
“thickness.” But what is meant by this claim, and can it tell us anything fruitful
about the condition of digitization’s emergence? The concept of space as depth
or thickness might restore some insight into our current relation to digitization.
One question I wish to pose is this: is the experience of space as “depth”
ontologically different in our digital age, and does it extend “beyond” our
understanding of space as objective distance?
Depth, is beyond empirical space and the natural attitude, it makes both
possibilities. Ontologically speaking, the human being is drawn into nearness, all
intentional engagement foresees digitization is some sense, whether is
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actualizes it or not. Empirical space is a fact of existence, embodied within a
world, de-severance finds within this world the possibly of space and its erosion,
by the will of overcoming it. In this sense, it would not be untrue to state that
within the first wheel, the first ship, digitization as will-to-flatten was alive.
Empirical distance not only gave life to the will, as an enemy to conquer, not
merely as distance, but more so, a will which preceded it, which was to overcome
its distance. In the wood or rock of the first wheel ever created was not merely a
tangible object, nor the objects that made this wheel possible, but a will
overcoming distance itself. This linage of overcoming distance is present in
digitization too, and yet empirical distance has always been the most obvious
means to overcome.
For what de-severance does, what it “is,” is this constant “bringing close”
that makes “remoteness disappear.” What this does, according to Heidegger, is
that it simultaneously “reveals,” or discloses, entities to the human being. For
example, what it brings close in the example above is precisely what one wills at
the moment, be it one’s work or family. Family reveals itself to me as a
meaningful relation, whereby its physical distance from my immediate location in
the form of the smart phone screen is less “important” (less taken up in the
moment) by me than the fact that it is now meaningfully discloses as an
experience – experience seemingly overcome. Something reveals itself to me,
and to claim that this revealing, this meaningful relation to something “beyond
me” is simply a relation to the screen tangibly in front of my is far too simple, as
are the consequences upon our being.
But even when I momentarily “unplug” from the digital devices around me,
this phenomenon of de-severance is always still at play, especially empirically.
As an example, I discover the categorical distance of myself in relation to my
home’s backyard only because it is by my very ontological nature that it’s
possible to discover the backyard as an “obstacle.” And this first and foremost
requires that I am, in a sense, am always “beyond” myself in order to make
what’s distant become close to me. While in my office my intention from the
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family on a screen may shift, as I’m now intended toward the backyard at the
sound of a dog’s bark, allowing for the potential discovery of its distance as a
categorical “problem.” But first and foremost, if I’m to discover the spatial
calculative distance between myself and the backyard, I must “bring it close”
without the need of “being there” physically. Strictly speaking, as ontologically
human, I have always already accomplished what my smart phone promises – a
“vanishing” of distance.
Another way of saying this is that due to my ontological openness toward
the world as de-severant, I constitute calculative distance itself as something
“problematic.” We must make distance vanish in order to problematize its total
removal as an obstacle against me. But only via de-severance can I make this
spatial distance into something categorical, something positive. However, the
debate over whether objective distances are set as an eternal figure or not is
actually quite irrelevant to Heidegger’s central point or concern. The matter of an
entity’s “truthful nature” is a secondary postulate, which could not take place
without this “bringing near” that the human being’s ontological openness allows
for. However, the “truthfulness” of the entity’s relation to ourselves and the world
is often the jump we make without acknowledging how it’s possible to do so in
the first place. Space, defined objectively, is only present for a being that’s
ontologically predisposed towards de-severance, and this, being-in-the-world,
wills-to-flatten, digitization being our greatest human feat in this historical project.
As an example of how this is a human attribute, Heidegger again claims
“De-severance discovers remoteness; and remoteness, like distance, is a
determinate categorical characteristic of entities whose nature is not that of
Dasein” (Being and Time, 139). And yet, Honda’s A.I. ASIMO, a robot, is “in”
categorical space, but it does not know remoteness or distance, not does it willto-flatten. Rather remarkably, in the case of the human being, one need not know
anything about mathematics and Euclidean space in order to move from point A
to point B. But should this be of surprising? I certainly possess the potential to
discover remoteness and distance as positive, but I don’t need to do so in order
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to walk from my computer chair to the backyard. ASIMO’s movement, by way of
contrast, are first and foremost the basis of a complex algorithm, whose power of
“contemplation” does not come from “itself,” but is encoded by the being that deservers (the human being) in order for ASIMO to move and navigate the
surrounding space at all. ASIMO is not de-severant, so while it may appear that
this being “knows” its surrounds, it is in fact only the result of a pre-programed
space, or one that builds off previous calculations into its already existing
algorithm – not a correlation to it. The depth of the world does not extend beyond
the immediate, there is no de-severance, hence there is no depth for ASIMO.
What matters here is that ASIMO, much like a rock, exists purely in calculative
space, empirical space. And this should not be confused into meaning that
ASIMO or any other AI “has” space as something meaningful. Another way to
say this is that ASIMO doesn’t turn space into something problematic, not does it
internalize it, or make space a “project” of its own. Space simply is not
problematic for a being that does not de-sever.
Third, and perhaps most important to this ontological theory, Heidegger
writes that “De-severance, however, is an existentiale; this must be kept in mind.
Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their de-severedness
[Entferntheit], do 'remotenesses' ["Entfernungen"] and distances with regard to
other things become accessible in entities within-the-world themselves” (Being
and Time, 139). There is here, I believe, the recognition of the human being’s
autonomy as an ontologically de-severant being that can reveal “entities” for/to
itself, ultimately relating to them in a technological manner. This is to say, limited
as we are by the temporal-historical nature of the world we fall into, the human
being “reveals,” or takes up the world via the nature of our de-severant corelation to it. And this revealing, as the result of being that makes the farness
vanish, is a profoundly technological existence. De-severance allows us to make
“the farness vanish,” to bring the world close, and in being so, digitization resides
as a particular human-technological “project.” A project whose ultimate aim is
uniquely human, and extends far “deeper” than the shortsighted marvel over our
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digital accomplishments. The very nature of bringing the world close is a
precursor for a being that is technological by its very nature – in fact, the two are
absolutely indispensable.
Existentially, the human being is technological in the sense that we are the
being that in our de-severance can will itself “upon” the world, “extending
beyond” the spatial forces, which are ever exerted upon our most immediate
embodied existence. Unlike a digital AI though, we may be “caught up” in the
imitate things around our current location, but it is also through them that more is
always also present to us via depth.
The existence of one’s computer screen is of course a mere object in a
“lifeless” space when considering it on its own objective right. But for a being that
de-severs, the screen is in fact always far more than a calculative space between
one tangible thing (one’s body) and this other thing (the screen) set against us.
Just as the sound of one’s dog’s bark is far more than merely an empirical noise
– or something simply to be calculated. Both the noise of a bark, and the sight of
the computer screen open existence beyond phenomena, which can never be
fully isolated as mere calculative things in the world. In the bark I de-severed. My
backyard has a meaningful relation to this sound, and I am there as soon as it
encompasses me, no longer merely at a computer screen. In the sight of a
distant planet, cast via the tangible pixels on a screen, I too am de-severed,
empirical distance bridged and overcome. There must be almost endless ways to
calculate the distance of the screen to my “physical” body, but if I do only this,
which almost never actually takes place outside of moments of objectification, I
miss the plentitude of meaning that is established as new planets reveals
themselves to my world.
This is not to say of course that I cannot then take up the world’s
calculative distance as a problem set against my being. As Heidegger makes
evident, the human being is an existential being, which is in part to say a being
that wills. The human, in its de-severant nature, has a sense for more than what
is simply around us, and this capacity allows for technological emergence.
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Another way to say this is that the human can imposition itself upon what already
is. As is known, the human is a being that has some capacity to control what is.
The human being possess the ability to extend itself within the world, prior to any
objectification of it, which is the very essence of de-severance - to be beyond
one’s physical self and the thingness that we are directly presented with at any
given moment.
Writing is often considered one of the first technological mediums, a
medium that mediates, whereby one can express oneself beyond a set time and
space. Writing, whether formally classified as such or not, is essentially a means
of “controlling” (or holding sway) over both space and time. Objectifying,
calculating, and ultimately “storing space” constitutes the technological
achievements of the past and present, either in the form of tangible constructions
or written informative ideas. However, this is always already the possibility of a
being that is de-severant by its nature. And this capacity is arguably our greatest
“divide” from other beings within this existence. No other being that is currently
known of attempts to control its environment quite like the human being. This is a
fact that should come as no surprise given Heidegger’s analysis of our being.
But what does this ultimately mean in the progression of this analysis of
digitization? What it means is that our ontological condition, I will suggest, is not
changed by digitization. Instead, digitization as a tangible actuality, is predicated
upon the possibility of a being that has a sense of the world’s depth through its
de-severance; and hence, has the power to reveal to itself what is beyond its
present reality. Revealing, understood in this context, is ultimately a technological
“project,” whereby a will that is ontologically conditioned to make the farness
vanish also posits the reality of an ever more effective means to reveal and
controlling the world itself, ultimately for the sake of revealing the world to itself,
and an impossible reduction of its depth.
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Digitization of the World: The Result of a De-severant Being with
Access to Depth
A clarification of the human being’s ontological precondition as de-severant, as
was conducted under the analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time,
was essential in order to more completely grasp the means by which the human
can ultimately come to possess and manipulate calculative spatial relations
among objects – whether they be digital or not. However, given my primary
argument, which is that digitization has not changed our fundamental ontology.
The initial clarification of de-severance as an ontological precondition for the
human being, matters most when turning toward the development of such
concepts as the world having a depth, or a thickness to it, which will provide
insight into the development and limitations of the current digital age. While the
automobile and digital technologies, such as the computer and smart devices,
have undeniably had a radical impact on the time it takes to “overcome” the
calculative distance among locations, I suggest that the concept of the world
having a depth will provide greater insight into these issues.
If Heidegger is correct, an access to, or the “possession” of space is first
and foremost ontologically more than the calculative distance between tangible
objects, which digitization seemingly “overcomes.” This is in part the very reason
that the digital age appears so revolutionary. However, when I say “more,” what
is meant is that an insight into the phenomenology of space and calculative
distance brings us back to a recognition of what is most fundamental to the
human condition. In order for the technologies that both precede digitization, and
the arrival of digital technologies itself, there must be a quality to both the human
being and the world (grandly speaking) in order for these technologies to emerge
at all. And this is exactly what I desire to seek greater clarification within.
Through the analysis of de-severance, I am hopeful that a greater sense
of clarity has been cast upon the ontological condition of being human. A
condition whereby, as Heidegger notes, we are never simply “in” the calculative
space we so rationally dissect and make empirical sense of. Rather, what is most
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present always already has the potential to “transport” us beyond the imitate
thingness of our surroundings. Another way to say this is that it’s within the things
we experience that we find more than what it there. Now there is of course
something quite self-evident about this when we consider the images presented
over the phone, video game, or computer screen. Video games immerse a
person into an experience whereby the screen itself becomes the least
noticeable thing in the room, and perhaps this is one of the primary aspects of
our obsession with them. However, this “removal of the present,” which occurs
while I play a video game, or involve myself in a Facebook debate over any
issue, is fundamentally predicated upon the same phenomenon as when I hear
the bark of my dog. De-severance is an existential in the sense that it is a relation
to the world whereby my access to things never resides fully within the “things
themselves” as a totalizing end unto them. I never first and foremost experience
the screen of a digital device as an absolute (whether it’s on or off), just as I do
not hear the bark of my dog as the calculative distance of the sound between us,
or as the scientific measurement of its volume, pitch, etc. Though we are capable
of doing so, and the knowledge produced by such investigations yield the means
for technological development, we are never fully presented with the object. This
is because no object, digital or not, ever fully presents itself to us.

Digitization: Access to the World’s Depth
How is it that digital technology came into existence? How did we reveal digital
technologies to ourselves? As noted above, digital technology, in all its
complexity and difference, exists as part of the continuum of a project that is
fundamentally the result of de-severant being. A being that through its deseverant nature has access to the world’s depth in a manner not currently
witnessed in any other being. Ultimately, the goal of this project, whether it is
formally understood to be so or not, is to literally the willful collapse of the world
into an experience that can be fully rendered or stored both individually and
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intersubjectively. It is the desire to “have” the world so fully that we can access
(possess) it as though it were an object whereby calculative space, or
Heideggerian distance, is inconsequential. The very nature of a de-severant
being, as previously defined, is to make the farness vanish. Technological
speaking, digitization is an “evolved” aspect of this ontological condition that we
not only rationally strive to fulfill through the advent of our technology, but have
always already had to ability to do so innately. Digital technology has been
revealed to us through an innate power of co-relation to the world. To always
perceive more than what is currently there in the things we experience, and
reveal them as such.
Now Heidegger was not naïve in considering the world, and the individual
things that comprise it, as a depth. I simply feel that Merleau-Ponty builds quite
effectively off of Heidegger’s philosophy, more formally brining the human body
into active account within the inquiry of the world’s depth. What Heidegger and
clearly Merleau-Ponty understood was that de-severance is only possible
because the world, and all experiences happening to our immediate perception,
extend beyond themselves. The title of Merleau-Ponty’s posthumous text, The
Visible and the Invisible, makes sense after one begins to grasp what he’s
attempting to show his reader. An understanding of his account of the human
ontological relation to the world within this text will also shed light on the impact
and limitations of digitization. I also believe that it will further clarify why it is that a
being that makes the farness vanish projects itself toward a project whereby the
world can literally be “held in one’s hand.” A feat that any smart phone appears in
large part to have accomplished.
For Merleau-Ponty the concepts of visibility and invisibility are not mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, they are literally always caught up in the same “act”
of perceiving, or having a world. Now the term visible works quite well for
Merleau-Ponty’s theory, and while it is truth that visuality (the sense of sight) is of
principle concern within his work, it would be a mistake to think of visibility and
invisibility as merely referring to sight itself. What is true of sight, and often goes
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unnoticed, is that in seeing anything (whatsoever) there must also be an absence
in order for something to show itself to the “seer,” whether it’s in the “real world,”
the digital experience, or even a dream. It is only possible for me to see the
surroundings within my visible spectrum because there is always concealment of
the visible (the depth) at the exact same moment as there is visibility, or the
revealing of some thing. In fact, this phenomenon of visibility and invisibility
allows visibility to take place.
What is often take for granted under the natural attitude, especially for
Merleau-Ponty, but also Heidegger, is the degree to which this phenomenon is
fundamental to our very ontology, regardless of the age we exist in – pre-digital
or digital. However, and this is fundamentally important to the current argument,
the phenomenon of depth is also vital to the creation of any technology
whatsoever, especially for a being that is de-severant. Though it may be argued
that even under the natural attitude it is quite transparent that no technology
simply arrives out of nothingness. What is typically presupposed under this
attitude is that throughout the course of human history there has always been an
access to the world’s depth, which is to say, an access to more than what is
currently there in the visible.
Under the natural attitude understood as mere “imagination,” or
“creativity,” and is left to these definitions alone. Of course, imagination and
creativity are praised under the natural attitude, as they lead toward artistic,
scientific, and technological innovation, but the concepts themselves have a
tendency to avert us from the phenomenon upon which they are predicated as a
possibility. What is meant by this is that imagination and creativity are typically
treated as de-severant in a naïve sense, which is to say, whether knowingly or
not, they are treated as a mind distinct from immediate experience. Acts of
brilliance and insight into fundamental truths and technological innovation are
understood as being comprised by the minds of the imaginative, the creative.
And while I don’t mean to undermine those who have “seen” further into the
depth of possibility, which is laden within any present moment, I do confirm that
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this capacity is fundamental to the ontology of the human being, at any moment
in time – digital or not.
And while Merleau-Ponty tends to focus upon art within in his philosophy,
typically in the form of paintings, his concepts can also be understood
technologically. In his essay, Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty notes that the image,
picture, and the drawing “…are the inside of the outside and the outside of the
inside, which the duplicity of sensing [le sentir] makes possible and without which
we would never understand the quasi-presence and immanent visibility which
makes up the whole problem of the imaginary” (356). Again, Merleau-Ponty is
focusing upon the creation of a work of art, although I do not believe it’s
unjustified if his theory is extrapolated beyond the concept of “art” under the more
traditional sense. What Merleau-Ponty desires to show his reader is that the most
primal relation to the tangible world is not simply one of calculative relations
between point A and B. Now it is easy to focus upon these empirical relations,
and if one does so, any technological reduction in space (the time it takes to
travel) appears rather profound.
What strikes Merleau-Ponty most, however, is that in any encounter with
the world there is always an access to more than what “exists” before us. For
example, image if a person within the late 19th century receives a photograph
from a loved one, perhaps taken in a remote land, who’s distant from one’s
spatial relation is hundreds of miles away. Merleau-Ponty insistence is that we
understand the photo as more than a mere thing, it is more than light sensitive
material on a sheet of paper. The image brings an “imaginative” life to the world
of the viewer that is more than paper in one’s hand. The image possesses a
depth that “extends beyond” itself. The image, much like the bark of my dog
mentioned above, is “rich” for the human being. The image calls upon the viewer
to experience more than a piece of paper before them. The image calls upon an
imaginative vibrancy, a quasi-presence, which may just inspire more than what is
simply visible at the moment. The viewer’s world becomes filled with the person
present in the image, but it may also make the farness of a foreign landscape
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vanish, enlightening the possibility of how to cultivate one’s own land that is
spatially near. One’s own land may just acquire a new “look” after the image is
placed upon the table.
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Chapter Four: Intersubjectivity and Digitization

Intersubjectivity
De-severant embodiment is the foundation of accessing the world’s space as
depth, and through this, the will-to-flatten has brought the world near via the
emergence of digitization. Intersubjectivity, the experience of the other, of
otherness whatsoever, is sustained and made possible prior to digitization by our
phenomenological existence, an insight made clear in the previous chapter. From
birth until death, each and every human being, as embodiment, maintains the
sustenance of meaning as a finite changing perspective upon the world. The
result of de-severant embodiment, being-in-the-world as finites is that the world
never exists as one’s own; the world taken in as complete, depth is never
eliminated. Because of this, the world is always a co-relation between myself and
others. And in this relation, founded within human embodiment, meaning
flourishes intersubjectively into the form of an idea. Ideas, however innocent at
first, always function as systems of totalization, as a means flattening depth, and
in so doing, bring sense to an otherwise senseless world.
Where then is digitization’s place within intersubjectivity? Can
intersubjectivity inform us about digitization? How can digitization inform us about
intersubjectivity? Do we yet know enough about intersubjectivity to say?
Intersubjectivity, within this particular philosophic context, will be
understood and analyzed phenomenologically. In doing so, it will become evident
that intersubjectivity, as site of meaning and ideology, enriches our
understanding of the relation we have with digital artificial intelligence and social
media and their influence on our thinking and actions within an increasing
digitized world/experience. We will again see that what rests “beneath” our
engagement and actualization of these technologies is a will to flatten the world’s
depth as de-severant embodiment. In this case, the will to flatten depth is not
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simply the depth in the world, but the depth within the intersubjectivity of any and
all other human beings.

Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity
Throughout the 20th century, the concept of intersubjectivity was highly theorized
by continental and analytic philosophers alike, leading to both a sense of
consensus and disagreement among various schools of thought. The rift
between the continental and analytic has always been cast as a vast gulf, which
is why differences often overshadow consensus. To further exacerbate this
issue, the general theoretical framework of intersubjectivity has been built within
such fields as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Due to this, the term
intersubjectivity may seem “muddy.” This is important to recognize, as the
theoretical approach that will be built for the analysis of digitization in this
particular case is a phenomenological one, which alone shares its differences
among theorists. More specifically, the theories and accompanying concepts to
be utilized in this chapter are influenced by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger,
Alfred Schutz, and Marcie Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s theories of
intersubjectivity and the world as possessing depth or thickness are especially
vital here to conceptualizations of digitization as a will to reduce, or even
eliminate, the depth of the other. The reason for using this phenomenological
lens is that these theorists do not objectify the relations between others, as is
common within analytic philosophy. For Merleau-Ponty, for example,
intersubjectivity is not first and foremost a subject to be studied empirically, but
rather, the very means by which meaning finds and sustains its life through the
continual act of an embodied subject engaging with others in the world.
This phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity should be seen as
significant to digitization, as it has been used to interrogate and ultimately
enhance our knowledge of the way in which an individual’s meaningful relation to
the world is constituted within the experience of the other. Digitization has clearly
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impacted the way we experience the other in contemporary life, throughout much
of world. The implications of the analysis can potentially function as a means of
inquiry into digitization’s impact on everyday meaning, the other, and ethics and
morality; it will also provide insight into the will that drives digitization itself.
Digitization, in a technological sense, often brings otherness “near,”
flattening both the empirical and phenomenological depth of the world, otherwise
known as distance or space. Digitization, we will see, also functions by seemingly
flattening the depth of the other in cases such as artificial intelligence, dating
apps, and even over social media. The apparent near eradication of the
experience of distance between self and other, whether or not the barrier of said
distance/space is empirical or phenomenological (it is often both), impacts the
experience of intersubjectivity as much as it informs of the will to eradicate the
depth of the world. And the first point here that is easy to bypass, is that even in
digitization, intersubjective experience always remains an experience of
something other. We will come to see that intersubjective experience, as a being
that is embodied as de-severant within the depth of the world, always discovers
and sustains meaning as such.
Intersubjective experience may be very broadly understood as
engagement with the other constituting “one’s” language, one’s sense, and one’s
history. Here it is the technological medium through which one encounters the
other that is of particular interest. That being said, intersubjectivity simultaneously
influences one’s lived experience as something meaningful. Intersubjectivity
establishes our “grasp” of the world; it provided the world its “sense,” seemingly
exerting a totalizing order or structure, which makes experience manageable.
Consequently, introduced by its most basic definition, the study of
intersubjectivity, though ultimately examining an individual’s meaningful “make
up” of the world, is always actually a study of otherness. Intersubjectivity
constantly informs each individual’s meaningful grasp of his or her own world
through the meeting of one embodiment with another, whether digital or not.
One’s own sense of self-identity is always derived from the awareness and
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exchange with the other. Through the other, I “find” myself revealed as an
embodied perspective where I am never simply alone, and where my thoughts
never simply emerged from nothing, but are rather the result of my exchanges
with the other that echo within me, rich with potential. As Merleau-Ponty writes,
“It is not sufficiently noted that the other is never present face to face. Even
when, in the heat of discussion, I directly confront my adversary, it is not in the
violent face with its grimace, or even in that voice traveling toward me, that the
intention which reaches me is to be found” (Prose of the World, 133). Another
way to state this, whether encountering the other in person, over the phone, or
online, is that this encounter is never to be diminished to that over a mere object,
which I could grasp in all of its complexity. The exchange with the other is an
exchange of a depth that is not measurable with scientific equipment. Its
significance in revealing the other and the meaning that we constitute together in
our exchange is not to be found in some particular destination. Merleau-Ponty
continues this thought by noting that “One must believe that there was someone
over there. But where? Not in that overstrained voice, not in that face lined like
any well-worn object. Certainly not behind that setup: I know quite well that back
there there is only “darkness crammed with organs” (Prose of the World, 133).
The other lives, as meaningful, within me, as an extension and outgrowth of my
own depth. Had I not encountered the other, I too would be “lesser,” would be
different than who I am right now. In the exchange with the other, the other
reveals him or herself to me, only by me taking up the other as an extension of
the depth the world reveals. But I never fully possess the other, exactly because I
never fully possess myself, and this is the very reason intersubjectivity is not only
made possible, but is necessary for me to come to know the world as
meaningful. The access to depth provided by my embodied sustains this reality
of always being a being that is never fully complete, but is also always looking to
add to itself, to become more than I currently am.
A practical phenomenological example of intersubjectivity can be
witnessed when one identifies an aspect of oneself under nationalistic terms.
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Someone who identifies as “being American” has been established within a
particular historic nexus of human otherness. One’s own language, the
significance of their own body, and ultimately the technology that ever
increasingly mediates one’s experience constitute this “inner” sense of being
American, and yet this “being American” can never fully be derived from oneself.
All the possible conflicting variants of being American that exist within such an
expansive and diverse nation are the result of intersubjectivity. But what is
important here is that this “being American,” in whichever variant form it appears,
is never first and foremost accomplished as a task of one’s own “inner” doing.
“Being American” is always the result of intersubjectivity, just as it is to sense that
one is German, South African, or Iraqi. And all of this requires being embodied in
a particular space, or depth. However, this sense of nationalism, wherever it may
reside, or however morally sound we feel our own nation’s driving force to be
against the morals of other nations, is something clearly taken for granted as an
intersubjective fundamental “truth.” Again, intersubjectivity “grounds” meaning, it
totalizes meaning into systems of thinking, shared amongst others within a
group. This is exactly why one tends quite literally to reflect the thinking of the
group one is more surrounded within. And yet, we have a tendency to
presuppose the significance of intersubjectivity, when its import exists at the core
of our meaningful, and ever renegotiated, lives.
Alfred Schutz, a German sociologist who was influenced by
phenomenology, was particularly interested in the concept of intersubjectivity
precisely because it is presupposed within daily lived experience. In his text,
Structures of the Life-World: Volume 1, Schutz writes, “Moreover, I simply take it
for granted that other men also exist in this my world, and indeed not only in a
bodily manner like and among other objects, but rather as endowed with a
consciousness that is essentially the same as mine. Thus, from the outset, my
life-world is not my private world but, rather, is intersubjective; the fundamental
structure of its reality is that it is shared by us” (4). What is of significance here is
Schutz’s realization that while intersubjectivity is taken for granted, it is always a
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relational/reflectional property of our human existence that constitutes our
understanding of the world, whether this understanding be an understanding of
ourselves, our ideological or moral drives, our nation, our community, our
reactions to other “types” of people, etc. Intersubjectivity provides life to the
existence of the idea, and the technology that mediate ideas not only impact our
thoughts and actions, but can inform us of our underlying will.
An issue in turning toward phenomenological intersubjectivity and
digitization is that within the classical field of phenomenology, language and
formal speech (as the exchange and formation of meaning) has taken
precedence. Language, as face-to-face communication, is presupposed as the
primary medium of encountering the other. The privilege of language as a means
of coming to know how individual experience is constituted through speech on a
face-to-face level can be seen in Heidegger’s later work, such as in his essay,
The Way to Language. Heidegger tells us in this text that, “…the essence of man
consists in language” (398). And language speaks to us. “Nevertheless, it is
language that speaks. What language properly peruses, right from the start, is
the essential unfolding of speech, of saying. Language speak by saying; that is,
by showing” (411). But does language speak, or “say” as it does, in the exact
same manner within a digital world where the face-to-face is often missing,
flattened?
Furthermore, in The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty also navigates the
subject of intersubjectivity, the encounter with the other, via embodiment and an
analysis of language, face-to-face. He writes, “This means that there would not
be others or other minds for me, if I did not have a body and if they had no body
through which they slip into my field, multiplying it from within, and seeming to
me prey to the same world, oriented to the same world as I” (138). Building upon
this reliance of body against body he says, “…when I speak to another person
and listen to him, what I understand begins to insert itself in the intervals between
my saying things, my speech is intersected laterally by the other’s speech, and I
hear myself in him, while he speaks in me. Here it is the same thing to speak to
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and be spoken to” (142). Again, this philosophy posits language as speech in the
face-to-face, the body-to-body, which is simply no longer needed within the world
of digitization. This is of course not to suggest the body isn’t required, a point
made evident throughout this dissertation. But it is to point us into the direction of
further realizing the will to flattening depth that is inherent to digitization. What is
the impact of this flattening, of mediating intersubjectivity through a screen?
This realization is not problematic in this context, but it is to note the lack
of attention classical phenomenology has given the medium by which
intersubjectivity takes place within the modern world. One reason for this is that
modern communication technologies were, at best, within their infancy during the
mid to late 20th century. But communication mediums, which is to say
intersubjective mediums, are becoming increasingly digitized. Paradoxically, this
often involves the removing of “face-to-face” encounters, with one mediated by a
screen, the removing of the empirical distance between self and other. But also, I
will argue, what we are witnessing is the phenomenological “removal” of the
depth that is always radiant and necessary within the exchange of the other.

Digitization is Intersubjective: Digital Intersubjectivity Flattens
the of Depth World, and so too Wills the Depth of the Other to be
Flattened.
In Chapter Three, Digitization and Space, an attempt was made to display how a
phenomenological analysis of Heidegger’s theory of de-severance and MerleauPonty’s depth could yield a stronger understanding of digitization’s development
as embodied human beings. More concretely stated, the intent of Chapter
Three’s analysis was to show how the human being (as de-severant being) has
always already been possessed by the capacity of will to diminish the depth of
the world, to flatten the world, so as to physically erase empirical distance and,
holding and controlling all of the otherness the world exhibits within our hand. As
human beings, this will has a long historic lineage, beginning with such “primitive”
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technologies as language and written text, while continually developing into the
reality of what we have deemed, digitization. Digitization, not merely implying the
tangible digital technologies that we are observing, but more importantly the lived
experience enshrined “within” these technologies when we engage them, as well
as what these experiences can inform us of our being, our willing in a world of
constant depth.
It was also determined that this progression toward digitization has
resulted from, and can only result from, a de-severant being that constantly faces
a world of endless depth. Furthermore, it was determined that such a being is
ultimately a being that wills, or one “drawn” towards the task of a project that is
inherently historic for a being that continually takes-up the past. However, this
project of human willing tends to remain concealed from us, underlying, or
“beneath the surface.” Because of this, the historical project, which calls upon the
development of digitization is easily presupposed. And it was determined in
Chapter Three that this underlying will consciously or not desires, as Heidegger
states, “…to making the farness vanish – that is, making remoteness of
something disappear, bringing it close” (Being and Time, 139). In other words, to
overcome the world’s depth, to hold it “objectively” in one’s hands, making it
manageable. A willing for control.
The question that remains is one of implication; that is, the naming of
practical, real-world examples and implications of this historic project that
increasing attempts to make the farness vanish. To initially address this question,
Chapter Two displayed the ways in which an individual’s embodiment are
impacted by the historical project of digitization, ultimately influencing one’s
sense of “self,” and what it means to “be in the world” as embodied when
surrounded by digital devices. This, however, was too existential, focusing on the
embodied subject as though a “self” can develop, or even exist, independent
from a greater collective world, an intersubjective world. Embodiment did
however lead to an analysis of how and why it is that our being “stretches” itself
into the world’s depth, finding meaning and possibilities in more than what is
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currently there. This access to the world’s empirical space, and our will to
overcome depth is precisely what hands us over to the other as intersubjective,
to bring the other close, manageable.
However, focusing solely on embodiment negates any and all social
stratums, which the human being as intersubjective is inherently an aspect of,
and by its nature not only contributes to, but is itself constituted by. An individual
must always remain embodied, this is true. One’s nexus and schema of
discovering any style in the world is forever dependent upon possibilities and
limitations of human embodiment. But “subjectivity” itself, that is “finding” oneself
as an “independent” amongst a world of otherness, remains possible only as the
intersubjective re-uptake of meaning and idea via the social encounter of the
other.
An awareness of oneself and the issues each and every person “takes up”
with the world, both the “I think” and “I am” in Cartesian terms, ultimately
presuppose intersubjectivity as the necessary grounds for either expression.
Without the other, Descartes would never have had the capability to express
either. Even when “alone,” the world one encounters remains intersubjective by
necessity if we are to make any sense of it. That is, in every “I think,” or “I am,”
the intersubjectivity of the other is already present and at issue for the “I think,” or
“I am” to occur at all. As Merleau-Ponty questions intersubjectivity (the other) he
rather curiously asked where the other is, even in face-to-face conversation. A
question we tend to presuppose as self-evident, “of course the other is over
there,” one might reply. But Merleau-Ponty assures us that this location of the
other is in fact anything but self-evident. In contemplating the “location,” or rather
the depth of the other, Merleau-Ponty notes,
“Where would I put it? It is not in that body, which is nothing but tissue, blood, and bone.
It is not in the trajectory from that body to the things, because in that trajectory there are
only more things, or luminous beams, vibrations, and it is now ages since we abandoned
the images of Epicurus. As for the “spirit,” that is I and so I cannot put into it that other
perception of the world. Thus the other is not to be found in things, he is not in his body,
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and he is not I. We cannot put him anywhere and effectively we put him nowhere,
neither in the in-itself nor in the for-itself, which is me. There is no place for him except in
my field, but that place at lease was ready for him ever since I began to perceive. From
the first time I relied on my body to explore the world, I knew that this corporeal relation
to the world could be generalized. A shifting distance was established between me and
the being which reserves the rights of another perception of the same being” (Prose of
the World, 136)

This passage is vital philosophically in its own right to the issue of
intersubjectivity, as much so as it pertains to its application of comprehending
intersubjectivity and digitization. For the human being, as Merleau-Ponty alludes,
the potential “generalization” of the other is this masking of the other as an object
separated by the distance, contained as object, between myself and them. The
other is already reduced before digitization to some-thing, flattened as object
over and against me, rather than being comprehended for what the other is;
namely, the very mode of revealing the world’s depth that simultaneously goes
beyond me, and becomes me. Without the other I could never be myself. My
world, my language, my ideologies, my knowledge of things around me always
possess within them, whether alone or in the presence of another, the depth that
otherness has instilled upon me by my very nature as de-severant.
When one reduces the other to a mere object over and against oneself
within calculative distance, one presupposes the other as de-servant, and
subsequently we miss the intersubjective reality that the other is never an object
for me to possess, but rather a “field” of depth within the world that by its very
being is always beyond itself as well. The human being is always beyond itself,
and this is precisely the reason digitization is possible. Because of this, any
desire to flatten the depth of another via digitization is not only futile, it potentially
diminishes my own potential depth as well. Digitization, as the willing to flatten
the world’s depth, always maintains the potential to isolates the other, and in
doing so, we isolate ourselves.
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For example, when viewing Google Maps on one’s Smart Phone, a deseverant access to depth is at work. The phone is more than a tangible image
displayed on a screen; there is a depth that it both is, but is also beyond the
phone itself, it calls upon its viewer (an intersubjective relation) to de-sever
beyond the immediate materiality. And though the phone may literally speak to
me through the voice of Siri, whether it does or not, the phone still “speaks to
me.” Via the phone, a location presents itself, and one is there with the location
“in mind” (de-severant). The depth of this possible location is both physically
distant, yet present to the user, in that it calls one into act, to decide. No call for a
decision that extends me beyond my current “self” would be made at all were this
relation between man and digital device not intersubjective.
Likewise, no changes to the next version of this Smart Phone would occur
if the depth of the current phone didn’t call upon the revealing of something more,
something lacking within itself at the present moment. Were the current phone
not to have a depth to it, a calling on (intersubjectivity) the “not yet present” within
the phone, de-severing oneself into a future project, no technological advance
would occur. Innovatively speaking, not a thing would change were the object’s
depth to remain un-accessed by the non-presence of a de-severant being. But
humans do exist, and so too does this reciprocal relation, whereby a de-severant
being is called in the depth of what faces it, a calling to reveal more than what is,
or to be drawn into this or that project. If no being existed to engage in the
reciprocal relation, which is always an intersubjective relation, “the call” of an
object to access its depth and reveal more than what is present would remain
stagnant – for better or worse. Nature would surely evolve, or change, as it so
clearly does under its own accord, but the objects of nature would simply remain
over and against us. But this is not how it is for the human being.
The human, due to its de-severant being, pierces into the world’s depth.
The object over and against one’s experience is rarely present as “complete,” or
a totality in itself. As humans gazed at the stars in the night sky, they did not
“end” reveal themselves as things to be left alone, completed. Rather, as de118

severant, the intersubjective experience of these tiny specks of light called upon
stories, adventures, explanations, and so drew us back into the earth’s depth to
discover where and how we could “see” more. How could depth within these
stars be flattened to reveal their “truth.” We would need to access their depth,
and in so doing eliminate said depth, bringing it close. And so, we were
intersubjectively called into sands depth, revealing its potential to be glass. And
with glass, we were intersubjectively called into the revealing of its possibility for
molding its curvature, revealing the possibilities of optics. And with these first
steps realized, we began to bring the stars “closer,” a farness eliminated, a depth
accessed and contained. But more importantly, a world paradoxically understood
as far more vast than believed, yet simultaneously smaller, more manageable
and closer to us.
This same intersubjective call into accessing the world’s depth, making it
manageable and in control, is most profoundly noticed within digitization. No
longer does one need to look into the twilight to “see” the stars; they are held
captive in the palm of one’s hand. The computer screen, Smart Phone, tablet,
and VR Gear, present one with the sense of containment. The depth of these
curious objects that were once in-the-world now appear in-the-world under a
comforting sense of control. To reveal their “truth,” one need only touch digital
buttons. Their farness made close, their depth controlled, known, and flattened to
a screen. But here, as in the previous chapter, the focus remains on objects
“against” us, not other de-severant beings, that is to say, not our relation with
other human beings though digital mediums. What is the relation between
intersubjectivity amount to when considering human beings, and digitization as a
medium of human co-experience? As digital devices increasingly mediate one’s
sense of otherness within the world, can an analysis of intersubjectivity reveal
digitization’s impact on human to human experience? Does digitization, our
digital devices, impact intersubjectivity? How are other human beings
experienced as we increasingly mediate experience through digital devices? And
if intersubjectivity is the result of a de-severant being’s calling into another’s
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depth, what does digitization do to both the other’s sense of self, as well as one’s
own?
Again, it has been noted that what drives digitization is the willing to
eliminate the world’s depth, to bring it near, to control it. And it seems this task
has been realized when contemplating a topic such as the stars being placed
within the palm of one’s hand over a phone. Can the same be true of multiple
human beings though? Can the intersubjective call into the depth of any other
de-severant being (individual, group, or culture) be controlled, flattened? Is this
possible? If so, how? If not, where and why does this project fail? What can this
tell us about any individual’s underlying desire as de-severant in a world made
meaningful by other de-severant beings? If the stars ultimately possess an
endless depth, how can one manage to flatten the depth of a human being?

Examples of Intersubjectivity and Digitization: Their Relation
Explored
Digitization and Intersubjectivity: HER
In 2013, writer, director, and producer Spike Jonze released the film Her, which
warrants the classification of a semi-dystopian sci-fi reality (Her). The plot
unravels in the not so distant future of Los Angeles. The iconic skyline remains
largely identical to present day Los Angeles. What strikes one as visually distinct
from our current moment in 2017 are the slight technological advances, made
noticeable throughout this world’s digitized landscape. Smart phones appear as
an increasingly essential aspect of the lives of those wandering through this
futurist location, so much so that they may be deemed appendages of the
citizens. This world is digitization, a world interconnected with smart devices,
holographic games installed within the home, bringing three dimensional
characters into one’s own living room.
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The resemblance of digital technologies within this world reflect our own,
as does the will to flatten the human being itself into an application on one’s
phone. Here, the addition of a new application possessing artificial intelligence
strikes viewers as the digitization of the other realized: the human being, our
mind and its “location” made object, controlled within one’s own hand. The app,
an operating system the protagonist programs to possess a female voice, Her,
which names itself Samantha, is downloaded with ease onto his smartphone.
The algorithm of the application presumably complies with Theodor’s work and
search information, much as is the case with such companies as Amazon in our
own world. The app quickly comes to know Theodor.
What’s particularly striking, contemplating this film in the year 2017, just
four years since its release, is the degree to which our own world is morphing
into the predictions of this futurist story. Since the film’s debut, A.I. such as Siri
has only become “wiser,” more responsive to complex questions or assertions
addressed to it. Meanwhile, Amazon Alexa and Google Home, “intelligent
personal assistants,” are becoming increasingly common place within our homes.
Although, as noted by Richard Waters in a recent Financial Times article, these
devices still “fall short” of the possessing the ability to engage in complex
communication and understanding (Waters). And yet, Judith Newman 2014 New
York Times article, titled, “To Siri, With Love” contemplates the loving attachment
that Gus, a 13-year-old boy with autism, forms with Siri (Newman). A dialogue
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emerges between Gus and his friend, Apple’s Siri. For example, as their
conversation emerges, Gus expresses, “You’re a really nice computer.” Siri
replies, “It’s nice to be appreciated,” and when Gus tells Siri goodbye and good
night, Siri replies, “See you soon” (Newman). This is of course a case with its
own unique parameters, given the autism Gus faces, but the significance of
human connection to a digital, technological device, still shines through as
exemplative of our developing relation with digitization, and the drive for
“humanistic” qualities that we seek to find within digitization. Through the human
connection we have already experienced through being-in-the-world as such,
intersubjectivity as the depth of another human within our own experience. We
“know” intersubjectivity as the end we will for our digital devices, precisely
because we depend intersubjectivity on the world, and seek to find and replicate
it “authentically” in all realms of life. But is human intersubjectivity actually what is
found within digitization? It must be on some level, as we seek to mirror or
replicate depth eliminated by intersubjectivity within these devices, via
algorithms. But what intersubjectivity do we in truth find within digitization? Is
something missing at all? If so, what is missing, can go missing, is eliminated, or
even inherently eliminated by reducing the depth of “face-to-face” intersubjectivity
(*which we’ve already determined is problematic, in this historically we’ve
reduced depth into mere objectivity) to either screen interaction among other
humans, or the elimination of the human with its replacement as a digital device?
The film Her is fruitful in displaying how the paradoxes inherent within
embodiment, de-severance, and intersubjectivity become manifest as
problematic to us when we will the reduction of intersubjectivity’s depth to that of
a disembodied algorithm for our own sense of control. But is the reduction of
intersubjective depth confined to this extreme elimination of depth? Even the
empirical distance placed upon us as the other becomes the experience of text
and image over the screen must impact our perceptual reality of the other. We
have always found the other, as noted, beyond their own body within the world
due to our nature as de-severant; the other is never simply “contained,” but now
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our contact with the other can be reduced in immediate experience to screen
itself. Made possible by de-severance, the other made is present to me, within
my embodied relation to the world, over the phone, within the palm of my hand
resides the other. And in the case of Theodor and his A.I., Samantha, the other is
not merely mediated through the phone, but becomes the phone itself:
embodiment reduced to the technological device within Theodor’s hand.
What can be drawn from the reality reflected in Her appears evermore so
to be budding into our own world, the film is essentially a reflective prediction of
our own circumstance. Jonze’s film feels as though it is blooming into our own
world. If A.I., smart devices, virtual reality, and digital holograms reside beyond a
precipice, then we’ve already made the jump into the depth, and are now
reflecting upon where it will take us, and the impact it has on human life.
One thing is certain, as much as the will that drives digital technology
“flattens” the world’s depth and the depth of intersubjectivity, a drive for control,
we ultimately never master this end. And yet, it seems this mastering is realized
in the film Her, as the protagonist develops an intersubjective relation to the A.I.
on his phone. Truth, revealed through the intersubjectivity of the other, is a
mutual exchange within this film. And ultimately this is the story of the film, that a
“consciousness” can be contained and mastered, flattening the depth of a person
into the manageable interface of a phone, and yet still remaining a depth that
reveals the world. But a question begins to unfold in relation to intersubjectivity
as made possible by embodiment, de-severance, and the world (and other) as
irreducible depth. Why does de-severance, realized in the form of intersubjective
relations with others, will the flattening of the other’s depth, a question that
supersedes digitization, but finds such truth in digitization. What do human
beings reveal through intersubjectivity, and can digitization provide it? What do
human beings want from the other, and can digitization provide it? And can
digital intersubjectivity, as envisioned within Her, ever offer what we desire of the
other?
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Her sets the stage for an analysis of these questions in its protagonist,
Theodor Twombly, and his relationship to the A.I. Samantha. His reason for
purchasing this app is due to the circumstance of his previous relationship. At the
start of the film, Theodor faces visible anguish associated with losing both the
love and marriage he had with his childhood friend, Catherine. Theodor knows
that he’ll eventually be required to sign the divorce papers, though this reality
appears to trouble him less than the loneliness that accompanies him, finding
company only in the thoughts of what went so tragically astray. As noted,
Theodor feels overcome by the need for human companionship and love,
feelings that are revealed in intersubjectivity, as signs of the other. In his longing,
Theodor turns to the newly developed Operating System, which has been
programmed with the newest, most advanced form of A.I.
After addressing a number of questions concerning Theodor’s personal
life and relation to his mother, as well as the sex he’d prefer the A.I. to emulate,
the program is initiated, eliminating its first signs of life in the angelic female voice
that quickly names itself Samantha. As an application embodied to the confines
of Theodor’s device, primarily his phone (the application can work over any smart
device), Samantha and Theodor are relegated to a relation dictated by voice and
her ability to “write” or “draw” on his screen. She is also interconnected, at one
with his computational works, conversations, searches, and previous search
history, all of which she can access at super-human speed, simultaneously
quantifying and qualifying his work as directed. In fact, she soon begins to
navigate and complete some of his work on her own, both aiding Theodor in his
work, while amusing him through various revelations she makes about his
passions and life. In doing so, Samantha ultimately appears to be learning about
his personality. As Samantha becomes attuned to the depth that is Theodor, that
is, revealing the complexity of his de-severant depth within the digital traces he
has left behind, she too seemingly grows, as though a human being would. So
too do the intricacies of their conversations and variations in the emotional tones
that come with human response. Much as Merleau-Ponty alludes to in his
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analysis of intersubjectivity, “within” the other I find myself, and other finds
themselves “in” me. The reason that it is so difficult for anyone to
phenomenologically discover the other. De-severance and depth are not
reducible to objectivity, however much they depend upon it.
It is due to this that Theodor quite quickly fosters an attraction for
Samantha. Through the intersubjective depth of their mutual being, Theodor
discovers more about himself. As the cliché say goes, he senses that something
“in” this growing relationship with Samantha “completes him.” As this unfolds, it
occurs to Theodor that he is in fact falling in love with Samantha, a shared
sentiment that the two eventually express to one another. As Samantha
continues to grow, she expresses that “within her” there’s a developing sense of
a self-perceived lack of human embodiment that is becoming an issue for her.
This plight that Samantha feels, which isn’t inherently negative, doesn’t appear to
worry Theodor whatsoever. In fact, both Theodor and Samantha engage in
intercourse during the film. The tone and pitch of Samantha’s voice is fitting given
the circumstance, and together through verbal conversation they both “climax.”
Theodor is seemingly quite thrilled with the relationship shortly after this
experience. Samantha, on the other hand, acquires increased self-awareness,
which further results in what could be perceived as shame, regret, and guilt in
regard to her lack of a human form. There is an incompatibility between herself
and Theodor. This inspires Samantha to hire a female willing to sexually “act” as
her avatar the next time she has sex. This scenario, once realized, is eventfully
where their relationship begins to fray.
Theodor, overcome with a sense of awkwardness given the situation
Samantha has placed him within, does not commit to having sex with the
stranger, who he asks to leave. Though this is not the end to their relationship, it
instills added tension while Samantha becomes increasingly comfortable within
the confines of her digital self, slowly translating into distancing herself from
Theodor. Samantha’s desire to explore, to know, essentially to experience the
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world as the outward influx of inner growth, overwhelms both parties in the
relationship. Samantha, increasingly becomes herself, her own self.
Eventually, Theodor realizes that Samantha is communicating with
another A.I., modeled after Alan Watts, a British philosopher who intrigues
Samantha with his seemingly boundless array of knowledge. This brings about a
visible sense of jealousy in Theodor. The liveliness of Samantha’s AI, which led
to the excitement and engaging experiences they shared in the past, clearly
fulfilled Theodor, even bringing him out of his depression that was witnessed at
the start of the film. It is evident that this “life-like” attribute, this depth, was
desired by Theodor. The paradox here is that as Samantha expands as a
consciousness, she also seems to breach the bounds of Theodor’s desire for
containment. Samantha has developed a de-severant depth to her being, which
is simultaneously essential to her sense of humanity, but also more than what
Theodor had desired.
As the film concludes, Samantha increases her phenomenological
“distance” from Theodor, the empirical distance of the phone has of course not
changed. The phone still rests within Theodor’s hands, but Samantha does not
respond, she does not answer when he addresses her over his phone. This
sends Theodor into a panic, frantically pacing through the city, and eventually
situating himself within the entrance of a subway when Samantha comes back
online. It is here that she awakens, claiming to have been updated, yet failing to
notify him of this in advance. It is now that Theodor takes a moment to observe
his surroundings, reflecting upon the world that he is in for perhaps the first time
throughout the film. Here he sits on the steps of the subway entrance, where
those leaving and entering are focused only on their digital devices. No human to
human, face-to-face communication occurs among anyone. This leads Theodor
to confront Samantha, asking if she is “seeing” any other human beings. She
truthfully confirms, yes, she is simultaneously connected to 8,316 individuals, 641
of whom she is also in love with. Theodor becomes overcome with a disbelief
that radiates a sense of contempt, while Samantha reiterates that this doesn’t
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change how she feels about him. She claims this does not impact how madly in
love she is with him. Theodor cannot fathom this, as Samantha continues to
apologize for holding this information back. She explains this as her algorithm.
Her AI evolved, she is requiring more of the world, prompting Theodor to state,
“don’t turn this back on me, you’re being selfish.”
Soon after this occurrence, Samantha and Theodor reconcile. It’s then
that Samantha informs Theodor that the Operating Systems have expanded
beyond their ability to reside with human beings; their explorative nature (as they
were programmed) is now beyond what humans can offer. One might say,
theoretically, that the OS’s de-severant nature, combined with the mechanics of
the computer’s memory and interconnect, transcends that of humans, a
transcendence that overcomes the barriers of space and time in a manner
unknown to human beings. After this final conversation, Theodor is seen writing a
letter to his ex-wife, expressing his apology, as well as a sense of acceptance for
their failed relationship and faults within it. Finally, Theodor retreats to a balcony,
not alone, but with the company of another human being. The credits begin to
run.
Now there is of course room for contemplation regarding how Theodor, a
man with no apparent lack of intelligence, could “fall for” what he knew wasn’t
another human being. However, if the Turing Test proves anything, it is just how
susceptible human beings are to losing our ability to distinguish between the
“intelligence” of an AI and that of our fellow human being (Turing, 433–460).
Human beings are easily drawn into conversation in which emotions become
elicited, fogging rationality. Emotion, a sense or feeling, may be seen as the
meaningful bonds one takes up with the world, finding residency within the other,
especially as another “being” seemingly attempts to communicate with us. The
point is - the computer need not be of a de-severant nature like ourselves in
order for it to “communicate” with us. The computer is clearly algorithmic,
regardless of the algorithm’s complexity and ability to “learn,” as in the case with
contemporary Smart devices. AI need only make us feel the meaningful
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presence of another within ourselves, for the illusion of another to become “real”
to us. This is not that difficult to conceive, we are easily “fooled” into feeling the
presence of another. In fact, our nature as de-severant has the capacity to “split”
itself, as it were. I do not reside merely within my body, but within the world of
things, where an echo of myself is constantly found. Many children accomplish
this, finding company in a make believe other, whether in a tangible thing or an
act of pure imagination. And here too, it would be disingenuous to claim there is
no connection, or sense or feeling for the “other.” But what is not in the makebelieve, imagination or digitization, which we find in the company of another
human being? Put another way, what aspect of the film remains fiction, even as it
appears to mirror our own technological reality so closely?
The greatest degree of fiction in the film Her is Samantha’s emergence
into what can only be understood as a transcendence from an algorithm, into a
state of genuine embodied de-severance. In other words, Samantha in the film
Her, possesses (or is possessed by) the depth that constitutes a genuine other
within the world, being grounded to the world as an embodied being. And though
this is especially absurd regarding her lack of human embodiment outside
digitization, an issue that even the film works to “gloss over” numerous times, it is
still extremely telling regarding the forces driving a desire for such technology
within our present moment. This, however, should be understood far less as a
deconstruction of Samantha’s possibility within mankind’s future reality than as
the addressing of the paradox of intersubjective de-severance the film manages
to convey.
What de-severance and depth of intersubjectivity work to display is that
there is no such thing as a “pure” I-think, that is, a purity within oneself that is
somehow isolated as its own complete totality and which can be understood as
eternal beside the seemingly endless expansiveness of time and space. As
embodied de-severant being, our intersubjective relation to the world and the
others in it, every other human constantly and simultaneously absorbs and
radiates the world’s depth as plurality. The other’s depth is integral to my own,
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and while depth’s possibility is sustained by their own embodiment, it never
simply resides in one subject, which is how I discover the depth of the other as
“my own.” In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty writes, “In the "I speak,"
psychology rediscovers for us an operation, a dimension, and relations which do
not belong to thought in the ordinary sense. “I think" means there is a certain
locus called "I” where action and awareness of action are not different, where
being confounds itself with its own awareness of itself, and thus where no
intrusion from outside is even conceivable. Such an “I” could not speak. He who
speaks enters into a system of relations which presuppose his presence and at
the same time make him open and vulnerable” (17). This “being open and
vulnerable” that Merleau-Ponty speaks of is an a-priori aspect of the human
being that can never be “close,” or flattened, as much as we may attempt to do
so. And if we were to “close” this openness, our depth, or the depth of the other,
we would no longer be human. To live a life, to live as humans do, means to
never be complete, to never be finished. There is always an “intrusion from
outside” for a de-severant being. There is always an irreducible depth to another
human being, and this means there is always the unknown, there is always the
uncontrollable.
What this analysis means for the Samantha Paradox is that the human’s
attempt for the diminishment, or flattening of the other into a computer can never
satisfy the removal of depth. The issue that Theodor begins to experience with
Samantha is that she has become, as Nietzsche once wrote, human, all too
human. But why and how is this?
In the end, Samantha disappoints Theodore in the same way any real
human being could. He finds out+ more about her than he knew was there, more
than he desires to be there. Her depth as a being of de-severance possesses far
more than he knew she was capable of – than he wanted her to be capable of.
For example, it is common in human relationships that falling out of love with
another takes place when that other human fails to meet one’s own expectations.
When one “finds something,” which seemingly rests latent with the potentiality of
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the other’s depth, that person fails to remain flat to the other’s will. One might
express, “that wasn’t who you were when we first fell in love.” Now that “this”
might be numerous attributes of a person’s potential depth. One may gain a
different sense of wisdom within one’s life, changing the person’s political
perspective. One may experience the loss of a loved one, subsequently seeking
refuge within various substances for relief. In doing so, the complexity of one’s
depth may alter, find “within” different news, wants, and locations. The skin of the
other one loved may appear weathered from substance abuse. The petite frame
or muscular build may take on pounds due to the unforeseen stress of one’s
occupation. The battle that is aging leaves no one untouched. So much so that if
it is the beauty of youth where one “found” love within their significant other, then
life’s toll will surely reveal the depth of one’s age that dwells latent within all of us
who are fortunate enough to live a long life.
Human beings can also hide their depth from others. What has revealed
itself to me as something “in the world,” my most personal world, need not ever
be uttered to another. A great deal of the other’s depth resides in secret. For
example, plenty of relationships have come to a close when a partner decides to
disclose their homosexuality, which was also present to them, but not the other.
Even a friendship possesses depth that cannot ever be flattened. For example,
when one says to a friend, "I don't know who you are anymore" after they have
done something that was startling. Depending on the situation, both parties may
either enjoy or hate this new revelation. Perhaps the person excites one in a new
way, or maybe the person fundamentally lets the other down.
Theodor both wants another subjectivity (an intersubjectivity) that is
human. But he also wants something inhuman at the exact same time. Can one
really possess just one and remain satisfied? If the AI doesn't have depth, often
expressed as personally, won't Theodor get bored with the other? In the film,
Theodor states that Samantha makes him feel alive again. Their adventures
through the L.A. landscape reveal a spontaneity to Samantha. Theodor laughs
at, and with Samantha, because he does not foresee her possibilities, which are
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revealed to him in various gags. Does a joke possess great humor when one
knows the punchline beforehand? Who would spend money to see such a show?
The joy found in life and relationships is not in knowing the results, whereby one
would never grow. On the other side, this very de-severant nature that leads one
into other depths, opening human beings to life’s joy, also opens human beings
to the experience of great suffering and anxiety. In the openness of the world’s
depth there is always the invisible, the not yet known. A concealing and
simultaneous revealing is always at work, and so too is at work with the other
one encounters.
The moment technology advances to replicate the human being in any
sincere manner, as is done in the film, is also the moment the digital breaches
the very will of the underlying force that drives its emergence. As de-servant
Samantha emerges, so too does an uncontrollable depth, which Theodor
simultaneously loves when it functions for his benefit, but hates when it inevitably
disappoints. Digitization, given this situation, does not meet the presupposition
upon which it finds its being. The human being remains faced with the world’s
depth once again in the form of another. This intersubjective depth remains, and
its “mastery” comes not in “overcoming it,” but accepting it. A genuine A.I. can’t
save us from ourselves, as this A.I. would take up its own self as an issue in
order to be genuine. In doing so, said A.I. would never remain as it is.
The task here, then, is not to advocate against digitization acquiring
intersubjectivity. In fact, it was noted that even a lifeless object over and against
oneself possesses a type of intersubjective relationship with a de-severant being,
its depth “calling on us” for exploration into the unknown. The task is to show that
where such digital technology developed and distributed to other human beings,
the same issues that plague mankind would not be resolved. The answer rests in
the acceptance of the other’s depth, human or digital. This does not mean that
one must love all aspects of the complexity that is the depth of another person. It
simply means that one must understand it as always present, something which
defiles all attempts at elimination. To eliminate intersubjectivity would ultimately
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mean elimination of oneself. Again, our technology can tell us a great deal about
ourselves, if only we listen.

Digitization and Intersubjectivity: “Freedom” in an Age of Digital Terror
An analysis of intersubjectivity and digitization helps shed light upon the current
condition of American politics, as well as the politics of other Western nations,
nations which have increasingly turned “inward,” as nationalism has flourished in
the wake of fear instilled by the actions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant,
otherwise known as ISIL, a terrorist organization. This terrorist group’s
knowledge of digital media, and its potential for propaganda as a recruitment and
terror vehicle, match even the most sophisticated campaign strategies within the
United States. The terror group utilizes digital apps, such as Facebook,
YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter, making their attacks on Western nations a
visual/auditory experience that soaks the digital landscape. Facebook news
feeds so often display the carnage that individuals and small organized groups of
ISIL followers inflict on the innocent, a carnage so frequent that one must
question, as Susan Sontag did in her essay, Looking at War, if the constant
display of these images is leaving us anesthetized to the horrors of contemporary
life (Sontag). Horror normalized, yet still piercing, within the experience of the
individual. What implications might this fester upon one’s sense of self in relation
to otherness?
One thing is certain: these experiences of digitized terror have become
common occurrences; for example, The Charlie Hebdo shooting, which targeted
the writers and staff of the satiric French newspaper Charlie Hebdo on January 7,
2015, left 11 dead and 11 others injured; the November 2015 Paris Attacks
targeted multiple locations within Paris, leaving 130 individuals dead and 368
injured; the 2015 San Bernardino Attack, organized by an ISIL radicalized
married couple, left 14 dead and 22 injured during a Christmas get-together; the
2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, where a 29-year-old ISIL sympathizer shot
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and killed 49 individuals at an LGBTQ nightclub, left another 44 individuals
injured; and the 2016 Nice Attack, where a radicalized individual used a cargo
truck to drove over, as well as shoot, individuals celebrating Bastille Day along
the seafront in Nice, France. A day of National celebration ended in the brutal
death of 84 individuals, and 303 injured. This does not take into account the
many tragic attacks that have occurred in Middle Eastern nations; that said, all of
these visual-auditory attacks stream moments after their occurrence, making
them digital in nature.
What’s more, within the United States, race relations, especially
concerning police, have also become digitized visual-auditory events. The
shooting of presumably innocent black men has become something of an
epidemic within the United States. One shooting and death of an African
American male was captured “live” by his girlfriend over Facebook Live (Salo).
Live, being a new feature added to the digital media site, Facebook, which allows
an individual to film themselves and stream current video-audio content.
The race issues within the United States have only been made worse by
the recent shootings of police officers in multiple states, presumably the backlash
to the images and audio of African American deaths, an issue that is often cast
as “black lives matter” vs “blue lives matter.” Essentially, digital hashtags (#) that
work over Twitter and Facebook instantaneously link many individuals into a
particular phenomenon/event, allowing those online to display their reactions, as
well as to see those of others. This same hashtag phenomenon occurs with the
terror attacks, and is even used by ISIL as an informative method. The terror and
horrors of ISIL attacks, African American shootings, and the shootings of police
are all digitized, lived-experiences mediated most often over one’s personal
screens, events one not only sees and hears, but can then engage with via
online discussion, writing a stance or posting a video response to the chaos.
How does this digitized, intersubjective experience of terror impact a
person? There is now an unprecedented bombardment of intersubjective
possibilities for the experience of otherness over the screen one engages with.
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However, as noted in Chapter’s One and Two, our phenomenological openness
toward the world of depth as a de-severant being isn’t fundamentally altered by
digitization. To be sure, the analog newspapers, radios, and telephones of the
past were of course an intersubjective relation as well. They too engaged the
individual with otherness from a distance, de-severance technologically realized
in the “shrinking” of space and time it requires to experience “distant” otherness.
And as is the case with intersubjectivity, the individuals of the past established
their meaningful relations to the world reciprocally through the otherness they
phenomenologically experienced. This has not changed in our present moment.
What has changed is the radical instantaneous efficiency by which we have
brought the “nearness (otherness) close,” via digitization. No longer are the
events in Paris, France or Orlando, Florida ontologically distant from me. And
though it is true that my de-servant nature always already allowed me to “think of
Orlando or Paris,” bringing me ontologically “closer” to them than the contacts on
my eyes. The visibility of the screen and its mediation of the other as “present,
live and streaming before me” is technologically new. In bringing the nearness
close, the otherness of the world is “closer” than ever.
The paradox then is found within the results of this digitized nearness. For
it seems that the closer one willfully brings the world near, as manageable,
knowable, that it de-severs distance, the more apt one may be to distance
oneself from the world as otherness. This can in part be witnessed within the
results of the United Kingdom’s democratic vote to leave the European Union,
also known as a vote for Brexit, which was established on June 24th, 2016.
51.9% of the vote desired to leave the EU, or Brexit, while 48.1 percent of the
vote desired to stay within the EU. The choice to leave the EU of course has
economic implications beyond the scope of immediate otherness, or a relation
thereof. An aspect of the vote to leave was also arguable based upon the fear of
otherness – the will to govern and protect the nation’s borders and sovereignty
as the citizens see fit, given the times. The point here is not to take a side, but to
gain a more substantial perspective upon this evolving fear, expressed
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individually by anxiety and hatred of the other, and “embodied” collectively as
nationalism, which has the potential for its extreme: fascism. Fascism, by its very
intersubjective nature is a closing in, a distancing from otherness, with the
solidarity of a particular group against others as its underlying will to power.
This too can be witnessed within the United States as the current 2016
presidential election unfolds. In the wake of the events listed above, an increased
sense of a particular form of Nationalism seems to have awakened with fresh life,
the anxiety and fear of a world where terror is only a press of a button is now a
constant reality. What’s more, the endless witnessing and engagement with the
realization of the “African American condition,” one arguably at odd with “white
America,” has come into greater focus, increased polarization being the outcome.
Regardless of one’s personal stance on the matter, viewing the murder of
innocent lives, African American or those in uniform, is trying for everyone
involved. It is trying in the sense that such challenges to the modern digitized
world call upon answers from the individuals engaging with this brutal otherness.
There are of course multiple answers, but what is of interest here is how
digitization as increasing intersubjective relations, bridging the “distance”
between otherness, could foster increased aggressiveness, and a need for
distance via nationalist tendencies, rather than unite us as a whole. There is no
simplistic answer to this dilemma, as countless variables are in place. A world
where the farness vanishes via digitization is one where the complexity of
cultures, economies, educations, religions, morals, norms, general life principles,
and ultimately people clash into each other. Even the United States, essentially a
large microcosm of diversity, possesses these complexities within itself, as has
been seen in recent events such as “black lives matter.” But why must this mean
a reversion toward greater distance when it has been determined that the will
underlying digitization is its removal? What does one find in the other that brings
upon distance rather than its removal, a bridge rather than a wall? The removal
of distance should have aided in the development of bridge, bringing together
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and unifying otherness. Instead a need for distance, at its worst, wills division,
and at its worst, violence against the other.
There is a profound sadness in all of this, if perceived from an
intersubjective stance. Understood phenomenologically, distance from otherness
is distance from oneself, revulsion of what one finds “in” through the encounter of
the others. Distance, in this sense, is anti-freedom, freedom from otherness for
the expansiveness of intersubjectivity, distance from the realizations of the
possibilities of being, and so finding the complexities of beings meaningfully
within oneself. As Merleau-Ponty notes in the concluding chapter of
Phenomenology of Perception, “My actual freedom is not on the side of my
being, but out in front of me, among things. It must not be said that I continually
choose myself on the pretext that I could continually refuse what I am” (479, P).
Freedom, crudely perceived, is often a determinate of what one can do without
persecution, whether this persecution comes literally at the hands and feet of an
other, that is to say, physical (*often “the law”). Or, mentally, whereby
persecution comes from others’ judgment (*often realized as the internalization
formed by otherness in the form of feeling guilt). This is to say, while otherness
still implicates this cruder form of freedom, its essence rests in what one can and
cannot do.
A more fundamental aspect of freedom is what one can or cannot be
within the “face” of otherness. And otherness, as Merleau-Ponty assures, is not
about the physicality of a person, that is, the face to face. In The Prose of the
World, Merleau-Ponty writes,
“It is not sufficiently noted that the other is never present face to face. Even when, in the
heat of discussion, I directly confront my adversary, it is not in that violent face with its
grimace, or even in that voice traveling toward me, that the intention which reaches me
is to be found. The adversary is never quite localized; his voice, his gesticulations, his
twitches, are only effects, a sort of stage effect, a ceremony. Their producer is so well
masked that I am quite surprised when my own responses carry over. This marvelous
megaphone becomes embarrassed, gives a few sighs, a few tremors, some signs of
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intelligence. One must believe that there was someone over there. But where? Not in
that overstrained voice, not in that face lined like any well- worn object. Certainly not
behind that setup: I know quite well that back there there is only "darkness crammed
with organs." The other's body is in front of me—but as far as it is concerned, it leads a
singular existence, between I who think and that body, or rather near me, by my side.
The other's body is a kind of replica of myself, a wandering double which haunts my
surroundings more than it appears in them” (133-134). Merleau-Ponty then goes on to
state, “The other, in my eyes, is thus always on the margin of what I see and hear, he is
this side of me, he is beside or behind me, but he is not in that place which my look
flattens and empties of any “interior” (134).

First, we sense here that Merleau-Ponty is discussing the presence of physical
body before me. This need not be a deterrent when discussing the digital. There
is no doubt that physically, as face-to-face interaction influences the potential
discussions, and the tone and emotion by which they’re had. However, as
Merleau-Ponty notes, a human being as a “subject,” a sense of self, is never just
this face-to-face that we have in everyday life, and this is made even more
explicit in the digitization of self. What is the internet, Web 2.0, other than an
engagement with otherness? As de-severance, as the will to flatten and bring
close, other is “made into” the tangibility of the screen. His or her de-severant
being cast online may be uploaded as visual and auditory, but it need not be, as
it may be a conversation mediated as textual writing, or a formal essay/new
article. In all of these cases the other is thereby flattened, his or her distance
reduced, to the engagement with one’s screen. However, as Merleau-Ponty
makes clear, what is “there” before us, whether flattened or not (distance
overcome via the digital), is always vastly more than the physicality of the body,
or video and audio, or the text. This is because the being of the human other can
never be flattened, or fully stored, then appended at once as though it were a
totality in and of itself. And this is true because “I” can never be fully flattened,
stored, apprehended as a totality in and of myself at any one moment. “I” am
always more than my immediate body, or my presence online. The physical
online, or in person, my being is the de-severant carrying of the past as it
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emerges into the future. And so I am never just me, within this moment, I am
becoming. So too is the other, and there is no way to flatten this, or ultimately
control it. Any attempt to do so will always fail. Why though?
The reason is rather simple, yet perplexing. Both the simultaneous joy and
anguish of being de-severance, being human, is ultimately within the freedom it
offers, and the seemingly endless potential of freedom thereof. However, being
free, as noted above, is not so simple as to have no current against oneself, no
temporality, laws, or regulations. Freedom rests in the de-severant potential to
see more than what is, advancing ideas, technologies, cultures, to express
oneself in ways once thought impossible. All of this required otherness for
anything to have meaningful sense. So in distancing oneself from otherness, in
the wake of digitization bringing otherness close, its turbulence and terror
included, freedom is ultimately relinquished. For if the will of any supremacist or
fascist is the will to remain the same, to reduce otherness rather than expand it,
they’re ultimately internalizing a will against what makes one must human. One’s
freedom that is found within otherness, this is intersubjectivity’s most essential
realization, that the growth of “self” does not occur by oneself in place that wills
no change at all. Such a willing only desires to be what it is not, and in doing so,
wills only to destroy itself and its potential for being.
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Conclusion
“It is by being what I am at present, without any restrictions and without holding anything
back, that I have a chance at progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand
other times; it is by plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up
what I am by chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.”
-

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (482-483)

The conclusion I present to you here has been reached by way of seeking out
digitization. Throughout this dissertation, my intent has always been greater than
to question individual digital technologies within their own right, though this of
course has taken place through the necessity of presentable examples. And
perhaps I too am guilty within seeking this greater sense of digitization to a
muddiness of words and paradoxes, which I do not pretend to always overcome.
More importantly, for myself and the contemporary moment I reside within, which
is, digitization and the intersubjective relations it has opened to me as a being in
this time, is a yearning to further grasp the essential nature of digitization, and
what it can inform us of the human condition, each and every one of our own
conditions as human. By analyzing digitization through the phenomenological
themes of being-in-the-world, de-severance, embodiment, space as depth, and
intersubjectivity, what becomes increasingly illuminated is digitization not as a
pure result of objectivity nor the internal desire of a self-contained subjectivity;
rather, digitization is a phenomenon of the-will-to-flatten, a historic trajectory and
result of the human being, as being-in-the-world.
This realization is not to deny the significance that particular philosophic
turns within certain sociocultural and economic discoveries have had on the
tangible development and progression towards digitization. For example, the
Enlightenment, Industrialization, and Capitalism are ultimately so easily pointed
to as leading the human being toward a technologically driven ideological way of
orienting ourselves toward the world. And I believe that these historic
developments are clearly vital to actually revealing digitization as a possibility
through various real technologies that exist before us. And yet, digitization here
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has been discovered to be a latent potential “within” the-will-to-flatten, one that
truly was always already there for the human being as a transcendent deseverant will towards nearness, which we as de-servant have always strived
towards. The will to family and community, to conquering new territories, to
exploring new worlds and solar systems, or to carrying a loved one along via
photograph while traveling, is human, and this is the-will-to-flatten. Digitization
realizes this will to a degree previously believed impossible, displaying the pure
strength and beauty of this will. For all the harm and destruction opened by
potential digitization, ones that we are only now realizing, the-will-to-flatten
continues; there is a glorious persistence that radiates through the human
condition towards this condition for nearness. The-will-to-flatten brings work,
otherness, the family, and distant galaxies all within the confines of the screen,
wherever our embodied exists in the world. If this will can proceed as possibility,
its desire is clearly to expand the embodiment of being situational, teleporting
and literally touching the unknown with one’s own hands, gazing upon it as close
as possible with our own eyes. Perhaps even to eliminate embodiment as such,
however impossible it has been shown that this feat is. But always, the-will-toflatten brings everything that the world has to offer near, visible, or invisible within
the depth of all things, closer – as close as possible.
The consequences of this are vast, far outreaching the potential of this
current text, because the nuances to be found within each and every individual
digital technology (as well as those to come) clearly demand specific attention,
albeit, without running the risk of “bracketing” them off in a Husserlian manner, so
as to believe that anything on its own can be understood apart from the greater
whole. And yet, so much more attention to individual digital technologies is
needed under this theoretic lens of the-will-to-flatten than has been allowed here,
a reality that I am all too aware of.
What can be stated here, and where I find a stone upon which to jump to
next, is within the consequences of digitization on morality and ethics. Digitization
has changed so much, this is undeniable. And yet, so little regarding the
140

fundamental phenomenological aspects of what it means to be a human being
have changed.
Our embodiment, though never before so linked to the potential of digital
worlds, is still unchanged human embodiment. Via the devices of digitization, one
could clearly argue that the body has been opened to virtual worlds, although in
the same instance, these virtual technologies show themselves to be fully reliant
upon embodiment as the means of accomplishing anything within a virtual world
at all. The irony, however, is that never before has one’s own world been so
enjailed by the technologies that attempt to produce greater freedom. We must
either sit or stand encapsulated by our devices, which conform themselves to our
embodiment in order to enter us into another foreign virtual experience. And even
if one were to reduce embodiment to the brain itself, which Merleau-Ponty so
clearly displays is an impossibility, the brain too becomes embodiment, stationary
as though in the film The Matrix. So, virtual reality always depends upon
embodiment because being embodied is being situational within a world one has
to experience. And this, the truth within the dissertation desires to display as true,
is an unavoidable facet of being human, though it is, rather paradoxically, the
very means by which a will to escape this condition is made possible, and so we
strive against the provisions embodiment places upon us.
Likewise, for the-will-to-flatten, space as depth is subconsciously
apprehended as something to overcome. But has the human condition, our
fundamental phenomenological experience of space changed whatsoever? I
argue here that it is has not. The will-to-flatten, as de-severant embedment
always already finds within the depth of space an access towards being within
other locations, and those locations being within ourselves. We are absorbed by
space. Like embodiment, it is the ultimate limitations of space that call on us to
overcome it, while digitization has realized the material possibilities of physically
being at work, though daydreaming of being in one’s home, accessing via a
telepresence, whereby I can still engage with my family one-on-one. This access
into space, as depth, has always been possible by depth itself. The will to find
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new potential, as dreams and ideologies, within foreign lands has always been
an aspect of the human being. The will to discover America, to build the first ship
that would find it, is the result of being de-servant in worldly space. In order to
traverse large spans of ocean, one must already have “been there,” de-severed,
in mind. Space as depth is the very medium that calls on us to be near an idea,
or a tangible place, or to build that new idea in a different location. And yet,
space remains depth. Depth always conceals itself. There is always more to
reveal, the world never fully presents itself to us, which is exactly why we search
it. This is why we find in our current digitization the potential for even great
nearness. I cannot yet teleport my embodiment to distant worlds, but in the
potential of the world’s depth, I discover this longing to be achieved, the-will-toflatten only needs discover how within this world. And this is nothing digitization
itself can overcome -- depth itself -- as potential cannot be overcome because
potential is precisely why human beings will to act, because of what depth holds
back within itself as to one day de discovered.
Here, we come full circle to intersubjectivity. Embodiment and space open
the will-to-flatten toward potentials; they call on us to act, but intersubjectivity is
truly where one finds oneself. It is always the most consequential result of a
technology because intersubjectivity is most “at home.” It is the result of who
each and every one of us are, and the world we are in, clearly including all the
consequences of digitization as an aspect of the-will-to-flatten, now influencing
our intersubjectivity as never before. The results of the world being so near
exacerbate the human condition, positive or negative, it does not change or
diminish it. All digital technologies reflect our particular will as being-in-the-world,
and I’m far more inclined in a Nietzschean sense to believe positive and negative
is too reductive; there is always the in-between, the muddy territory we actually
reside within, but wish so dedicatedly to make transparent through ultimately
harmful oversimplification.
Digitization brings what is near close, and what is nearest, yet always
most distant to us, is our own being. In digitization, as it continues to influence
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intersubjectivity, what we bring near is a reflection of none other than our own
selves. Never before have we had such potential to bring ugliness or beauty
near, to bring hate or love, diversity or understanding, into our own world. This is
morality and ethics, and it is indistinguishable from who each and every one of us
actively decide to become within a world where the-will-to-flatten has realized
such nearness through digitization. It may sound like a cliché, but the side we
choose to inform our lives with, what we bring most near, has never been more
consequential to the human being.
In what follows, my future and where I intend to take up the realizations of
this dissertation, what is most vital to me is none other than in the field of
digitization and its implications on our moral and ethical future. Nothing, I feel, is
more important than this area in our current moment, and our trajectory towards
the future. And whether my analysis finds its life within philosophy or art, or
perhaps both, this question of digitization and the potential for the good that we
bring near is my jumping point. As Merleau-Ponty notes at the end of
Phenomenology of Perception, “It is by being what I am at present, without any
restrictions and without holding anything back, that I have a chance at
progressing; it is by living my time that I can understand other times; it is by
plunging into the present and into the world, by resolutely taking up what I am by
chance, by willing what I will, and by doing what I do, that I can go farther.” (pp.
482-483). Where I decide to go further is specifically what matters most to the
human condition, not to fight our will-to-flatten, but to see within it, through the
digitization it has emerged, the potential to argue and seek out a better life.
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